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SUMMARY
This thesis presents the product of the research into the comparative marketing strategies of
competing American, British and Japanese companies in the UK market. These companies
were drawn from the audio/hi-fl, ball bearing, machine tools, microwave ovens and
photocopier industries.
A.	 The aims of the research were: 
i) to investigate and compare a matched sample of subsidiaries of the three
national parent companies to discover whether there were significant
differences in the way that these subsidiaries went about their business of
marketing;
ii) to identify which marketing applications, supported by behavioural and
organisational differences, contributed to the achievement of effective
marketing strategies;
iii) to examine headquarters-subsidiary relationships regarding the extent of
overseas headquarter's support for its UK subsidiary's marketing operations;
and
iv) to discover whether there were any pointers to change which would be
beneficial in the marketing organisation or operations of UK firms seeking to
improve their marketing strategies and performances in these industries.
Suitable hypotheses indicated by possible gaps in the literature review were prepared
for investigation and testing in order to achieve these aims. The literature review
discussed in this thesis also highlighted the difficulties faced by UK firms and the
challenges posed by overseas companies in the changed international business
conditions from the 1980s to 1991.
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B.	 The h%nollieses developed for the UK research were:-
Hypothesis 1:	 Successful companies are oriented to market share rather than
short-term profits.
Hypothesis 2:
	
Successful companies demonstrate greater orientations to new
environmental opportunities.
Hypothesis 3:	 Successful companies pursue fast market adaption rather than
innovation.
Hypothesis 4:
	
Successful companies are more aggressive in their use of
marketing tactics.
Hypothesis 5:
	 Organisation, planning and control are more informal in
successful firms.
Hypothesis 6:
	
Entrepreneurship and experimentation are stronger in market-
focussed than in functionally organised structures.
The hypotheses developed for the overseas field research in the USA and Japan 
were:- 
Hypothesis 7:	 Effective marketing is a factor of critical importance in
asserting the successful global competition of firms.
Hypothesis 8:	 Ethnocentricity is a barrier to successful global competition.
Hypothesis 9: Successful firms clearly focus marketing strategies at targeted
opportunities in national markets and develop global
advantages.
Hypothesis 10: Globally successful firms are stronger market and technological
innovators and investors with less dependence on low pricing
to sustain market entry.
Hypothesis 11: Successful organisations encourage closer parent-subsidiary
relationships, and maintain greater scrutiny and evaluation of
their subsidiaries' marketing performances.
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The 'Prior Research' (chapter 4) investigated differences in the marketing
performances of American, British and Japanese firms. In selecting the hypotheses
for this thesis, it had to be decided whether the hypotheses should postulate better
performances in terms of a national classification of firms or whether firms should be
assessed on 'success' regardless of nationality. The 'Prior Research findings' made it
clear that 'better performance' or 'success' was not limited to a nation's firms even
though there were more Japanese firms with better marketing performances.
Therefore the hypotheses for this thesis's research referred to "Successful
companies 	 " instead of stating that "Japanese companies are better than American
or British ones in....".
The cross tabulations and cluster analysis were applied to the data relating to all the
firms under the headings of nationality because of the comparative nature of the
research. But the results showed that the effectiveness of marketing strategies was
spread over firms of each of the three nationalities. Not all the Japanese firms
excelled and some are found in the American and British clusters which were weaker
in their marketing performances. The research analyses sought to pinpoint areas of
successful marketing strategies of firms. The postulating of the hypotheses is intended
to demonstrate what marketing practices appear to lead to this success.
In the international marketing hypotheses, hypothesis 10 was a logical development
from hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7 sought to establish the existence of marketing
functions in companies and their relevance to the efficacy of the companies in
promoting and sustaining their positions as global competitors. Specifically this had
to be linked to their sales, profits and market shares because they were essential for
corporate growth and survival. It was necessary to examine and assess the variations
in the internally percieved importance of marketing to the competitive stances of
companies in their pursuit of greater shares in world markets. Hypothesis 10 differed
because it specifically concentrated on whether successful firms were strong
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strong innovators in their marketing and product development. Such firms may
therefore focus less on reactive and defensive short-term pricing policies as only one
element of their marketing mix to sustain their market presence. Hamel and Prahalad
(1985) stated that international competitiveness should not be merely seen as low cost
manufacturing in order to compete on low prices. Dunning and Pearce (1985) saw the
presence and investment of multinationals as having a good effect on the efficiency of
domestic firms by raising the standards of productivity, technology and management
quality of domestic firms.
In order to test the hypotheses, the method of investigation included field research
with the sampled companies in the UK, the USA and Japan. Two semi-structured
questionnaires, one for the UK and one for the overseas research, were used to cover
the areas of the hypotheses. These generated qualitative and quantitative responses
which were analysed and compared, using the cluster analysis and chi-square
methods. The cooperation of the companies in the sample had been gained through
the promise of confidentiality and the availability of published papers derived from
the research results.
The respondent firms were asked questions related to the elements of the marketing
strategy formalised in Figure IA. The extent to which their answers reflected either
the whole or parts of this strategy were used to determine the intensity of their market
focus.
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Identification of the firms' markets
Attraction and importance of UK markets.
UK growth opportunities in existing and new
markets, technologies and products.
UK consumer & industrial demand for American,
British and Japanese products.
Internal Environment
Firms' goals & resources
(eg.managerial)
Firms' ability to respond to
marketing opportunities & threats.
Figure IA Research into the Comparative Marketing Strategies of American, British
and Japanese Companies.
Analyses of American, British & Japanese firms and
their strategic focus
External Envirmunent
Political-economic factors
Competitive-technological factors.
Business practices
Cultural-social-ethnic factors
Strategic fit and the firms' setting of
marketing objectives
Development of market strategies 
Products, services & their mix.
Pricing objectives & tactics
Distribution
Advertising, promotion & personal selling
Production capability
Organisation and implementation
C.	 The main findings relevant to the hypotheses in the UK study are presented in (a)
and (b) arid those for the overseas studies are presented in (c) below.
a) Hypotheses 1,2,4 and 6 were supported.
Successful companies pursued market share for long term strategic
considerations rather than concentrating on short-run profit maximisation.
This meant the deployment of marketing and technical capabilities in support
of the strategic focus on developing long term competitive advantages such as
strength in product innovation, manufacture, effective product positioning and
segmentation. Such deployment encouraged entrepreneurship and
experimentation in market focussed companies.
b) Hypotheses 3 and 5 were not supported.
The successful companies were amongst the market leaders and did not have
to pursue fast market adaption rather than innovation to be in a position to
compete with other competitors. The successful companies were able to
combine innovatory product and production expertise with a strong consumer
orientation to stay competitive. Their organisation, planning and control
procedures were not more informal as there existed a mixture of fomial and
informal planning to support the strategic focus of their business.
C) The five hypotheses (7-11) in the overseas study were supported. Global
competitiveness was enhanced by the commitment to marketing with the
continuous deployment of organisational resources to key subsidiary
operations. The companies which exhibited higher ethnocentric orientations
to marketing found themselves less effective in targeting opportunities in
overseas markets and keeping ahead in the drive for market supremacy.
Despite the homogeneity or non-homogeneity of company employees,
globally competitive companies were found to encourage closer headquarters
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subsidiary relationships and greater involvement in the scrutiny and evaluation
of subsidiaries' marketing performances.
D. A summary of the research activities has been given in Figure 1B in order to clarify
the direction and the important aspects covered in the research. Figure 1B is not
intended to show the exact progression of the research as many of the tasks were
ongoing ones, for example, the information search on companies and industries, the
interviews with companies, and the evaluation of results in the light of learning
experiences.
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Initial Research Stages
Examination of aims and prior research
Selection of sample of companies
Information search on companies and industries
Literature search
Generation of hypotheses
1
Establishment of Research Criteria
Development of research methodology
Construction of questionnaire and interview topics
Consideration of firms marketing and organisation
Field Research Activities
Contact with company, trade and government
organisations.
Arrangement and conduct of personal interviews
Interviews in the UK
1985- 1986
Interviews in the USA
1987
Interviews in Japan
1988
Field Analyses
Evaluation of UK and overseas research results
Test of hypotheses
Findings and conclusions
Recommendations for firms
Figure I B A Summary of the research activities
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Figure 1B showed that the field research activities were conducted in the UK from the
end of 1985 to 1986, the USA in 1987 and Japan in 1988. The major reason for this
was that the interviews with the sampled companies in each country required months
of advanced planning and communication between the researcher and the companies
before the interviews could take place. For the interviews in Japan, clearance and
assistance for the research were sought from JETRO, London and MITI, Japan before
the companies were contacted. Time and cost contraints on the author meant that the
research phases were carried out in different years. It was recognised that
macroeconomic conditions would have changed in the countries which might have an
effect on the comparability of the research results. While it was acknowledged that
this was a limitation of the research plan, the author took the view that the overall
economic figures in the UK, USA and Japan showed consistent trends allowing for
the comparability of the research results. Hence the examination of Table 1A.
Table IA from the Financial Times (1990) showed that exports in Ecu billions for the
UK dropped from 132.4 in 1985 to 108.3 in 1986. In these two years, the visible trade
balance worsened from -5.7 to -14.2 caused by a combination of factors such as
consumer spending, low savings and high imports. The current account balance
dropped from 4.7 to -0.3. Compared to the USA, US exports showed a fall in 1987
from 1986, picking up in 1988 but this was still lower than the 1986 figure. The US
visible trade and current account balances had been falling because of the cuts in
public expenditure by the Reagan Administration and attempts to reduce trade deficits
particularly with Japan. Japanese exports in 1988 at 219.8 Ecu billions were still
higher than their 1986 and 1987 figures. Japan's trade and current account balances
peaked in 1986 but its figures in 1987 and 1988 were still better than that of 1985.
Therefore compared to the recession in the USA and the UK . Japan enjoyed
important macro-economic advantages. Further support for this can be found in Table
33 on page 123 which showed that Japanese gross domestic product and employment
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outperformed UK and the USA. Porter (1990) in examining the environments of the
UK, USA and Japan amongst his list of countries in his book , "The Competitive
Advantage of Nations" stated that Japan's economy and its businesses have grown
because of strong domestic and overseas demand for its products.
Table 1A. International Economic Indicators
Trade figures are given in billions of European currency units (Ecu).
The Ecu exchange rate shows the number of national currency units per Ecu.
III UNITED STATES
	 • JAPAN	 • UNITED KINGDOM
Exports
Visible
trade
balance
Current
account
balance
Ecu
emblems
rate Exports
Visible
trade
balance
Current
account
balance
Ecu
exchange
rats Exports
Visible
trade
balance
Current
sccounl
balance
Ecu
exchange
rite
1984 275.8 -136.8 -125.5 0.7891 213.8 56.7 44.1 187.03 118.9 -9.0 3.1 0.5908
1985 279.8 -174.2 -160.5 0.7623 230.8 76.0 64.5 180.50 132.4 -5.7 4.7 0.5891
1986 230.9 -140.6 -147.8 0.9836 211.1 96.2 86.8 165.11 108.3 - 14.2 -0.3 0.6708
1987 220.2 -131.8 -138.8 1.1541 197.3 86.1 75.2 166.58 112.3 -16.4 -5.9 0.7047
1988 272.5 -100.2 -106.7 1.1833 219.8 80.7 66.5 151.51 120.9 -32.5 -23.4 0.6643
1989 330.2 -99.3 -96.5 1.1017 245.3 70.5 52.8 151.87 137.3 -36.6 -30.3 0.6728
1990 308.8 -79.8 -72.3 1.2745 219.9 49.8 28.1 183.94 142.7 -26.1 -20.1 0.7150
Source: Financial Times (1990), November 18th, p6
The field research in this thesis extended from the end of 1985 to the early summer of
1988 but the analyses of the figures in Tables 1B and 33 (p123) showed that the
overall trends were consistent. I.e. Japanese growth, exports, employment and current
account surpluses outperformed both the USA and the UK. The research in this thesis
in its terms of reference focussed upon the identification and analyses of the
important elements in the successful global marketing strategies of competing
Japanese, British and American firms. While there were changes in the economic data
over the relevant time span, the opinions and attitudes of the managers interviewed in
the three countries seemed to have crystallised so that expectations remained
relatively constant. This allowed comparability of the research results for the firms in
the three countries.
However a note of caution has to be included in this consideration. To some degree, it
allowed a comparison of the research results amongst the firms of the three countries
but due caution must be taken , as in any research of this kind, in interpretation of the
results.
The hypotheses for this research were oriented around how successful firms
developed their strategies which advanced their effectiveness or abilities to compete
with one another. Porter (1985) defined competitive strategy as the search for a
favourable competitive position in an industry which aimed to establish a profitable
and sustainable position against the forces that determined industry competition.
Successful in the context of this thesis therefore implied the 'capabilities,
competences or effectiveness' of firms in their drive towards establishing their
businesses as a thriving and dominant force in their highly competitive markets.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE INTRODUCTION
1
1.0 ABSTRACT 
This introductory chapter explains the order of the chapters in this thesis to show the
development and conclusion of the research.
The chapters in the thesis have been structured to show the progression of the
research from the literature review centred around the hypotheses, the analyses of the
relevant industries, the methodologies adopted, the testing of the hypotheses, the
presentation of the results, and the conclusions and recommendations.
An explanatory statement of each chapter in the thesis is provided to show how each
chapter contributes to the research.
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1.1	 INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the marketing strategies of a sample of competing American,
British and Japanese companies operating in five industries in the UK market. The
terms of reference included the identification of the important elements in their
marketing strategies such as their innovative qualities, consumer orientations and
strategic focuses which had impacts on the effectiveness of their marketing
performances in the UK. The study of the marketing strategies of companies took
into account both the published literature from academic, trade and government
sources and in-depth interviews with the companies in the sample.
The design and implementation of the marketing strategies and their successes are
seen as dependent not only on the structure and system of firms but also on the people
who carry them out. So the findings from the field research upon which the
hypotheses were tested and the methodologies tried, resulted from in-depth interviews
using semi-structured questionnaires with the senior managers and directors
particularly in marketing and sales.
The following chapters show the progression and development of the research starting
with the analyses of the industries from which the samples of firms were drawn to the
conclusion of the thesis.
1.2 CHAPTER EXPLANATIONS 
Chapter TWO 'A Review of the Literature draws upon the published writings on
marketing strategies. These writings took account of marketing principles and
practices such as strategic focus, marketing mix, segmentation, product positioning,
competitor targets, customer orientations, product and production capabilities of
firms. Various sources from newspapers, journals, academic texts and conference
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papers, government and industry publications were used. The examination of the
literature indicated opportunities for research and are discussed under the headings of
hypotheses. The objective is that each section under a hypothesis heading should deal
with the appropriate literature relevant to it.
The contribution of this chapter is that it seeks to provide the framework by which the
contemporary literature on the marketing strategies of firms can be presented and the
hypotheses for the research explained.
Chapter Three "Industrial Performance and Competition" presents the background
for the research with the analyses of the competitive conditions within the five
relevant industrial sectors namely, audio/hi-fl, ball bearings, machine tools,
microwave ovens and photocopiers. The trends in these industries producing for the
domestic, commercial and industrial markets are compared to those in the UK
manufacturing industry as a whole to enable an overall perspective to be shown. This
chapter contains a mix of secondary and primary research undertaken to determine the
extent of competition and the perfonnance of American, British and Japanese
companies in these industries. Information is given in national aggregates for direct
comparisons to be made.
The contribution of this chapter to the aims of the research is that it provides a basis
for the understanding of the competitive forces in these markets which would
facilitate the identification of the characteristics of successful companies and the
difficulties faced by local firms in copying such successes.
Chapter Four "Research Rationale and Methodology in the UK study" shows the
choice of industries, the sample selection and size as well as the clarification of the
hypotheses for the research in the UK, United States and Japan.
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In this chapter, the UK research builds upon the initial ESRC study carried out by
Doyle, Saunders and Wong (1985) and incorporates the sample of American
subsidiaries operating in the UK. This made possible further testing of the hypotheses
with a wider sample. It also enabled further investigations and comparisons to be
made overseas into the American and Japanese headquarters' support for the
marketing strategies of their UK subsidiaries, in competition both with one another
and with indigenous British firms. This chapter contributes by establishing the
criteria for the research into the sample of companies and the relevant hypotheses to
be tested.
The conduct of the research and the justifications for the use of percentages, the chi-
square test and cluster analysis methods to analyse the results are also shown.
Chapter Five "Findings in the UK Research" assesses the results of the research into
the American companies and their comparison with the fifteen British and Japanese
companies in the initial ESRC study. A major research finding suggested that
companies regarded their strengths in their marketing performances to be due to a
combination of their long-term strategic focus, investment, effective marketing skills
and competitive leverages as in production. This combination helped them to
overcome barriers to entry in national and overseas markets and the establishment of
a permanent presence in these markets through their subsidiaries. The application of
the chi-square tests and cluster analysis helped to demonstrate the levels of
significance in the results and the relative importance of the companies respectively.
This chapter represents the results of the UK research. It demonstrates the testing of
the hypotheses and their validation with the findings.
Chapter Six "Methodology in the Overseas Research" illustrates the processes in the
second major stage of the field research. The American and Japanese headquarter
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firms and the relevant trade associations in the two countries were approached for
study in their respective national environments. A semi-structured questionnaire was
designed specifically for the overseas research because of the orientation of the
research towards headquarters attitudes and their commitment of resources towards
their subsidiaries marketing activities and achievement of strategic objectives.
The contribution of this chapter is to explain the methodology used, the preparatory
research for the interviews abroad and the orientation of the questionnaire topics in
order to make possible the testing of the hypotheses.
Chapter Seven "Findings in the Overseas Research" illustrates the testing of the
hypotheses with respect to the samples of overseas American and Japanese
headquarter firms. The comparisons were made in terms of nationality with
percentages derived from the questionnaire results, and included the significance
levels from the chi-square method. The comparisons took into account American and
Japanese marketing orientations and their support of the marketing performances of
their subsidiaries in the UK markets.
This chapter shows the tests of the hypotheses for the overseas research and their
validation. The contribution of this chapter is that it presents an important dimension
which, when taken with the findings of the 'UK research in chapter six, enables the
overall results of the research to be seen against national and international
perspectives. This combination in the findings can then be presented in Chapter Eight
for discussion.
Chapter Eight "Conclusion", summarises the findings and overall conclusions
reached in the research process as a whole. These are discussed with references to the
tests of the hypotheses and their acceptance or rejection. The recommendations for
UK firms in general are stated with a discussion of the obstacles for indigenous firms
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seeking to compete in these markets, given the competitiveness of the dominant firms
in the research sample.
This chapter is an important part of the thesis as it presents an overview of the results
of the research and the importance of the main fmdings. It seeks to provide insights
into the competitive nature of the relevant industries which concern the companies in
the sample and which affect their marketing strategies.
1.3 CONCLUSION 
The structure of this thesis takes into account a review of the literature, the
competitive market and industrial conditions for firms in the sample, explanations of
the background, methodologies and findings for the UK and overseas research with a
final conclusion. The contribution of this introductory chapter is to illustate and
explain the process of the whole research effort.
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CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
8
2.0 ABSTRACT
This chapter presents a review of the literature. It attempts to survey the
relevant publications in the contexts of marketing strategy and competition.
For example, what are covered are the strategic issues of market share versus
short-term profits, the orientations to national and overseas environmental
opportunities, the aggressive use of marketing tactics, innovation, organisation
and planning. The competitive advantages or weaknesses of America, Britain
and Japan are also discussed because of the comparative nature of the
research. The literature review has been centred around the hypotheses and in
the light of the review, arguments for the testing of the hypotheses can be put.
The review conclusions showed the importance of implementing well thought-
out marketing strategies in preference to reactive ones. Porter (1990), stated
that Japanese firms were fortunate to face buoyant national demand in Japan e
while recession in the USA and Britain affected the abilities of clusters of
related firms and industries to penetrate and sustain growth in overseas
markets. Japanese firms were thus able to continue investment and
commitment to new technologies and products. This led to spin-offs for other
markets leading them to compete successfully with American and British
firms in robotics for the automation of factories and in machine tools and
bearings.
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the published literature with the discussion organised
under the headings of the hypotheses.
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Each section starts with an explanation of the relevance of the hypothesis to
marketing strategy. This is followed by a review of the relevant publications
on marketing theories, strategies and conclusions.
Each section ends with a short summary of the main areas discussed in the
literature and the implications or justifications for testing the relevant
hypothesis in future research.
2.2	 Hypothesis 1: Successful companies are oriented to market share rather
than short-term profits. 
This hypotheses stems from an examination of the literature's support for the
marketing concept and the abilities of firms to build on their market shares
through the provision for and satisfaction of their customers' needs, which is at
the heart of the marketing concept. A successful competitive strategy
resulting in market share gains can therefore be brought about by a firm being
responsive to and being able to influence the state of competition within the
industry in which it operates. So one element in the success of firms which
can be examined is whether firms oriented to strategies for gaining long-term
market share compared to others focussing on short-term sales and profits,
perform better in the market place.
Kotler (1991) explained marketing as resting on 'four main pillars, namely a
market focus, customer orientation, coordinated marketing and profitability'.
The competitive marketing strategy consists of specific strategies for target
markets, marketing mix and marketing expenditure level. Heavy selling and
promotion to achieve sales volume and profits in the short-term was a feature
of the 'selling' rather than the 'marketing' concept.
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Day and Wensley (1988) on diagnosing competitive superiority stated that
businesses needed to develop distinctive competences with lowered cost on
differentiation to achieve superior customer value. This would lead to a
promised pay-off in terms of market share dominance and profitability above
average for a firm in to industry, as shown under their 'performance outcomes'
in Table 1B.
Table 1 B
The creation and sustenance of competitive advantage
Sources of
	
Positional	 Performance
advantage	 advantages	 outcomes
• superior skills •	 'opener • satisfactkat
• superior customer value • 10:1YatiY
resources •	 lower relative • market share
costa • prolitsbalty
Investment of profits
to sustain advantage
Source G. S. Day and R. Wensley, 'Assessing Advantage: A Framework for Diagnosing
Competitive Superiority, Journal of Marketing, April 1988.
Despite such theoretical concepts on good marketing, Heller (1987) had
argued that many firms had to think in terms of short-term profit maximisation
rather than market share giving the following reasons. Short-term profit
maximisation as a strategic objective is followed because firms think in terms
of survival and riding the slumps in the trade cycle with fears of predators and
liquidation. Markets and technologies change environments forcing firms to
adapt. Increasing national and international competition put pressure on high
profit margins. Technological advances combined with huge investments by
large corporations alter markets. Firms with traditional skills orientated to the
production and selling concepts found themselves unable to compete in
markets which had changed. Such firms had little choice but to off-load
surplus production and to think in terms of short-term profits. However firms
which had strengths and investments in new product-markets and technologies
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were in a better condition to expand their market shares in the light of national
and international competition.
The process of matching a company's resources and assets to the external
environmental opportunities and threats is referred to as the 'strategic fit'.
Opportunities and threats need to be appraised in the light of strengths and
weaknesses. The S.W.O.T. analysis (Figure 2) enables the setting of
objectives, such as market share within the strategic fit.
FIGURE 2
ACHIEVING A STRATEGIC FIT: SWOT ANALYSIS
Source: Lancaster G and Massingham L (1988), Essentials of Marketing.
McGraw Hill p.62.
An investigation into the practice and effectiveness of marketing in the UK by
Hooley and Lynch (1985) reported the responses of the top 10% companies in
their sample which included 1,700 senior marketing executives. They found
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High	 Also	 High-fliers
Sample	 Fliers	 Rans	 variations from
(1.453)
	
(170)	 (1.283)
	
Also Rans
Product
orientated
Selling
orientated
Marketing
orientated
14.4%
25.7%
59.9%
8.8%
25.9%
65.3%
15.1%
25.7%
59.2%
-42%
0%
+10%
Chi-Square = 5.08	 Significance = 0.10
Source: Journal of Marketing Management. 1985, 1, p65-72
that the 'high fliers' (65.3% in Table 2) were shared three common
characteristics which the 'also rans' (the remainder) could not match. These
were a genuine market orientation, a strategic sensitivity and responsiveness to
the marketing environments and a profit orientation geared to the marketing
assets and resources of companies. The 'high fliers' were greater users of
market research with more emphasis upon product design and performance
without simply relying on price.
Table 2
Marketing Approach of the Company
Hooley and Lynch contended that the 'high fliers' had superior marketing
practices and a strategic vision of the business linked to the need for effective
implementation of their marketing strategies. It would appear that marketing
planning enhanced market leadership and market shares.
To achieve the objective of market share, sacrifices needed to be made in the
short-term. Gale and Branch (1985) found that companies wishing to
strengthen their future market positions with increased marketing expenditures
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or new product introductions had to withstand higher costs in the short-term
thereby foregoing short-run profit maximisation. In their sample of
companies, those that did had a negative cash flow of 4% compared with a
positive 5% for less aggressively minded businesses. However in the longer
term, the justification for increased marketing expenditures was to obtain a
profitable balance between their present requirements and their long-term
goals. Such competitive strategies held consequences for competitors which
pursued short-term financial gains at the expense of long-term market share.
In addition, Abernathy and Wayne (1974) had argued that a company had to
continue to aim for an 'even larger market share' if it wanted to maintain
constantly a significant rate of cost-cutting. This was increasingly difficult to
do when faced with segmentation tactics by competitors to expand markets
'from above' with superior products or customized options. So a company
facing such tactics would have to abandon its volume scale economies or
support a major product improvement which would effectively end its
sequence of cost reductions on the learning curve. Some companies have
found it very difficult to do the latter. Perhaps an example could be where
manufacturing companies in the UK went out of business in the recession in
the early 1970's with obsolete products and machinery and had to abandon
years of accumulated experience in manufacturing their products such as in
the 'valves' and 'spring' industries.
Despite such problems, a long-term benefit in pursuing a market share strategy
has been identified in a project on the 'profit impact of marketing strategies'
(PIMS) sponsored by the Marketing Science Institute and the Harvard
Business School in the USA. Buzzell, Grade and Sultan (1975) found a strong
relationship between market share and return on investment (ROI). This is
illustrated in their diagram (Figure 3). They had no doubt that market share
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and return on investment were strongly related showing the correlation
between expanding market share and higher returns.
FIGURE 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET SHARE AND PRE-TAX ROI
RO1
%
30
20
10
0
Under 10 10 - 20
Market
20 - 30
Share %
30 - 40 Over 40
Source: Buzzell. Gale, Sultan (1975) 'Market Share a Key to Profitability, HBR
Highly profitable companies such as IBM, Eastern Kodak and Xerox had high
market shares and dominant competitive positions in their main product
markets. The researchers' explanation of this dominance through high market
shares were:-
a) Economies of scale in procurement, manufacturing, marketing, cost
components and accumulated experience;
b) Market size enabling establishment of prices to dealers and customers
setting the market lead; and
c) Quality of management through recruiting the best people with
leadership skills and the innovative use of resources.
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Baker (1991) concluded that, "success is not so much a matter of what you do
but how well you do it". With reference to his work with Hart (1989), Baker
stated that their findings confirmed that many attributes in successful firms in
growth industries (sunrise ones) were found in less successful firms in
declining (sunset) industries. Managerial mistakes could be compensated for
in growth markets but were more serious in declining markets leading to loss
of market share and competitive edge.
Summary
The discussion has shown that marketing strategy development in the
literature is mainly oriented towards market share rather than short-term
profits, and therefore such strategies are more likely to be the hallmark of
successful companies. The writings in the literature support the importance of
long-term strategy development paying attention to the marketing concept to
achieve goals such as those of market share but there has been much less
evidence of field research specifically in this area. For example, Western
companies have reportedly been stated to be oriented to short-term profits and
those of Japanese ones to be oriented to market share (Hamel and Prahalad,
1989; The Economist 1990; Financial Times 1991). However, field research
on the direct comparisons of Western and Japanese companies have been far
less evident in the literature, hence supporting the case for the research and
testing of hypothesis 1.
2.3	 Hypothesis 2: Successful companies demonstrate greater orientations to
new environmental opportunities. 
Porter (1990) stated that there was a long history of effort to explain
international successes in industries in the form of international trade, ranging
from Adam Smith and Ricardo to present-day government intervention in
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industry. This effort has not answered his question on why firms from
particular nations achieve international success in distinct segments and
industries. Porter's theory was that' a fun's proximate "environment" shapes
its competitive success over time'. Hypothesis 2 is concerned with how a Finn
can be helped by its environment as stated by Porter, but also essentially
whether successful firms have the better grasp or orientation towards the
marketing opportunities in their environments. In other words, if marketing is
an important factor in the national competitiveness of firms, a greater
orientation to new environmental opportunities, at home and abroad should
enhance the national competitiveness of firms.
Historically Adam Smith in the eighteenth century and Ricardo in the early
nineteenth century had expounded the advantages accruing from trading
opportunities between countries (Samuelson, 1970). Adam Smith in 1776 in
his 'Wealth of Nations' (Kindleberger, 1969) wrote that,
"in every country it always is and must be the interest of the
great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those
who sell it cheapest."
Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage (Samuelson, 1970) was based on
the wide diversity in climatic, natural and human resources which created
significant variations in the production capabilities of combines which at times
led to absolute advantages and specialisation. As Samuelson (1970)
explained, if a country had an absolute advantage for all goods, it would
benefit from specialising in its most efficient areas involving "complete
mutual independence" between countries. Heckscher and Ohlin (Ohlin, 1967)
stated that because there was considerable variation in the resources of
production between countries, this meant that countries could specialise and
export the products of their specialisation whilst importing other goods. But
these classical economic writings on the advantages of 	 international
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trade and specialisation are seen by Porter to be inadequate to explain the
realities of competition in the late twentieth century. Porter thought that the
theory of comparative advantage had intuitive appeal since trade patterns in
various industries had shown up the importance of national differences in
factor costs. However he argued that such a theory was unrealistic because of
the diversity of economies of scale, technologies, products, labour, capital and
tactics of modern-day global competitors.
Channon (1978) had also pointed out that the classical theories held
limitations in the real world. They pointed to advantages derived from trade
without taking account of changes in government and business practices or of
social, cultural, religious, legal, economic and political influences. Countries
and corporations protected themselves from the rigours of the open market to
secure short and medium term advantages in specific areas, to protect jobs and
to obtain access to new technologies and skills. ICindleberger (1969), also
stated that "apart from purposeful state interference,....markets are separated
by language, custom, usage, habit, taste and a host of other causes of
difference".
The early theorists primarily concentrated on production and developed a
mechanistic approach based on natural endowments though Adam Smith
recognised the importance of the individual in the market being free to pursue
his own trade. The significant contrast in the later approaches is the
contribution of marketing with the non-product, service based elements (such
as distribution) within the context of the wider marketing mix than was
hitherto conceived. This seems to be a fundamental difference between
classical economic thinking and current marketing analysis. Current
marketing thinking is based on an effective organisational approach for
strategic implementation such as an integrated marketing mix.
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Hypothesis 2 is concerned with the focus by companies on environmental
opportunities to develop their national and overseas markets. Export markets,
compared to staying in one's own domestic markets pose greater challenges
with the presence of diverse national preferences and difficulties created in
matters like export bathers, procedures and problems of dealing with a wider
variety of languages, legislation, cultures, tax liabilities and intercompany
transactions. There are greater uncertainties in export markets compared to
the domestic environment, but this does not deter firms from exploiting new
environmental opportunities abroad as evidenced by the West German and
Japanese trade surpluses in the late 1980s.
Porter saw competition as dynamic and evolving. In his study of ten
important trading nations he showed the links between the environments in
which firms operated and their effects on competitiveness in 'good' and 'bad'
environments. To explain this environmental influence, Porter's diagram
(Figure 4) showed the four boxes linking together in a 'diamond'. In
successful nations, the whole diamond sparkles as all of the boxes contain
active forces conducive to expansion into export markets. Porter's view is that
in America, which is itself the promoter of economic growth and financial
stability, the diamond has grown dull as each of the boxes reinforce decline by
restricting the improvement of individual firms. The relative decline of the
British economy with growing emphasis on leisure, entertainment and service
industries at the expense of manufacturing was also compared.
In Figure 4, 'factor conditions' covered the traditional factors of production
with the best ways of using them, including 'education', as the raw materials
offered to entrepreneurs. 'Firm strategy, structure and rivalry' when present in
domestic competition help to ensure that companies look for continual gains
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in productivity and fresh sources of competitive advantage. Demand
conditions' describe consumer habits and preferences which keep companies
active in their marketing. The clusters of related and supporting industries'
draw upon common inputs, skills and infrastructure to stimulate investment by
government bodies, educational institutions, firms and individuals. Porter's
publication has been the largest recent text on issues relating to the
competitiveness of nations and the influences of environments.
FIGURE 4
THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL ADVANTA(;E
Source: Porter M (1990), the Competitive Advantage of Nations. Macmillan
Press Ltd. p.139
The key interactions between the 'environment', the 'strategy' (behaviour of the
firm) and the 'structure' (the internal cultural, organisational and technological
capacity within the firm), see Figure 5, had been postulated by Chandler
(1962).
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STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
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Source: A Chandler: Strategy and Structure. Cansbndge. Mass. 1962.
This adaption to the environment is seen to be essential (Ansoff 1978) in
Figure 6. The 'stable, reactive, anticipatory, exploring and creative' states of
the entrepreneurial dimension, changed the 'product-market-customer-
technology-finding source-natural resource mix' through which an
organisation interacted with the environment. Baker (1991) stated that
surprises and discontinuities in the environment were the norm rather than the
exception and referred to Ansoffs proposal that managers should structure
their environmental appraisals to pick up weak signals heralding future
changes in their environments.
FIGURE 6
TYPES OF STRATEGIC TI1RUST
The UM of tune. Strategy Unka pan. present and fume
Same: W Keegan 19841 'Mc	 coal Markeong Management
EtivommErfr	 ORGANIZATION	 SHAREHOLDER VALUES
Strategic	 Eamorruc	 Resaurcesicapabilines Sim/mirth
divenacce	 SOCIOCLIAllig	 Human	 Profnabilityhesuro
Political	 Marketing	 Geographic
Techoolcagal	 Roman	 Soma! responsibility
Medina	 Manufacturing	 ambenc
Com	 Emumeruag	 Style
Competition	 R&D 	 Ethics
Customers
. Government
2	 Swathe
roams
31 Identify
61 Assess
ci Determine
Key LISLIMIX1003. Key asuunparms-	 Key asummacen
opportunsties	 strengtlashireaknesses Mame unponance
damn. ovals	 °Ides=
Allernatne - What is Possible
I	 Decade	 Objecutes & goala
Idenufy driving torce of the bunions
CATEGORY	 STRATEGIC AREA
NI:Mums. mattes Produas offered. markets saved
Capabilities	 Tectmology
Produculin capability
Method of sale
Method of Miniboom
Natural mom=
Renate	 Size/growth
Profirabdityfieturo
1 5	 Develop	 Human mourn= Engmeenng
1	 integrated	 markemg	 R&D
plans and	 nuance	 social respcaubdity
programs for	 Manufacturing	 Cocarol
6	 Plan unplemeotanca. °burn sod comfort resource to plans and pnigrams. Manage reaources
COMA. Compare unplemeatmon results with plans. Compare elptroarneaul organusuonal. and
value assessment with key anampamis. Recycle to phase
Timing
Evaluase and assess 	 Forecast. plan and program
Annual operetta; plan/bodies
	 1	 Guide plan 
Priem	 One yisr Medium ienn Long tenn
However as stated Porter stated there were no specific empirical method for
the formulation of competitive strategy in markets. Keegan (1984) in Figure 7
proposed an orderly approach with universal appeal, relating strategic issues
and decision-making to organisational aspirations and resources in order to
meet challenges, opportunities and threats.
FIGURE 7
STRATEGY FORMULATION - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Lancaster and Massingham (1988) also provided a framework for the
'selection of company strategies' taking account of internal and external
environments. The dotted lines in Figure 8 showed a sequential consideration
of the elements in corporate planning relating to the SWOT analysis and
environmental forecasts.
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FIGURE 8
THE ELEMENTS OF CORPORATE PLANNING
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Summary 
On the subject of the need of firms to take account of environmental
opportunities in their strategic thinking, writings in the literature provide
theoretical guidelines and framework on the principles and methods of
approach. However as Porter has stated as a reason for his study, there has
been a need to examine why some nations and the firms in them, innovate and
are more competitive than others. This need for more empirical research
suggests that hypothesis 2 on whether successful companies have greater
orientation to new environmental opportunities based on a field study of
competing firms from three countries in five UK industries could be a useful
contribution.
2.4	 Hypothesis 3: Successful companies pursue fast market adaptation rather 
than innovation. 
The market environment is a dynamic one and companies have to adapt to the
demands and needs of their markets if they are to be successful. Hypothesis 3
looks at whether companies are more successful though fast market adaption
of their products to achieve competitive advantages rather than the
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concentration on innovation. Japanese companies for example have been seen
to have entered western markets in consumer electronics in the 1970s through
price-cutting and the copying of Western technology to gain market entry and
build up market share (The Economist, 1989). The original leads in
technology, in xerography or machine tools for instance have not protected
American nor British companies form Japanese competitors.
On the subject of new product innovation and development, the literature
listing their importance, and the factors needed to improve manufacturing,
productivity and research and development processes seem comprehensive
(eg. Crawford, 1983; Gluck and Foster, 1975; Johne and Snelson, 1987, and
Sands, 1983). Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow (1981) indicated that much less
was written on how firms integrate their R & D and marketing into a winning
partnership or combination yet this was an area where the exposure to
international competition and technical advances altered the nature of
competition. The integration of R & D, and marketing was important and less
developed in the literature, a theme supported by Sowray (1989), and
Rothwell and Gardiner (1984). Rothwell and Gardiner (1984) asserted that
most empirical studies focussed on major or radical innovations. There was a
failure to recognise the importance of design and resulting 'incremental'
innovations through modifying and improving products for the marketplace.
Given a wider choice of products with widely differing characteristics (see
Table 3) Rothwell and Gardiner saw that customers were able to make optimal
choices pushing manufacturers towards long-term product and process
developments and a suitable balance of technical skills Price was not the only
consideration in the marketing mix as non-price factors could considerably
enhance the value of the product purchased.
24
PRX2 FACTOM
List Price
Sale PrMe
Net pm= after trade-in allowance
Fulancuig or leasutg arrangements
Non-Price Faison
i)Software Factors 	 ii)Hardware Factors
(mainly economic) 	 (moat), tech:null
Serncing costs	 Speediproducuon rue
Quality of after-salgs	 Reltability
serincing	 Flexibilltv.
Pans avadabdity and	 adaptabdity in use
con	 Perfomunce :re
Breakdown costa	 operanon
Depreciation	 Ease of use
Rtumeig costa	 Ease of maagenance
Delivery dates	 Safety in use
User diatom facilities
	
Appearance
Source: Rothwell. R and Gardiner. P1191141
'Oestitn and Competnion m Enemeenne'
Long Range Planning. Vol 17. Nu 3. p78
TABLE 3
FACTORS COMMON TO PRODUCTS
In his literature review on new product development, Sowray (1989)
maintained that with 'important exceptions' the published literature was
"weighted towards comprehensive but fairly superficial books...often too
esoteric to attract the interest of practicing managers". It maybe that in the
literature there is much interest in product innovation (eg. Rogers, 1962; and
Twiss, 1974) and in the product development process (eg. Booz, Allen and
Hamilton, 1982; and Johne, 1985). However generating ideas for new
products which are important for new markets may have been less evident, as
maintained by Sowrey.
In their matrix (Table 4), Johnson and-Jones as far back as 1957, had based a
range of product innovation options for new products and new technologies to
reflect the link between R & D and the marketing efforts. But product
innovations required co-ordination between departments and specification of
task groups responsibilities, procedures and budgets, and also attention to
changes in consumer demands.
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Included In Rothberg, R (19111) 2nd CMGs'.
:tqvorate Strain/ and Corporate Innovation, Free Press. NY
TABLE 4
ORGANIZATION FOR NEW PRODUCTS
The interface between Marketing and R & D which varies considerably
between companies and between industries and problems could have been
aggravated by poor organisation. Fluctuations in product or markets did not
encourage stable relationships to be built over time or on a continual basis. So
firms capable of fast market adaptations would be quicker to satisfy market
and organisational demands. As Foster (1989) pointed out, the pace of
innovation was slowing as fewer discoveries were made but increasing sums
were devoted by companies to research and development. The time and cost
required to discover a marketable product continued to rise. Balanced against
these, the rewards were great (eg. changing Glaxo's 21st place in the world
pharmaceutical revenue league to 4th place within a decade). The choice
between fast market adaptation of existing products or innovation which could
enhance market leaderships may therefore be relevant in the context of
examining how firms compete.
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Since 1978, ACARD (Advisory Council for Applied Research and
development) since 1978 had maintained that institutional problems, lack of
communication and poor specialisation acted against innovation. It argued
that market considerations were neglected due to the separation of R & D and
marketing activities. Firms which were 'laggards' in the marketplace were not
likely to have a positive Marketing and R & D interface. It recommended
bringing the functional, project, operational and service groups in marketing
and R & D closer together with the requirement for strategic direction from
the top.
Japanese companies might have benefited from such strategic direction. For
example, Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) specified that the Japanese 'rugby'
approach as opposed to the western traditional 'linear' approach to product
development, meant top management giving a broad goal or direction to the
project team with complete freedom to structure its self-development. The
project team was able to overlap phases cutting down development time and
improving the sharing of market and technical knowledge. This had an effect
of achieving the speed and flexibility in creating new products, as companies
needed more than the accepted basics of high quality, low cost and
differentiation to excel.
In contrast, Hedley (1976) pointed out that when British managers failed to
reduce costs along an experience curve an uncompetitive cost positions
resulted so that failure to grow as rapidly relative to the competition would
lead to further uncompetitive cost positions. Japanese costs reduction through
improved production and managerial efficiencies were perceived to be strong
improving their marketing competitiveness. American and British firms had
also practised such theories but appeared to have historically failed to reduce
costs along these curves faster than the Japanese.
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But Davidson (1987) argued that the high ratio of new product failures
(quoting an average low success rate of 10%) need not deter Western
companies. New product investment was essential for companies with skills
and strength in existing markets. Multinational companies also had the
advantage of offsetting R & D costs against volume in many countries.
Davidson stipulated that the ideal screening system should contain three
elements: continuity, clear yardsticks and top management involvement with
project evaluation as in the schedules outlined in Table 5 with continuous
assessment for adjustments when new as information on the product and the
marketplace became available. However it was extremely difficult to predict
the life span of a given product and its competitive substitute which might
replace it.
TABLE 5
SCHEDULE FOR EVALUATING NEW PRODUCTS
Check Points
1. New ideas
2. Prior to R & D
Development
3. Prior to test
market
4. Prior to
national
experience
Data
Short verbal
statements
One-page business
analysis
Full recommendation
Full recommendation
Assessor
New-Products Manager
New-Products Manager
Marketing Director
Managing Director
Source: Davidson, .1(1987) Offensive Marketing,
Penguin Business Library, p362
Summary 
The literature contained writings on the need to combine effective marketing
with innovative product development policies without adequate explanation of
28
how so it would seem important to assess whether fast market adaptation
rather than innovation and the implications for long-term product commitment
has been a factor in the make-up of successful companies.
2.5	 Hypothesis 4: Successful companies are more aggressive in (heir use of
marketing tactics 
Porter (1990 and 1985) had stated that firms created competitive advantage
when they found new and superior methods to compete in an industry and its
markets, thereby creating acts of innovation Such innovation were defined as
including technology, product and process changes, new approaches to
marketing, new forms of distribution and new conceptions of scope.
Hypothesis 4 seeks to examine through research with companies in the UK
whether companies are more successful in their marketing strategies through
aggressive or innovative marketing tactics which would shift their competitive
advantage so that their rivals are not able or willing to respond appropriately.
As Porter has stated, much less has been written or known about why firms
make good choices instead of bad ones and their aggressiveness in their
pursuit of them.
Abegglen and Stalk (1985) found that Japanese firms operating in western
markets were confident of their suCcesses and did not see themselves as
possessing clear weaknesses. This confidence enabled them to be less averse
to risk-taking and more aggressive. This is supported by Brouthers and
Werner (1990) who saw the Japanese as adapt at exploiting strategic windows,
defined by Abell (1978), and opportunities created by changes in technology,
distribution channels and new market segments with active encouragement in
selective industries from Japan's M.I.T.I. (Ministry of International Trade and
Industry). Quoting examples of competition between Japanese and American
firms eg. Honda and Harley-Davidson, Toyota and General Motors, Hitachi
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and General Electric, Brouthers and Werner made the overall conclusion that
Japanese firms were very bad competitors. Taking Porter's perspective of bad
competitors, the authors argued that Japanese corporations had no 'clear self-
perceived weaknesses or strategy to improve industry structure and did not
play by American rules'. The authors also maintained that Japanese firms 'had
goals irreconcilable with American firms'. Japanese firms had 'high exit
barriers, high strategic stakes, viewed return on investment, profitability and
cash generation differently, had a long time horizon and were risk aversive'.
Porter, however had not stated that the Japanese were bad competitors. He
had seen their demand-led domestic environment as stimulating their growth.
The view of the Japanese as very bad global and assertive competitors has also
not been supported by Kotler (1991) or Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak (1985).
Kotler (1991) suggested that only a handful of American companies are truly
market and customer driven and attributed the example of General Motors'
substantial market share decline as due to a chronic sales orientation.
Kotler et al (1985) referred to the Japanese as the world's champion marketers
because they had built loyal leadership and market share over the last two
decades in many industries eg. cars, steel, shipbuilding and consumer
electronics. The Japanese firms were more aggressive because they had
worked hard in cooperation with their government to identify attractive global
markets requiring high skills, high labour intensity and low natural resources.
These markets had been in a state of technological evolution where existing
Western market leaders were complacent or underfinanced. Once committed
to markets, Japanese firms were prepared to invest. It was suggested in the
Financial Times (1991) that Japanese investment in the UK far from bringing
the menial jobs and leaving the highly skilled research and design work in
Japan, was redressing the balance eg. Sharp's Oxford laboratory concentrating
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on optoelectronics, artificial intelligence and imaging technology for Europe's
markets.
In building market share, Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak stated that Japanese
firms relied on product development and market development strategies.
These meant investment in product improvement, upgrading and product
proliferation to offer more and better things than their rivals. New
opportunities were spotted through market segmentation tactics helped by
building networks of world markets and production locations. But from cars
to computer chips, the Economist (1991) stated that Japanese industry had
built a vast and fortified market at home "to get the business rolling" to
support their overseas ventures.
The two views of the Japanese as bad or good global competitive marketers
specifically with regard to American firms and industries, essentially provide
comprehensive insights into the reasons and outcomes for Japanese
advancement at the expenses of American market share. Writings on
American, British and Japanese firms from the Japanese viewpoint (Kono,
1984; Kagono et al, 1984) have regarded Japanese long-term stockholder
gains, profitability and high return on investment measured by market share
and superior competitive leadership as more beneficial than western short-
term profit maximisation. From the Western viewpoint, Hooley, Lynch and
Jobber (1990) have also indicated that long-term success was best served
though willingness to achieve market power though investment and growth
rather than the maximisation of short-term profit returns.
The rate of success of Japanese companies can be seen in the outcomes. In
1990, 34 more Japanese firms started operating in Britain (Management
Today, 1991; The Economist, 1991) bringing to a total, 150 Japanese
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manufacturing companies with over 45,000 employees in the United
Kingdom. Japanese firms produced diverse products including cars, audio/hifi
equipment, microwave ovens, ball bearings, machine costs, photocopiers. In
addition there were joint venture agreements as with Toshiba, G E (US) and
GEC (UK) reported in the Financial Times (1991).
There are many factors which contribute to trade and market success.
Alkhafaji and Hill (1988) commenting on these, stated that chief amongst
them was a nation's trade policy and showed in their table (see Table 6) the
differences between American, Japanese and West European nations
(including Britain) and the impact on trade of those differences.
TABLE 6 A Comparison of Trade Policies
United Same	 /1990	 Ewan
Al. WW II	 Policy	 SWiset damn.	 Rebuild industry.	 Rebuild industry.
innl 1970	 non. capons >	 spend len on R&D spina las on R&D
imparts
Ratan	 Wages goer. collee. Depend on copy- 	 Improve teduques.
dm harpoons,
	
	
mg, DM manage. new management
mem ink. lifetime style a
employment	 tedetenniation
1970-1980	 Policy	 Cut cum. bona	 Enanalay slows	 Slow economy
speeding, tight	 down. reduced	 down. reduce am-
anita:my policy,	 production. dosed ducona. spend Inn
upon markeolree	 market	 on R&D. national.
trade	 in sinparuni
industry. dotal
market
Result,
	 High maven rata. Domenic demand	 DOFIIMIL demand
oher carman"	 incrcues bv OR	 increasa by 1%
dump products
into mania.
domain demand
incrusts by If%
1910	 Results	 $12.2 billion trade	 5414.4 nullion	 bran: 5531 mil-
deficit	 wade defiat	 lino trade &fiat
&sum 51.1 billion
trade surplus
Ink 56.9 million
trade deficit
1916	 Results	 $169.1 &Ilion trade 55 5.5 billion us&	 fines: 61.0 billion
deficit swain 11400 1005901
&raw 54.2
tads surplui
Indy, 51.1 billion
trade deficit
Soren F.  Alkhaa. and E. R. 1141....n Campirom lade Policia U.S.. lima. sad Eutaw: Preormig. .ica.999 9
1.9romeri imams. 1911,p. 109.
However government policies on trade and environmental influences aside,
how do firms decide what marketing mix tactics to follow and how aggressive
are they at following them? Dahringer and Miihlbacher (1991) pointed out
that with over 880 million consumers in the 'Triad' (W. Europe, Japan and the
United States), there were opportunities for firms to standardise their
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Firm's potennal
• Success factors
• Competitive
advantages
External Environment
• Economic
• Political and legal
• Cultural and social
Market choice
• Target customers
Target areas
Differentiation
• Benefit. offered
• Technology
&Kited
Key:
Analysis
Decision
Market emry
marketing mixes or determine the degree of modification for particular
national markets. But with the increasing integration of these markets,
consumer tests could become increasingly similar and a business should feel
"comfortable in Europe, Japan and the United States, all at once".
FIGURE 9
Positioning and Market Entry
Basic Deceuons
• Corporate potc-y
• Portfolio strategy
• Competitive
market strategy
Positioning
Source: Dahringer, L and Miihlbacher, H (1991) International Marketing,
p.307.
The positioning strategy in Table 7 involves the determination of the desired
image of the product in the 'minds' of potential customers, to make it
distinctive or better than other rivals' products. The firm had to make
decisions on how it could best respond to the options open to it. These
decisions related to market choices and differentiation to determine the
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positioning of the product in the chosen markets and the appropriate marketing
mixes.
Hamel and Prahalad (1990) maintained that a firm's focus should also be on its
'core competences' and those of its competitors, and not merely on existing
products. These core competences ie. a firm's abilities and skills would
furnish a firm with its competitive advantage. Day and Wensley (1988) noted
that given the difficulty with every single measure of performance no single
measure would do. Therefore Hamel and Prahalad's core competences were
important.
Summary 
The hypothesis that successful companies are more aggressive in their use of
marketing tactics seems valid for testing in the UK field research, given that in
the literature, there seemed to be conflicting views on the way Japanese firms
build market share at the expense of British and American ones. Moreover, as
Porter had stated, less had been discovered about how firms make good
strategic choices and their aggressiveness in pursuing them.
2.6	 Hypothesis 5: Organisation, planning and control are more informal in 
successful firms. 
Kotler (1987) has commented that marketing planning and control 'as a
higher-order activity' which rewards the company with improved sales and
profit performance, is not practised by every company. In his view, most
companies operate without the benefits of a formal planning system solving
problems as they occur. This view is supported by Spillard (1988) as business
history "littered with examples of marketing failure caused by organisational
infelicities". Hypothesis 5 seeks to examine this aspect, by researching to see
whether more informal organisational, planning and control procedures could
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lead to greater flexibility by companies to respond to the demands of their
markets.
The literature on the organisational structures and decision-making processes
of firms eg. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and Kootnz and O'Donnell (1976)
includes comment on the complexities occurring through the interactions of
organisations with the environment. These put limits on management's
imperatives on strategic choice and highlighted the need for good
organisational design. However such texts on organisational behaviour did
not specify the linkages to marketing. It can be argued that there is no formal
empirical method or technique for formulating and planning 'the competitive
marketing strategy'. Business organisations can be perceived at one extreme
as 'muddling through' (Lindblom, 1959) with a lack of planning, or at the other
extreme as attempting to put too much emphasis on the design of a good
strategy (Charuion, 1976). The Boston Consulting Group's (BCG, 1985)
framework for product portfolio planning environmental factors to those
directly affecting market share or growth in order to allow for the technical
difficulties posed by discontinuous environmental changes and the impact of
inflation rates on costs and price structures.
Kotler (1980) in reviewing the BCG's growth share matrix (Figure 10) stated
that management's first step was to identify the key business units making up
the company (the strategic business units or SBUs). The Boston Consulting
Group advised companies in their planning functions to classify their SBUs in
the growth share matrix to distinguish four types: star, cash cow, question
mark and dog (Hedley, 1977; Lorenz, 1981). What followed was to determine
the roles and objectives assigned to each SBU. Each SBU could build so as to
increase market share; to hold to preserve market share; and to harvest to
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preserve short-term positive cash flow, despite the long-term effect; or to
divest in order to sell or liquidate.
FIGURE 10
THE BCG GROWTH MATRIX
Market High Star Question Mark
Growth
Rate
Low Cash Cow Dog
High	 Low
Relative Market Share
Source: P. Kotler (1980), Principles of Marketing, Prentice Hall, 81
Such overall re-structuring of freestanding strategic business units is seen to
have advantages in focussing on current and future customer needs leading to
efficient new product development (Harnmermesh, 1986). Additionally
provision of better products at competitors' price levels in offering products at
lower prices while not eliminating the need for distribution and promotion
would help to ensure success (Baker, 1991).
The Boston Consulting Group distinguished four generic competitive
environments (stalemate, volume, fragmented and specialised) in its 'strategic
study of the machine tool industry' (1985) for the European Commission. The
BCG framework (see Figure 11) related the research and assessment needs of
a business to its specific competitive position. Its study examined the market
environment facing firms and related it to the recommendations for individual
companies. The Boston Consulting Group in matching their theories to
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customer practice tried to bridge the credibility gap between the academic
theorists and the practitioners.
FIGURE 11 STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
It seems that the substance of marketing in improving industrial
competitiveness requires the strategic focus and the rigour of planning applied
actively to operational implementation (Gluck, Kaufman and Walbeck 1980;
Cravens 1986; Day 1985; and Gray 1986). The interdependent relationship
between strategic planning and its implementation is according to Spillard
(1987), "especially so in marketing because of the essential way in which it
has to relate to other functions both inside and outside an organisation".
Spec:Ansa-
In the UK, a survey on British management by management consultants,
Kepner-Tregoe (Management Today, 1987) found a surprising lack of strategy
in some of Britain's largest companies (one hundred and ten firms out of the
37
Times 1000 companies). Of the chief executives interviewed, 14% saw
themselves as not involved in setting strategy with 29% detached from the
planning of strategy. This was due to running the company 'purely on gut
feeling' and seeing strategy emanating as a 'bottom-up process' in their
organisations. This implied lack of contact and control from the chief
executives.
The differences between British and Japanese planning systems are
emphasised by Kono (1984). In Japan, planning is often a 'top-down'
approach (UK bottom-up). Setting clear goals and guidelines are of prime
importance (UK planning systems have priority). The diffusion of long range
planning practices in Japan especially in large corporations contrasted
favourably with the short-term orientations of UK companies.
In the USA, Cundiff and Hilger (1984) noted that management styles (Table
7) resulted from a combination of training, personal preferences,
organisational structures and cultural traditions. Centralised decision-making
was standard in western firms with hiring and firing decisions based on
performance and qualifications criteria. In comparison, Japanese firms were
noted for consensus decision-making and employee participation
demonstrated in Table 7 in the various contrasts of managerial decision-
making in the contrasting cultures of American and Japanese firms.
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TABLE 7
CONTRASTS IN MANAGERS' DECISION-MAKING STYLES
kres ul dectsion-maitine US Firms Japanese firms
Delegation of Authority Yes: believed to be
manna/ in mcreasing
subordinates
capabilities
Yes: subordinate
development us a
pnmarv milUleMent
function: violater
Sup/cations tor
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SOUght and accepted
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comnbute to
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dectsions:consernus
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Is 'went
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for maiuni good
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firms: more
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Empnasis in Communication
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difficult topics
Japanese attributes included group and committee consensus, employee
participation, single status for managers and employees, on the job training,
and life-time employment. With these 'attributes', Japanese product quality
and the success of its firms in export markets have been mentioned in the
academic literature and the business inedia whenever Japanese organisations
have been compared with Western ones. Essentially the message is that
Japanese business culture is bound up with the philosophies and histories of its
companies which make them different. These differences in some collective
way are seen to lead to the successes of their exports and their investment
ventures in the UK and the USA.
For example, Tom Peters in 'T Peters, Management Guru' on Channel Four
television (April 1989) harangued an audience of managers over the
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limitations of western corporate culture. He maintained that the Japanese
corporate culture of encouraging self-development in workers and managers
alike towards the mutual fulfilment of corporate goals were at odds with the
expected management perks in Western companies and their treatment of
employees.
Barney (1987) noted that organisations were intrinsically bound up with the
uniqueness of their history. This might make them individually rare and
difficult to imitate. The relationship between the highly subjective
organisational characteristics (eg, values, symbols and beliefs) and the firm's
competitive advantages defied rigorous description and inspection. Barney
asserted that culture was a powerful force in explaining individual and group
behaviour within organisations but it was unspoken and taken for granted.
There is support in the literature towards good organisational design and to the
improvement of decision-making procedures to establish authority, control,
bureaucracy, task specifications and responsibilities. However the powerful
relationships between strategy, structure and environment first explored by
Chandler in 1962 meant that organisation and its effect on marketing, as stated
by Spillard (1988), was "too important to leave to the organisational theorists".
An example of a particularly consistent theme in organisational development
has been that of the 'organic' organisational structure, as advocated by Burns
and Stalker (1961). The organic structure is suitable for coping with the
uncertainties in changing dynamic environments. Characteristics of such an
organic structure include continually redefining tasks, responsibilities and
specialist knowledge. Unobtrusive, administrative controls are present with
lateral rather than vertical communication to influence the value premises of
members' behaviour. The spread of commitment for the concerns of the
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organisation was highly valued. Intrinsically such a structure encouraged
creativity, risk-taking and innovation. It was evolutionary and enhanced
leadership based on merit, skills and work position. In contrast, the formal or
'mechanistic' approach reinforced the hierarchic structure of control, authority
and communication. It had a clear breakdown of functions between superiors
and subordinates, with specialised differentiations and definitions of roles and
rights. While the marketing function is not 'highlighted' in importance, in such
deliberation on organisational design, the informality of the controls in the
organic structure is seen to be more effective to deal with fast moving and
changing environments. The mechanistic structure is seen to serve firms
better in stable environments.
Complexities occur when organisational and environmental factors interact,
which has led to 'open systems' empirical research in the study of
organisational behaviour. Child (1982) and Galbraith (1973) considered that
the uncertainties faced by decision-makers showed that there was a wide
disparity between their actual information needs for action and the amount of
information presented for processing. Decision-makers could either reduce
their information needs or increase the organisation's information processing
capacities. Therefore while some formal planning, organisation and control
seem inherently necessary, some informality in procedures with better
communications between organisational levels appear equally desirable, as
indicated in the literature.
Davidson (1987) pointed out that the aim of a good organisation was to
provide a framework "in which, with qualified people and the right attitudes,
an integrated marketing approach is more likely to flourish in the long run".
To be effective, an integrated marketing approach depends on the spirit of the
organisation. Preoccupations with formal aspects like seniority, procedures
and demarcation lines would not lead to progress.
This view is supported by Drennan (1988) who saw a company's statement of
corporate mission or intent however highflown 'grinding to oblivion' if it was
not carried through by all employees. It had to be understood by all members
of the organisation so that they could make their contributions including any
radical changes which signalled a new era in a firm's mode of operations.
Real commitment to the company's strategy had to be demonstrated and its
success 'celebrated' and shared with employees. This has importance in the
marketing context for employees are the ones who deal on a day-to-day basis
with customers. Employees did not need to be involved in every aspect of a
company's strategy, eg. formulation for takeovers or diversifications but a
firm's image and reputation would suffer if employees did not identify with
corporate goals or strategies. Japanese firms were seemingly more successful
than Western firms at integrating their employees and socialising them
towards their company cultures, partly because of their homogeneity and long-
term employment practices (Cundiff and Hilger, 1984).
Summary 
As the literature has indicated, operational efficiency in implementing
marketing strategy seems to require understanding and acceptance of the
corporate philosophy at all levels. The hypothesis that informality of
organisational, control and planning processes are present in successful
companies would seem valid for testing. The requirements for firms to
develop strong orientations to develop markets and products while being
competitive in costs, production and the ability to motivate and keep its skilled
personnel, are important internal organisational factors to consider. A
limitation in the literature on empirical research into the formality or
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informality of marketing organisational procedures seems to suggest the
validity of testing hypothesis 5 with regard to the American, British and
Japanese subsidiaries operating in the United Kingdom.
2.7	 Hypothesis 6 Entrepreneurship and experimentation are stronger in
market-focussed than in functionally organised structures. 
Galbraith (1988) stated that there was evidence that "for any strategy, the high
performers are those which have achieved a fit between their strategy and
organisation", and that subsequent research in the literature was aimed at
expanding organisational attributes beyond merely 'structure'. Hypothesis 6 is
concerned with examining these aspects where it relates to the priorities of
managers of firms in their observation, understanding and responsiveness to
the external environment and to feedback eg. verbal information and market
response to the product itself. Where the organisational structure shows some
resemblance to this pattern of behaviour it could give some evidence that the
firm was innovative or entrepreneurial and willing to experiment eg. making
trial decisions, thereby improving the strategic fit. This section looks at
contrasts between market-focussed and functionally organised structures in the
literature and implications for entrepreneurship and experimentation.
In looking at the 'strategy and structure' from the Harvard Business School
studies of the Fortune 500 companies, Galbraith's view was that there was a
relationship between the type of business and the fit of product (Table 8). He
stated that an organisation which stayed in its original businesses would
remain committed to its industry its traditional markets and to its centre of
gravity, ie. the centralised fiinctional organisational structure, with subsequent
sequential stages operating as profit and loss divisions. The clearest
difference was between the unrelated business company which was clearly
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decentralised to divisions and the traditional functional splits in marketing,
manufacturing, or R & D. The strategic fit between strategy and organisation
was an important one. To Galbraith who maintained that there was "no work
done on centre of gravity changes and their changes in structure", and on
"comparisons for economic performance".
TABLE 8
Strategy and Structure
Strategy	 Structure
Single business	 Functional
Vertical by-products 	 Functional with P & Ls
Related businesses	 Divisional
Linked businesses	 Mixed structures
Unrelated businesses	 Holding company
Source: Galbraith, J., in The Strategy Process, edited by Quinn H et al.,
Prentice-Hall, p.304.
Traditional functionally organised structures work best with firms committed
to a core business while diversification into products and businesses not
related to the core business necessitated changes towards a divisional style of
organisation with increased autonomy vested in each division. But as
Galbraith stated, the shortcomings in the literature were of a lack of studies on
how such changes took place and on the related economic performance of
relevant firms.
An example of a functional organisational structure has been described by
Mintzberg (1988). It is favoured by process and scale interdependencies and
less by social interdependencies. Functional grouping encouraged
specialisation but the problems included a narrowing of perspectives focussing
on means rather than ends.
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Mintzberg favoured the market-based structures such as those grouped on the
bases of products and services. As Mintzberg puts it,
"the tendency is to decentralise in parallel, delegating to each
market-based unit the power to make most of the decisions that
affect its own operations. In this way the unit-generally called
"division" - is allowed to operate in quasi-autonomous fashion,
coordinated, as noted earlier, only by performance control
systems".
Mintzberg noted that market focussed types had a tendency to reduce the
degree of bureaucracy and the wastefulness of repetitive tasks. The market
basis for grouping was favoured because an organisation would be more likely
to be stronger in entrepreneurial and experimental leanings in its responses to
its environment.
Baker (1991) stated that in practice a marketing department could be
organised with one of seven basic orientations:- functional, product,
market/customer, regional, functional/product, functional/market and
functional/regional. A department organised under functional specialisations
shown in Figure 12A(i) had its activities coordinated by the marketing director
or manager but the negative effects of compartmentalisation, diverse interests
and difficulty in coordination might be wasteful of managerial time and effort.
Figure 12A(ii), where marketing functions are organised under product
groups, is justifiable provided each product or product group has sufficient
sales volume, as found in large decentralised companies which have strategic
business units in their divisions. Sitice marketing is both a function and a
philosophy, a market oriented structure, Figure 12A(iii) may lead to an
important recognition of customer requirements and means of satisfying them.
The comparison of marketing structures is shown in Figure 12B. The relative
merits of types of organisational structure had to take into account the
company's size, products, employee specialisms and markets.
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Figure B	 Comparison of marketing structures
Form	 Advantages	 Disadvantages	 Situational indicators
Functional	 Specialisation in task
activities to
develop skills.
Marketing tasks and
responsibilities
clearly defined.
Product/
	
Specialisation in
brand	 products/
brands.
More management
attention to marketing
requirements of
different products/
brands. Fast reaction
to product-related
change.
Excess levels of hierarchy
may reduce unity control.
Direct lines of
communication
may be ignored.
Conflicts may emerge.
Integration problem
for C.N1E.
Dual reporting.
Too much product
emphasis.
More management levels
and cost.
Conflict.
Simple marketing
operations.
Single primary product/
marker.
Wide product lines
sold to homogeneous
groups of customers.
but sharing production/
marketing systems — i.e.
proliferation of brands
and diversified products
requiring different
skills/activities.
Market/
customer/
geographical
Product/
marker
overlay
Specialisation in a
market entity— focus
on customer needs.
Fast reaction to market.
related changes.
Advantages of func-
tional product and
market specialisation
and integration.
Duplication of functions.
Co-ordination problems.
More management levels.
Allocation of respons-
ibilities is difficult.
Duplication inefficiences.
Limited, standardised
homogeneous product
line sold to customers
in different industries
— i.e. proliferation of
markets each meriting
separate eiforts.
Multiple products and
multiple markets.
Source: Baker. M.. (1991) Marketing. An Introductory Text. Macmillan Ed.
Ltd, p.482, 483, 487.
Waterman, Peters and Phillips (1988) asserted that 'productive organisational
change' was not simply a matter of structure or the interaction between
strategy and structure. Effective organisational change had to be about the
relationship between 'structure, strategy, systems, style, skills, staff and
superordinate goals'. The interaction of these were not especially obvious and
were underanalysed in the literature according to the authors.
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FIGURE 13
A new icw of organisation
Source: Waterman. R.. Peters. T. and Phillips. J.. The Strategy Process, edited
by Quinn et al. p.272.
In Figure 13, Waterman et al's diagram had no starting point or implied
hierarchy because each of the critical variables was important in
organisational change and each was interconnected to others eg. with
'Structure,' emphasis should be on coordination rather than over-concentration
on the division of tasks. Since Chandler (1962) first pointed out that Structure
followed Strategy, a company should plan for or anticipate changes in its
external environment. This would help to improve its position vis-a-vis
competitors.
'Strategy' was a central concern supported by the systems or formal and
informal procedures that were followed by organisations. Waterman et al
stressed that 'systems' should be market-oriented rather than internally
oriented. The personalities and patterns of actions of managers ie. symbolic
behaviour, reflected managerial 'styles' impacting on decision-making. People
should be regarded as a pool of resources to be nurtured, developed and
allocated in the 'staff context, and new 'skills' should be added to enhance new
capabilities in organisational processes.
4 8
With superordinate goals, the authors claimed that unlike the other six S's
these goals "don't seem present in all, or even most, organisations. They are,
however evident in most of the superior performers".
The guiding concepts as a set of values and aspirations often unwritten, going
beyond the formal statement of corporate objectives, represented the
superoalinate goals. These gave the fundamental ideas around which the
business should be built. Ongoing research reported in the Economist (1991)
on Britain's Most Admired Companies' introduced a further element to be
counted amongst the best performing firms. This was 'peer admiration' from
competitors because admiration for the way in which a firm operated would
encourage customers to buy more, employees and suppliers to work harder,
and shareholders to be more loyal.
TABLE 9
Stages in an organisational development programme
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Diagnosis Action Implementation Evaluation
and
feedback
Planning and
Consolidation
Source: Woolhouse, J., 1989, - The Gower Handbook of Management, edited
by Quinn J, et al, Gower, p.46.
Woolhouse (1989) put forward four main stages to conceptualise what he saw
as a good organisational programme. In Table 9 Stage 1 concerned defining,
diagnosing and understanding the tasks to be performed, relating to the current
stage of the organisation and where it wanted to be in the future. The ability
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of people to respond was dependent upon the level of entrepreneurship and
experimentation allowed by the organisation. As Waterman et al had stated,
their superior performers were those consistently performing better in the
seven S's. In Stage 2 of Table 9, more detailed analysis of problems,
relationships and roles led to action planning. In Stage 3, the implementation
phase, feedback and modifications were necessary as every programme was an
experiment in managing changed. The implications of actions needed to be
understood by everyone involved. Stage 4 concerned evaluation and
consolidation to reinforce changes that were effective in practice.
Woolhouse stated that since organisations vary in purposes, methods,
technologies, scope and size of operations, cultures, economic, political and
social environments, there was no single solution to what constituted the best
organisation in a given situation. The seven S's provided a framework which
could be consistently applied to all organisations as the variables involved
were important to any firm. The issues of entrepreneurship and
experimentation were important in this context because of the need, as
specified by Waterman, Peters and Phillips, for organisations to be effective in
responding to the environment. Therefore market-focussed firms, as proposed
by Mintzberg, were better equipped in this respect than those traditionally
structured by functions (Manufacturing .Today, 1991).
On a further dimension, entrepreneurship and experimentation were
encouraged in the learning approach preferable over that of planning
according to Mintzberg, where 'individuals at different organisational levels
contributed. Chief executives should use a visionary approach where,
"strategic formulation is a semi-conscious process in the
mind of a business leader...with a profound knowledge of
his company's products and markets, and an insight., of the
way the company must go".
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Mintzberg argued that this visionary approach was part of the Japanese
global corporation's ethos and that western formal business training
distanced managers from products and markets.
Peters (1988) had argued that 'excellent firms' were those that focus on
constant improvement an change. But the dilemma was shown in the
question 'Who's Excellent Now? (Business Week 1984) when two
years after the publication of 'In Search of Excellence' by Peters and
Waterman (1982), seventeen companies in their list had fallen from
grace.
Summary 
It therefore appears that while good organisational theories are
prescribed in the literature, there is a shortage of studies, as stated by
Galbraith, on how firms change or respond to the need of markets and
on comparisons between firms. Changes in the nature of competitive
pressures on firms and on competing nations with their entrepreneurial
and experimental responses to market based developments were shown
to be important, by Waterman et al and Mintzberg. But the need to
understand how firms can organise to succeed in the light of change in
the marketing environment supports the testing of hypothesis 6.
2.8	 Hypothesis 7: Effective marketing is a factor of critical importance in 
asserting the successful global competition of firms 
According to Cundiff and Hilger (1984), the optimization of
international strategies in the multinational firm requires a capability
within the corporate system to adjust strategy to different market
conditions within an integrated planning framework. So marketing
decisions should be integrated geographically. They must also be
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synergistic in terms of short versus long-term goals and the effects of
overall strategy input on each other. Hypothesis 7 seeks to examine
whether it is the effectiveness of the marketing strategies that has
accounted for the global competitiveness of firms.
The European Management Forum (1984) explained competitiveness
as the immediate and future ability of, and opportunities for
entrepreneurs to design, produce and market goods worldwide whose
price and non-price qualities form a more attractive package than those 
of foreign and domestic competitors. Global competitiveness referred
to this process whereby firms were able to manufacture, distribute and
sell their products in world markets more effectively than competitors.
This required marketing strategies to be effective and to be adapted to
the different stages of companies' product life-cycles and resources.
Porter's work on 'Competitive Strategy' (1980) identified the principle
reasons for strategy fragmentation as: low overall entry barriers, high
transport costs, low achievement of scale economies, high inventory
costs, erratic sales, and size advantages in dealing with buyers and
supplies, heavy creative content in the fmal product, diverse
fragmented marketing, local regulation, and government prohibitions.
So how do firms overcome these barriers to devise and implement
successful marketing strategies?
Porter's classification of generic strategies to outperform other firms
using a position of cost leadership, differentiation and focus can
provide a useful conceptual framework. For example to pursue a
position of overall cost leadership, based on the popular experience
curve concept a firm would aim for the most efficient facilities and
scale economies.
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In order to do this, it would have to achieve high market share so that
cost per unit remained the lowest in its industry. The firm would
necessarily have a high expenditure in updating facilities and
advertising other promotional support to stimulate market interest.
Differentiation as a strategy would involve the creation of a product or
service which could be seen as unique. Strategic focussing based on
market segmentation tactics could serve market segments more
effectively than competitors. In principle all three strategies involved
investment but also high returns. In practice, how could firms adapt
such strategies to their product-markets to ensure winning returns?
The literature includes explanations of tactics adopted by firms in their
strategies, for example, Kotler (1980) described target marketing as
'the act of selecting one or more of the market segments and
developing a positioning and marketing mix strategy for each'. Ryans
and Shanklin (1984) stated that additions to high technology product
mixes and product lines were often modifications and improvements of
existing offerings, many of which were suggested by customers or
distributors.
In their various forms, marketing strategies differed between
companies involving many different pricing, product and customer
tactics. Terpstra (1983) showed that their implementations required
manipulation of the marketing mix variables (Table 10) to optimise the
firm's resources with the best effect in the marketplace. The variables
in the export marketing mix can be manipulated by firms in varying
degrees to sharpen the competitive focus in a market segment. So the
elements of price, promotion, distribution and product features could
be varied by firms to present acceptable product and service offerings
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A. Advertising and promotional support
B. Direct selling by Wes forces and agents
C. Madceting services and sales nuuket support
(including MIA= intelligence, information claims
and warranty services)
D. Pricing support
E. Inventory support and warehousing
F. Product management support
G. Financial support (including bodget dates and
repora, credit auchonsation and auditing)
H. Technical support (including specifications.
operating control. product testing and pans
30P1,0)
I. Packaging support
J. Distribution support (including amen preparation.
shipping and landing expenses)
IC_ Other support (sods as data processing, legal. tax.
insurance, translation services)
Source: Adapted from Terpstra. V (19)13)
International Marketing, CBS College Publishing. 054
as they represented the 'controllables' within the firms' strategies. This
seems to be in line with the definition of competitiveness provided by
the European Management Forum.
TABLE 10
EXAMPLES OF ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE EXPORT
MARKETING MIX
Sharpening the competitive focus in a marketing strategy will therefore
have implications for the positioning of a firm's products, as it could
regenerate the growth prospects in a product's life cycle. This is
because as demand stagnates in a mature industry and relative
competitive positions become more 'stable a company can remain
successful through ways of continually seeking opportunities for
improvement, otherwise 'decline' becomes unavoidable. Achieving
operating efficiencies and product innovation in stagnant industries is a
characteristic of successful companies.
In Table 11, Porter's diagram leads to the object of creating the
sustainable competitive advantage achievable through the
establishment of an overall low-cost advantage or in product
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3A. Cost Focus
differentiation and premium pricing (Porter, 1980). Donaldson (1987)
stated that the types of competitive advantage included superior
product benefit, the perceived product advantage in the mind of the
consumer, achievement of lower costs, legal and economies of scale
advantages, superior contracts and knowledge, and developing
offensive attitudes involving a set of shared values and a sense of
mission.
Table 11
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Lower Cost	 Differentiation
I. Cost LeadershipBroadTarget 2. Differentiation
COMPETITIVE
SCOPE
Narrow
Target
3B. Differentiation
Focus
Source: Porter M 'Competitive Advantage', MacMillan Free l'ress,
p.I2.
Summary 
The literature on generic marketing ' strategies (Hamel and Prahalad,
1985, Hamermesh, Anderson and Harris, 1978; Levitt, 1980 and
Mathur, 1984) has supported the importance of differentiation and cost
leadership on a firm or industry-wide basis. A third type of strategy,
that of focussing to service a target market more effectively than other
competitors, is also explored in the literature. What seems less clear is
how firms came to adopt such strategies, whether brought about
through external policies and processes, or adopted on a 'me-too' basis.
Less indication is also given as to how these strategies need to be
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adapted over time for a combination of factors to take place in order to
arrive at a winning strategy, given the intense competition in mature
industries and the need to develop new products for growth industries.
This perceived gap in the literature may justify the testing of
hypothesis 7 overseas to investigate in a given sample of American and
Japanese headquarters firms what generic marketing strategies are
pursued and their effectiveness in asserting their subsidiaries' global
competitiveness.
2.9	 Hypothesis 8: Ethnocentricity is a barrier to successful global
competition 
Perlmutter (1969) first identified the EPRG orientations
(ethnocentrism, polycentrism, regiocentrism and geocentrism) in
association with management attitudes towards successive stages in
evolving international operations. Ethnocentrism referred to a
preference for a home country approach contrasting with polycentrism
as having a host country orientation. Regiocentrism was associated
with a regional orientation and geocentrism to a world orientation.
Hypothesis 8 seeks to examine whether there are ethnocentric
orientations in the formulation and implementation of the marketing
strategies of American, British and Japanese firms which could affect
their competitiveness.
Cundiff and Hilger (1984) had stated that 'myopia with respect to
foreign markets, a lack of interest in the potential for new growth and
profit in foreign markets' restricted the domestic firms' profitability and
weakened their ability to compete with imports in their own market. 
They maintained that firms had to make the decision to be competitive
in world markets to help to safeguard their domestic interest. They
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Problem solving	 Opportunity seeking
Export
Operational Internally
stimulated
Externally
stimulated
rv
Internally or	 Internally or
externally	 externally
stimulated	 stimulated
II	 m
Straw=
exports could be both operationally and strategically stimulated in the
problem solving and opportunity seeking contexts as shown in Figure
14.
Figure 14
typoimm I IN rERNA rioNm. •ARMAINI;
DECISIONS
Motivation to Export
Source: Cundiff. E and Hiker, M (1984) Marketing in the international Enviomment
(Prentice Hall) p30-
The routes by which firms go international may be many and varied
dependent on resources and decisions operational or strategic, problem
solving or opportunity seeking. The decisions could be internally or
externally stimulated. The routes by which firms go international
could be examined on a sample basis to determine the factors which
influence their abilities to compete abroad.
Jones (Management Today) pointed to the fact that British companies
had been investing abroad for hundreds of years. In the 1950s British
companies had more foreign subsidiaries than the USA or Japan.
Jones explained that management problems resulted in gradual losses
on the ground. 'These problems related to:- insufficient priorities to
subsidiary operations by sending corporate 'misfits' rather than high
calibre executives groomed for promotion; loose control by the British
parent companies; inappropriate organisational structures to supervise
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foreign operation and inabilities to manage change. He saw the
stereotyped view of British business as good at inventing and poor at
marketing supported by such perceived weaknesses.
British firms have been reportedly criticised for their orientation
towards the home market in the belief that home market strategies are
appropriate for both domestic and overseas markets. The Economist
(1989) saw these criticisms as based on the prejudice that British firms
had been insular, ignorant of export markets, foreign competitors and
languages. But the Economist argued that the criticisms were unfair,
giving the example that 20% of Britain's gross domestic output in 1988
went into export which was twice that of France and of Japan, and
almost four times that of the USA.
However, the UK competitiveness has in turn been helped by foreign-
owned firms, including the growing number of Japanese companies
investing in Britain. As Dunning (1986) puts it, foreign owned
multinationals directed their efforts towards the UK's fast-growing
industries. In 1981, the total net output was more than 40% in motor
vehicles and parts, more than 30% in chemicals, rubber and plastics
and over 20% in mechanical engineering, electrical, electronic
equipment and instrument engineering.
The Japanese approach was termed 'global localisation' by Morita, the
Chairman of Sony (Financial Times 1988). With the protectionist
sentiments and barriers of Europe in mind he could not see European
companies solving their problems of competitiveness by putting up
trade barriers. Japanese companies were moving into Europe for the
single European market of 1992 and setting up subsidiary operations to
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become 'good' European manufacturers. The process of 'global
localisation' as he termed it was to describe the process of setting up
operations around the world headed by local management.
Ethnocentric behaviour on the part of such Western competitors was
seen to aggravate trade disputes but did not hold back Japanese market
advances.
There is support for the global orientation from Western writers. Hout,
Porter and Rudden (1982) showed that the power of geocentrism,
which makes a company think of the world as one market instead of a
collection of national markets, can successfully change the dynamics
of a firm's industry and pull it way from its major competitors. They
showed how Caterpillar (USA) exploited world-wide sales volume and
its existing market for parts revenues. Ericsson (Sweden) created a cost
advantage in its modular technology for its market segment and Honda
(Japan) used marketing to create homogeneity for its products, thereby
using its potential for scale economies in production, marketing and
distribution.
Moreover ethnocentrism towards one's home market can be seen as
damaging. Cundiff and Hilger (1984) cited an example brought about
by environmental change. American car firms concentrated on the
large US home market as the most important, with a lack of interest or
attention to the enormous potential of the world market for small cars
because there was less profit per unit on them. When Chrysler got into
difficulties, it sold its foreign plants in 1979 as an early move to raise
cash. Retrenchment to the home market did not protect Chrysler, Ford
and Vauxhall from the advances into western markets by Japanese
59
companies initially manufacturing and selling small cars, increasing
volume and moving into other vehicle segments.
The Chrysler example of the late 1970s showed that firms would use
the same domestic marketing strategies for its overseas markets with
low status appropriated to their overseas subsidiaries. In contrast, the
polycentric firm having a decentralised organisation, with each
subsidiary operating independently of the others, would have each
subsidiary tailoring its individual resources to the unique requirements
of its local markets and needs because the differences in national
markets and their environments are recognised. The regiocentric
company see4 to develop integrated regional marketing strategies as
exemplified especially by focussing on the markets of the European
Community.
The texts on international marketing (eg. Keegan, 1984; Majaro, 1978;
Livingstone, 1975; and Terpstra, 1983) state or imply that the
geocentric approach for an organisation is the best orientation. The
geocentric firm is global in its approach because markets are not
treated as individual foreign entities as they are by the polycentric
firm. The geocentric firm pursues market opportunities, irrespective of
national boundaries or barriers to trade, using comparative analysis in
spotting similarities and differences in market environments.
If this is the case, should not firms try to convert to the geocentric
orientation in order to become more competitive? After all as the
literature suggests, it redirects marketing thought, expertise and
resources strategically to global opportunities. This enables a firm to
protect its domestic market if it has the competitive leverage to
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reallocate its financial, economic and personal resources across
national environments. This is not a view shared by other writers who
see the impact of global competition on national markets as very
harmful. For instance, Culbertson (1986) argued that in a world of
diverse nations "free trade works perversely causing obstructive
competition among nations". Desirable industries and jobs move from
countries with higher standards of living and lower wages to countries
with lower standards of living and lower wages. He cited America's
rise to pre-eminence as based on the interaction between the market's
demand and the pace-setting industries that developed to meet the
demand. Government subsidies and low wages in developing
countries distorted costs for products sold abroad, thus affecting the
competitiveness of western countries. This combination rather than
successful marketing strategies gave Japanese firms the start they
needed to compete with the West and to undercut American industry.
Culbertson supported the case for the protection of American
industries and trade barriers against the Japanese.
Glassman (1986) refuted Culbertson's arguments on the basis that the
market should decide which goods were to be sold in the USA because
consumers should be allowed to buy high quality goods at low cost.
American firms would be spurred on to become more competitive and
that politics should be kept out of economic decision-making. He saw
competitive Japanese firms as clearly having successful marketing
strategies despite the political economic debates over the
manipulations of trade by governments.
Rose (1978) also believed that US government measures to increase
corporate cashflows would become inadequate if American
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manufacturers did not adopt effective marketing strategies, despite the
political economic debates over the manipulations of trade by
governments. He argued that Japan's success in international trade
depended to a great extent on the rapid growth of its internal economy
which enabled Japanese manufacturers, unlike their US competitors, to
understand the close connection between the internal and external
markets without due emphasis on an ethnocentric orientation. Rose
was critical of American producers for not reducing their profit
margins to defend themselves against Japanese competition and for not
becoming more export-orientated in cultivating overseas markets. US
producers were 'product orientated' ceding the bottom end of their
market, enabling the Japanese to move in with lower priced mass
produced products and to challenge them later in the higher technology
specialised sectors such as cars and consumer electronics. He saw the
Japanese as able to simultaneously repeat such marketing successes in
Western Europe. Furthermore, Rose maintained that if the Japanese
manufacturers hit harder than their US competitors, it was probably
because they had a clearer understanding of the dynamics of
international competitiveness.
This view is not accepted by Wolf (1983) who made charges in his
book that individual Japanese industries were efficient but that their
competitive advantage was based on borrowed, copied or stolen
technology and that Japan's industrial elite in its Tenth Day Group'
cartel had secret agreements to raise prices in Japan of consumer
durables in order to subsidise losses in western markets when using
price-cutting to gain market entry and to destroy western domestic
firms
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Wolf (1983) stated that Japan had not played fair by American rules
because the individual corporate strategies of Japanese companies
were harnessed by MITI to destroy American industry systematically
through market means. It was not American industries which were
ethnocentric. American firms had not been able to withstand such a
systematic onslaught and successive American governments had not
woken up to this realisation of Japans 'economic war' against America.
But Japanese government intervention in industry has been seen as
'guidance' not economic warfare by Morishima (1982) without
deliberate concerted effort to undermine other countries. Morishima
attributed Japan's success in trade to the fact that since the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, Japan's business world has been guided by its
governments which have protected and subsidised industries such as
oil refining, petrochemicals, motor cars, artificial fibres, industrial
machining and electronics, while curbing excessive production.
Morishima also put the emphasis on harmony being valued where
business enterprises were communities binding management and
employees together by a common fate and common interests.
Morishima put forward the point that unlike Western firms Japanese
competitiveness had an element of greater state intervention because
there was a natural tendency not fashionable in the West to listen and
cooperate with government policies concerning industry.
Lazer, Murata and Kosalca (1988) argued that the widely held
misconceptions about Japanese government protection and closed
business practices were misguided. Japanese marketing was shown to
have a definite international dimension, taking international factors
into account in designing the marketing mix. Japanese executives
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Phase	 Date	 Selected Significant Occurrence
Premarketing
	 Prior to 1953
	 Japan Society of Commercial Sciences
Emphasis on basic needs and manufacturing
Random sampling and marketin g research
Gaining technology
Improving image of Japanese products
Necessities of life: Television
First marketing research agency awareness of
Japanese Productivity centre (1955) interest
Japan Marketing Association (1957)
Rapid economic growth
First consumption revolution
Liberalization of trade
Product planning emphasis
Translation or- marketin g articles and books
First periodicals on marketing
First marketing course
Marketing study team visits
, Marketin g
	1953-1964
1
Oil boycon
Environmental of Pollution issues
Social issues and responsibilities
Productivity and efficiency emphasis
Consumerism movement: Major market
Quality of life: High consumption
Liberalization of forei gn exchange and trade
Expansion of exports
Expansion or	 1970-1973
the marketing
domain
were seen to be human relations orientated in setting marketing goals
and determining strategies. American firms through their neglect of
consumers and markets were blamed for giving Japanese firms the
opening to establish themselves in the US. They saw Japanese
marketing qualities as helping Japan to emerge as a 'world class
marketer'. Their explanations contained a description of the phases
through which Japanese industrial society had passed to reach this
supremacy (Table 12). These phases were premarketing, marketing
awareness and interest, acceptance and diffusion of marketing,
expansion of the marketing domain and global marketing emphasis.
TABLE 12
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKETING IN JAPAN
Acceptance	 196 -1969	 Spreading affluence: Mass consumption
and diffusion	 Supermarket growth:
of marketing	 1966	 Association of Voluntary Chains
1967 Tokyo Distribution Centre
Advertising and TV
Product diversification
Electronic technology and new products
Acceptance of Japanese products 	 1
Rationalization of distribution
Adapt marketin g approaches: Status products
Japanese approaches to marketing
Japan Institute of Marketing Science
Research Institutes
Global	 1974 to	 Global markets: mature of saturated markets
marketin g	present	 Impotence of autos and steel: oil shock
emphasis	 Increase in efficiency: International focus
Expansion of exports: Trade surpluses
Reduction of barners:
increased competitiveness
Orderly market agreements: Increasin g market
share
Knowledge industnes: Hi-tech mdustnes
Source: Journal of Marketingt 19/15). S prin g. Vol 49. P73
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Lazer, Murata and Kosaka's study (1988) was one of the few attempts
to 'dig beneath all the surface', seen as important by Dentsu and
Shigmaguchi (1978). The concentration in the literature has been on a
comparison of the short-term objectives of western firms contrasted
with the advantages of Japanese firms. Abegglen (The Economist,
1986) pointed to the overriding emphasis placed on the return on
investment, the shareholder's objective, of Japanese firms. Lazer and
others stated that, in addition to this, the adversarial nature of
management and worker's relations was a factor contributing to poor
American performance and ought to be taken into account as one of
the explanations for slow American global advances in world markets.
Summary 
The discussion in the literature has gone into the question of whether
the Japanese were efficient marketers (eg Lazer 1988) or unscrupulous
ones (eg Wolf 1983) compared to Western firms because the
competitiveness of such firms has appeared to be affected by
government support or non-support for industry. What seems relevant
for testing is whether American, British and Japanese firms exhibit
ethnocentricity in their marketing orientations, in order to determine
the competitive factors for success, and not merely attribute this to
government intervention or non-intervention. The growth of
competition on an international basis can be seen to be an inevitable
consequence of the expanding international marketing activity (Baker
1989). Ethnocentric firms may therefore put themselves at a
disadvantage. So hypothesis 8 seems relevant for testing overseas to
determine whether foreign owned firms competing with indigenous
British ones are more or less ethnocentrically oriented and whether
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Threat of new entrants
Macro Forces
Economic
Social
Cultural
Technological
Potential
Macro Forces
Customers changing
needs and wants
Government
Suppliers bargaining
for power and
effectiveness
The Industry 
Competitors Jockeying
for position
ethnocentrism has an impact on the market success of their subsidiaries
abroad.
2.10 Hypothesis 9: Successful firms clearly focus marketing strategies
at targeted opportunities in national markets to develop global 
advantages. 
Effective competition implies a strong link between the selected
marketing objectives and the means with which they are implemented
by the firm. This principle applies in the consideration of national and
global markets. As Keegan (1984) stated, the marketing principles
guiding strategy development are fundamentally similar for both
domestic and foreign markets. Hypothesis 9 seeks to examine the
ways in which overseas competing firms from Japan and the United
States can transfer and make their marketing strategies work across
national boundaries.
In Figure 15, Porter (1980) showed the major forces influencing the
competitive strategies of firms to demonstrate that firms had to jostle
for position in the middle as members of their 'industry'.
FIGURE 15
FORCES INFLUENCING COMPETITION IN AN INDUSTRY
Source: Porter, M., (1980) 'Competitive Strategy'
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In his 'Competitive Advantage of Nations', Porter (1990) takes this
further to show examples of where overseas firms can gain advantages
over domestic ones in the latter's markets. For example, Porter
contended that Japanese firms in a variety of industries gained because
the needs of their home buyers anticipated those of other nations over
energy costs, efficiency and conservation. The long distances between
Japan and many markets stimulated innovations in logistics and
demand for its shipbuilding industry. Japanese investment in robotics
research funded out of overall corporate earnings paid off in spawning
successes in automated production lines for the car industry, machine
tools and bearings production.
On the other hand Japan had also been a recipient of technological
know-how and technical assistance programmes from the west. It had
initially been seen to produce imitations of standardised mature
products with earlier advantages of low labour costs for export markets
(Wenlee Ting, 1982). Overcoming its dependence on imported
resources by prospering through a protected domestic market and
relatively free access to western technology and markets would have
helped Japanese polycentric and geocentric orientations. But the
consequences of trade friction over its high surpluses with the UK and
USA was forcing radical changes in Japan in order to stimulate
domestic demand for imports and to reduce Japans large trade
surpluses. As Michelson (The Economist Conference Unit, 1988)
stated, the shifting balance of economic power from the west to Japan
have led to 'resentment, frustration and growing protectionism' from
other developed nations.
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The Economist (1989) pointed out that Britain offered 'low labour
costs and relevant skills" as inducements to attract Japanese
investment. If such competitive advantages can be found in Britain,
why have Japanese companies continued to make advances into British
markets and not indigenous British producers? The Economist put
forward a paradox for consideration. It argued that British business
may be "too international, more willing to buy up foreign companies
than invest in good old Britain". It cited evidence from the American
'Mergers and Acquisitions Magazine that in 1987 and 1988 British
firms spent £30 billion buying American firms and thus beating Japan's
spree in the USA. The abolition of Britain's exchange controls in 1979
with its oil based current account surpluses of 1980-1985 were given
as reasons for the outward flow of British investment. This was to be
overtaken by Japan in 1985 as the world's biggest net creditor.
Arguments about Japanese low labour-cost advantages or UK firms
needing to shift to offshore production because of rising labour costs
may now appear exaggerated, according to the Economist.
Lipsey's work suggested that overseas market shares held by American
firms were very steady, especially those of American multinationals
indicating that they were strongly tompetitive with other overseas
firms including the Japanese. Lipsey's work on the competitiveness
and comparative advantage of US multinationals (Banca Nationale Del
Lavoro Quarterly Review, 1987) suggests that while the US share of
world manufactured exports declined steadily from the 1950s to the
1970s (Table 13) their 'exports position' seemed to be insulated from
changes in home-country policies or circumstances because of
ownership of businesses or operations in several countries and
worldwide responsibilities for decision making. Typically for most,
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decentralisation is into international divisions run by specialist staff.
In the UK, Johne and Snelson (1987) found that most successful
British and American businesses were technology-led in engineering
and chemicals and market-led in food.
Table 13
SHARES (%) IN THE WORLD EXPORTS
1957	 1966	 1977	 1982	 1983	 1984
1	 US	 21.3	 17.5	 13.3	 14.3	 13.7	 14.0
US Multinationals 
2	 Parents	 n.a.	 11.0	 9.2	 9.5	 9.1	 9.2
3 Majority owned
affiliates (MOFA)	 5.8	 8.2	 9.7	 9.7	 9.9	 10.3
4 Parents and MOFA	 n.a.	 17.7	 17.6	 17.7	 17.7	 18.1
Source:	 Lipsey, R (1987) 'The Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage of
US Multinationals 1957 - 1984 Banca Nationale Del Lavoro,
Quarterly Review (vol 161) p151
The overall share of US based multinationals (Table 13) including
exports by parent companies and the majority owned affiliates
(M0FAs) remained stable and increased slightly in 1984 (see line 4 in
the diagram). The growth of the affiliate exports to 10.3% in 1984
more than offset the decline in the US performance as a whole. This
seems to show that multinational firms are able build upon local
strengths in their diverse markets and build global advantages in the
way in which they can allocate resources and target opportunities in
national markets. Lipsey (1987) stated that more research on the
characteristics which determined the competitiveness of firms and the
attractiveness of countries in terms of production locations should be
emphasised.
Rugman (1987) found that the world's largest five hundred
multinationals accounted for about half of the values of international
exchange. They possessed a bundle of competitive advantages in
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raising capital, exploiting scale economies or increasing distribution
channels. For example, business corporations could shift to offshore
production if they did not find it easy to achieve cost economies or
efficiencies at home. By taking advantage of scale economies and
controlling sources of cash flow in different national environments an
organisation can also develop competitive advantages. An appeal like
this is described by Hout, Porter and Rudden, (1982).
However, some of the literature on export research seems to place
greater importance on distribution channels in facilitating market
success abroad. The Uppsala School (Rosson and Reid, 1987) held
that foreign market operations were frequently dominated by
intermediary distributor and agent activities who had almost sole
responsibility for promotion, market research, setting inventory and
service provision. These converted for the exporter strategy into action
in a specific foreign market. This view is modified by Rosson and
Reid (1983) who emphasised the importance of the links between
'processes, structure, strategy and organisation'. These have been
variables included in Waterman's et al 7's' framework. Rosson and
Reid saw exporting as strategic requiring a combined management and
marketing focus, with the choice of channel as the 'embodiment' of an
exporting firm's strategy. The research carried out by Bilkey (Reid and
Rosson, 1987) based on a judgement sample of firms in the United
States on their export marketing practices to the ten export destinations
of Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, the UK and West Germany concluded that a
subsidiary or foreign distributor were the two most profitable export
channels.
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This may explain why Japanese firms have put extensive dealer
support behind their dealer operations, as in the UK car market and
used subsidiary or affiliate selling structure as in the UK consumer
electronics industry. In other words strategic modes of entry into
Japan regarded to be profitable can also be applied by the Japanese
themselves to overseas markets. This would seem to indicate that the
distributive and selling tactics in the marketing strategies of successful
exporters can be transferred across national boundaries despite the
increased complexities of operating in international markets.
The difficulties faced by firms in overseas markets in the 1970's were
given by the International Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP)
which made detailed analysis of buyer and seller interactions in the
five industrial markets of France, Italy, Sweden, Germany and the UK.
It took the view that suppliers and buyers had to form relationships to
obtain mutual benefits, some of which were difficult to quantify such
as access to market and technical information, and responsiveness in
handling customer complaints (Turnbull and Cunningham, 1981). The
IMP's criticism of western firms included:-
- a lack of understanding of how foreign firms work;
- an unwillingness to change normal established procedures;
a lack of joint product development and skills in understanding
buyers' problems or analysing customers' needs; and the
reluctance to learn and use foreign languages.
In this context some British firms were seen to lack interest and skills
in foreign market ventures thereby reducing their long-term
competitive abilities. Buckley (1987) asserted that firms could be
competitive provided there were reductions in costs, adaption to local
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demand conditions, improvement in market intelligence and
information with the appropriate timing of strategic moves. These are
seen as factors which contribute to marketing effectiveness and hence
competitiveness.
A wider perspective to this has been taken by Baker Hart and Black
(1987). They stated that to impute competitive success to marketing
factors alone was unsatisfactory since four sets of factors of
environment, organisation, strategy and management affected
competitive performance. They attributed the shortcomings and lack
of empirical work in the literature to examination of only one set of
factors and its effect on corporate success concentration on successful
companies only and within growth sectors of an economy.
Hamel and Prahalad (1985) identified three types of response for US
and European firms to follow in the face of Japanese advancements.
First, to follow low cost strategies of globalization, hence the
geocentric or regiocentric approaches, to minimize costs in productive
capacities and improve quality. Second, to improve their managerial
effectiveness in organisations. Third, to have a competitive-market
focus, to improve on their international distribution and market
penetration strategies.
Summary 
Criticisms in the literature of the performance of Western firms in
exporting as seen in the IMP study, may appear to be justified on the
grounds that the American and British have been less competitive than
the Japanese, measured by the manufacturing trade deficits of the
former and the surpluses of the latter. The limitations indicated in the
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literature (Baker, 1989) also showed the need for more empirical
field research. The scarcity of the direct comparisons of the marketing
strategies of companies from different countries seems to support the
investigation and testing of hypothesis 9 to examine how Japanese and
American headquarters companies focus their marketing strategies at
targeted opportunities in national markets and develop global
advantages.
2.11 Hypothesis 10: Globally successful firms are stronger market and 
technological innovators and investors with less dependence on low prices
to sustain market entry. 
Hypothesis 10 seeks to examine whether firms that compete successfully in a
number of world markets avoid the short-term tactics of low price. While low
price bears an economic advantage in sustaining initial demand, it can create
the longer term problems of continued low priced expectations in the minds of
customers, with low profit margins, and claims from competitors of low
quality products being dumped on their markets. Global competition is
essentially long-term and therefore includes more than an analysis of current
demand but Japanese firms have been accused of undercutting western
competitors on price (The Economist, 1989).
Otunae (1985) stated that Japanese firms were successful because they could
count on mass production, incremental managerial improvements, marketing,
technology, fast turnaround time for innovation, small systems and hardware
orientation, and a strong quality orientation amongst their strengths. Price was
only one factor but Ohmae acknowledged that the degree of financial support
from government and public R & D funds to such Japanese industries made a
73
real difference. Western governments' allocations for their aerospace and
defence sectors were large but comparatively small for their domestic
industries. This resulted in Japan overtaking its OECD partners in the early
1980s in terms of non-defence R & D expenditures as a percentage of gross
national product.
The literature on the ability of successful firms to marry their technological
capabilities with their market requirements seems to be oriented towards
comparing the abilities of Japanese companies with western companies
because of Japanese successes in western markets (Management Today,
1987). It has been argued that even if factory productivity in the US were
raised over that of overseas competitors, it would be difficult to negate low
foreign exchange rates, foreign export subsidies and Japan's 1.04% GNP
contribution to defence compared to 7.88% in the USA. Abbeglen and Stalk
(New York Times, 1985) like Olunae, found that the competitive strength of
Japanese companies lay in not only price but also the quality of their products.
There was a highly competitive level of R & D expenditure 'with
technological innovation becoming the centre of competitive capability'.
Whilst US and UK governments' funds to defence were found to be higher
than those of Japan, these writers support the view that of the big Japanese
corporations, 'the Kaisha' spent more of their total revenues on research 1983
(5.1%) compared to American corporations (3.7%). Thus commercial gains
were likelier to accrue with the greater resources given to Japanese industries,
thereby increasing their technological competitiveness in world markets.
However, the Japanese have been perceived to be unfair in trade with claims
that Japan 'soaked the west for its technology when it was poor' but hoarded
knowledge from their own technological advances, concentrating on product
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development rather than basic scientific research (Financial Times, 1988).
But there has been some evidence of scientific knowledge flowing from Japan
to the USA as Japan progresses to being 'an exporter of ideas' (The Economist,
1989). Although Japan spent $3 billion in 1985 on foreign technology
compared to $2.7 billion in 1970, Japanese firms also earned $898 million in
1985 compared to $373 million in 1980 exporting their technological know-
how.
Japan is reputed to achieve 'high savings, investment and productivity growth
rates through national development strategies that mobilise resources and
foster work incentives' for long-term prospects (Lodge and Crown, 1985). In
contrast, the UK and the USA have been seen to pursue 'wide-ranging
diplomatic and domestic goals' which did not dampen domestic consumption
for imports nor foster a climate that would significantly increase the
competitiveness of their manufacturing industries.
However the belief that Japanese successes in markets are supported by unfair
trade practices persisted, according to Drucker (1983). This has prompted
European and US Trade Commission investigations into dumping and allied
issues such as a 'beggar-thy-neighbour policy ie. stimulating Japanese exports
to reduce Japanese unemployment at the expense of other countries. As
Hoshino (1982) puts it, Japan's rapid economic growth was in sharp contrast to
the UK's position, which had a comparatively low economic growth rate
despite it large exports of technology. Dudler (1988) maintained that
complaints about unfair trade practices served to cover up the deficiencies of
firms for 'wrong product profiles, ignorance of consumer requirements, non-
adherence to agreed quality standards, lack of sufficient image, sales
promotion and poor-sales service'.
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Prentice (1984) pointed out that Japanese management strategies in
technology had enabled them to mass produce for world markets successfully
He identified certain Japanese key strengths as high R & D investment into
civil research with a higher proportion of R & D staff (24 Japanese researchers
per 100,000 of population compared to the UK's 14 per 1,000 of population)
investment in production technology (eg. computerised programming and
robotics) high product quality and high management quality.
This is supported by Stone (1984) as being a story of "manufacturing and
marketing strategy bolted onto a firm technological base in an integrated
way " . Others like Hannay and Steele (1986) had also pointed out that the
competitive leverage obtained from the 'technological advantage' was more
important than low pricing. In a study of the US competitiveness in
automobiles, aircraft, electronics, fibres and textiles, machine tools,
pharmaceuticals and steel, Hannay and Steele supported the view that the most
dramatic common theme was the world scale nature of those industries which
reflected the realities of international competition. Foreign competition
analysed showed that Japanese superiority in advanced technology lay
primarily with good management in technology, operations, choosing reliable
suppliers, and giving responsibility for quality and output to workers. There
was a close tie between technological leadership and financial performance
which included the ability to obtain capital.
Lodge and Crum (1985) maintained that the UK's decline in competitiveness
stemmed from a "mixture of antiquated economic theories, inconsistent
government policies, ineffective management-labour practices and unrealistic
priorities", at a time when the erosion of international cost differences,
diffusion of advanced technologies and the development of foreign
infrastructures were taking place. In other words while the efforts of some
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American firms and US trade policies centred on calls for trade restraints,
domestic subsidies and protectionism against overseas producers, the market
environment in the USA was drastically changing for ethnocentric
organisations. For instance, the USA was losing its capacity to produce
certain classes of machine tools, electronics and specialised bearings, to
overseas producers.
Ethnocentric firms were put at a disadvantage when overseas competitors took
wider options in their markets such as joint venture agreements making
possible the use of local networks, market intelligence, technology,
distribution channels and access to local markets. A feature of a growing
geocentric orientation was the use of pre-emptive strategies, as in the alliance
with a domestic partner for sole distribution of a foreign firm's products in a
particular local market contributing to its 'strategic agility' in the
commercialisation of ideas and a manufacturing response that would shorten
scheduled production cycles.
Explanation for Japan's large market share gains included its rise in
technological competitiveness with a large capacity for 'imitation and high
investment'. Fagerberg (1988) argued that the US loss in market share might
have been unavoidable as it was a major technological innovator, with a high
proportion of its natural resources diverted to defence and military
establishments. In looking at the national factors determining company
competitiveness, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow (1981) suggested that the
complex relationships between the dynamic environments in which firms
operated and the culture, training and resources of firms should be studied
more.
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Relative Unit	 1961-1973 
Labour cost
(RULC)
	
Growth in
market share
(Value predicted) 
Country
Japan	 31.0	 103.3
UK	 -25.7	 -16.2
USA	 -33.9	 -29.8
Source: Adapted from Fazerberg, J. (1988) 'International
Competitiveness' The Economic Journal.
Table 14
Relative unit labour cost and growth in market share
Fazerberg (1988) showed a comparison of twelve countries, there was support
for the arguments that the fastest growing countries in terms of post-war
exports and GDP also experienced the fastest growth in relative unit labour
costs (RULC). Table 14 showed this comparison for the three countries,
Japan, UK and USA. The rise in labour costs had been commonly assumed to
restrict employment and lose market share as in the other two countries.
Fazerberg showed that this was not the case with Japan because it had
technological strengths and was prepared to invest in its industries from
corporate earnings. He maintained that Japan's market strength was derived
from this.
Fazerberg's view(1988) focussed on one narrow aspect. Others have seen
Japanese strengths in marketing as a predominant factor to consider. On the
question of strategic effectiveness Rohlwink (1988) believed that many
companies often encountered severe difficulties in bringing about the
strategies that were formulated. It required the ability to coordinate the
various business operations and managers from all major functions had to be
involved in the business plan. Competitive firms therefore needed to display
clearly defined marketing strategies as part of their characteristics.
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Hanel and Prahalad (1985) took this further. They stated that those who
defined international competitiveness as no more than low-cost
manufacturing, were aiming at the wrong target. Those who failed to identify
the strategic intentions of their global competitors could not anticipate
competitive moves and often shot behind the target. Seeing it in terms of
global war, Hamel and Prahalad saw 'world brand domination' as the goal.
Retaliatory cross-subsidisation, using fmancial resources from one part of the
world to fight a competitive battle in another was used to describe the battle.
They saw the Japanese as winning the global competitive war against their
western competitors. So they advocated a framework (see Table 25) to
include three types of strategic intent for Western companies which were
building a global presence defence and overcoming fragmentation in the
development of strategic initiatives to respond to the Japanese challenge. The
authors argued that Japanese competitors had been successful at building a
global presence leaving US firms to defend domestic dominance and
European firms trying to overcome national fragmentation.
Table 15
A GLOBAL COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK
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The authors claimed that strategic intent, the obsession for winning in the
quest for global leadership, may have led Japanese organisations to be more
inventive with their resources. Western firms were seen to respond by
copying their Japanese counterparts eg moving to off-shore production to
obtain low labour costs, cost cutting improvements and investment in
technology. They were also criticised by the authors for following the
traditional planning methods of portfolio planning leading to competitive
imitation but not to innovation.
The learning and experience curve concepts can arguably be motivators for
Western firms to 'go global'. Shifting to off-shore production might have been
a result of firms not fmding it easy to achieve cost economies or efficiencies at
home due to rising production costs. So the advantage in having a global
competitive strategy seems to be that an organisation can develop a worldwide
vision on competition and control leverage points, reduce costs and thereby
sell quality products at competitive prices.
Summary
The need to combine effective marketing mix strategies for global markets
with innovative product development and high investment priorities is
therefore supported in the literature. However the orientation in the literature
has been on Japanese successes and American and British demise in these
respects. Hence Hypothesis 10 seems to be relevant for investigation and
testing to examine in a sample of headquarters companies in Japan and the
United States, what comparative strengths and weaknesses lie in both Japanese
and American parent approaches to globally oriented strategies.
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2.12 Hypothesis 11: Competitive organisations encourage closer parent-
subsidiary relationships and maintain greater scrutiny and evaluation of
their subsidiaries' marketing performance. 
To be responsive to global markets, Ohmae (1985) pointed out the importance
to corporations of 'reorganising the age of global products'. He argued that
companies were increasingly faced with difficult balancing acts in decisions
on what and how to centralise, and what decisions to leave to the discretion of
local managers. Such decisions had been exacerbated by the globalisation of
markets and products. Multinational companies needed to restructure and
reassign responsibilities at local, regional and corporate levels' because of the
growing number of products sold around the world. Ohmae (1985) stressed.
large corporations need to pay attention to the way in which their subsidiary
functions are organised in order to be more effective in responding to the
needs of their markets in different parts of the world. Hypothesis 11 seeks to
discover whether a critical factor in the effectiveness of marketing strategies
lies in the close nature of the relationship between a headquarters company
and its overseas subsidiary.
In a two-way relationship, the subsidiary may get the benefit of the collective
management expertise and resources for investment from its headquarters
organisation whilst the latter may have control, oversight and feedback of the
successes or failures of its subsidiary's marketing programmes. Hypothesis 11
seeks to analyse the closeness of this relationship, the degree of independence
or tight control, the direction of feedback and information flows, and
performance appraisal of marketing as exercised by headquarters. This
analysis includes the views of managers in both subsidiary and parent firms as
to whether they see their headquarters subsidiary relationship as helpful or
frustrating to the subsidiary's marketing strategies and operations.
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There is present in the literature a commentary on the evolution of
organisations with centralised and decentralised planning and control, and the
importance of responsive global networks and local material demands. For
example, a theoretical framework in the evolution of organisational structures
with centralised to decentralised and integrated control is provided by Keegan
(1989). Keegan in the examination of multinational and subsidiary
organisations put forward three alternatives to be considered on international
business strategies. These were Stage 1 international, Stage 2 multinational
and Stage 3 global (see Figure 16). These incorporated the progressive stages
of Perlmutter's EPRG scheme which have been mentioned in the discussion
under hypothesis 8.
In Figure 16, the basic strategy in Stage 1 is the internationalisation process
which is evolutionary and not standardised. Management's assumptions are
ethnocentric and a typical product sourcing plan is a direct export arrangement
with standardised marketing programmes. Research and development are
concentrated in the home country. In Stage 2 product sourcing inclines to
local manufacture with decentralisation of organisation and R & D.
Marketing is partially standardised with key jobs going to host country
nationals. In Stage 3, there is integrated world-wide R & D, key jobs go to the
best people and marketing is standardised in terms of a common
organisational approach to planning and achieving corporate goals. Product
sourcing takes account of all the costs and profitability factors take place.
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STRATEGY: THREE ALTERNATIVES
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The appeal of having a geocentric orientation, as suggested by Keegan, is that
an organisation can develop a worldwide vision of competition and control
leverage points. Ohmae (1985) and Peters and Waterman (1982) emphasised
that the senior management of a corporate headquarters organisation had to
have methods for picking up information or pre-empting the opportunities of
other competitors by being strategically placed on a global scale. For
example, global products made in one country required a consistent and co-
ordinated worldwide marketing operation. For instance, Canon Inc was seen
by Ohmae to change from "a local technology oriented consumer
optoelectronics company to a global 'first-class' organisation". This helped it
to establish itself in a position of market leadership in cameras and plain-paper
copiers in the 'Triad' markets of Japan, Europe and the United States.
A perspective on the success of Japanese management organisation is
provided by Pucik and Hatvany (1988). They proposed that the successful
basic organisational paradigm (see Figure 17) in large Japanese organisations
was the 'focus on human resources', that is, a shared amalgamation of common
rules and intuitions which related to three strategic thrusts. These were a
faithful internal labour market with desired skills; a company philosophy
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Figure 17
The Japanese Management System
Source: Quinn, J., Mintzberg, H and James, R., (1988) The Strategy Process,
Prentice-Hall, p.352.
Pucik and Hatvany (1988) stated that the value system of Japanese managers
and executives placed a premium on maintaining the corporation as a semi-
permanent group of individuals tied together with lasting bonds. They argued
that this led to a focus on a market share orientation, aggressive innovation
and the competitive spirit where markets are to be 'captured or defended'.
In contrast, Goold (1987) listed the pitfalls which have arisen in western
companies because interventions from corporate headquarters have been seen
as "disruptive and irrelevant". Goold listed such descriptions as:-
a) abandonment of the normal planning and control criteria to enforce
arbitrary edicts (eg cutting all overheads by 10%);
b) tunnel vision in following particular strategies; furthering the 'baronial
interests' of particular groups or divisions;
8 4
c) over-reliance on bureaucratic formal planning systems;
d) lack of support for non-core businesses;
e) failure to create a lack of consensus for action;
The findings of Hamermesh and White (1984) stated that corporate managers
needed to focus on the internal functions such as marketing, sales, engineering
and the production capabilities of their subsidiaries, as Japanese firms did.
They suggested the need to enhance performances by 'tailoring the
organisational context to the business unit's competitive strategy' and by
devoting attention to 'operational details and productivity improvements', but
did not report on empirical studies in these contexts or comparisons drawn
between corporate organisations from the Triad' (Europe, USA and Japan).
There appears to be a lack of empirical studies on parent and subsidiary
relationships, and their contact and control mechanisms to improve global
competitiveness.
Differences in the triad, particularly between Japanese and Western firms have
been highlighted by different writers. Donaldson (1985) has stated that in
western organisations, the decision-makers in corporate headquarters set
different goals in response to different priorities. These were to follow
aggressive growth in promising market segments, with high spending on
investment; keep superior management and technical personnel; provide
employment; maintain a stable revenue stream; and diversify.
These were articulated for the benefit of investors, managers, employees,
customers and host communities alike but they were all achievable. At the
same time, Donaldson saw a tendency for western firms to restrain their
activities, in R & D and staff training to fit their resources.
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This latter point has been a basis for a critical indictment of western
companies by Hamel and Prahalad (1989) over the concepts and techniques
guiding western competitive performance over the past two decades. The
authors argued the following points.
a) Widespread use of organisation structure with decentralised
strategic business units (SBU's) in western companies
discouraged coordination across different businesses and
countries. Product life cycles, generic strategies and product
portfolio matrixes constrained them within strategic strait-
jackets.
b) Japanese companies 'leveraged' resources by challenging all
organisational personnel to achieve dramatic personal, group
and corporate goals, unlike the common western approach of
trimming a company's ambitions to match available resources
known as the 'strategic fit'.
c) Japanese 'strategic intent' while in a desired leadership position
also involved an active management process over ten to twenty
years to reinforce the overall target through medium and short-
term programmes in quality achievements, cost reductions,
cultivating export markets and underwriting new product
development. This active management process involved a
commitment from all managers alike to these corporate goals
and philosophy of their enterprises. The vague mission
statements couched in financial terms from western companies
were not providing the direction for winning a global
competitive war. Japanese corporations were thus seen to be
able to sustain the obsession over the ten to twenty years quest
for global leadership. This obsession is described by Hamel
and Prahalad as 'strategic intent'.
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The importance of marketing is not disputed nor the importance of integrative
relationships between a corporation and its subsidiaries, as put forward in the
literature. But as Hamel and Prahalad indicated, it is clearly the ways in
which marketing knowledge, organisational and managerial expertise are
applied, that separate the strong from the weak.
Hamel and Prahalad (1989) believed that applications of concepts such as
strategic fit between resources and opportunities, generic strategies low cost vs
differentiation vs focus and the strategy hierarchy goals, strategies and tactics
had contributed to western decline. They stated that Japanese global
competitors had a perspective fundamentally different. Western thought was
typically focussed on existing resources, human, technical and financial.
Japanese firms had ambitions out of proportion to their resources and
capabilities. However, there are few empirical studies or discussion in the
literature concerning the lines followed by the authors that western
organisational structures and management control had put managers in
strategic strait-jackets.
Other sources in the literature indicated a different perspective. For example,
the Financial Times (1988) stated that the value of Japanese organisations in
the USA is less than that of the Dutth and UK companies. The Japanese
presence, like the presence of the US multinationals in Europe twenty years
ago had appeared threatening only because of the fast and successful pace of
its sales and investment in highly visible sectors like cars, consumer
electronics, computing technology and machine tools.
Another viewpoint put by Buckley and Mirza (1985) was that Japan's
achievements should be taken in a more reasonable context. Japan's exports
based on GDP per capita still lags behind that of the USA, Germany and
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France with a high deficit in services. Powerful western multinationals were
capable of standing up to the Japanese challenge. The management
consultants, Cresap (Financial Times, 1988) stated that all head offices'
activities of large firms should produce recognisable benefits for the operating
units. These units had the right to be consulted on the inclusion of additional
activities and to take part in the evaluation process.
However Dunning and Pearce (1985) thought that the presence of foreign
multinationals in the UK had tended to improve the competitiveness and
efficiency of indigenous firms. Foreign owned companies in the UK
performed 'above industry norms in almost all sectors individually'.
Summary 
The discussion in the literature has pointed towards Japanese successes in
western markets compared to the shortcomings of western firms and attributed
this in part to weaknesses in the management of western firms. A
shortcoming in the literature appears to have been a lack of empirical studies
on the issues of headquarters and subsidiary relationships, and the comparison
of such relationships between companies of different nationalities. This
supports the testing of hypothesis 11 to examine whether closer headquarters
and subsidiary relationships and scrutiny enhance the effectiveness of the
marketing strategies of overseas subsidiaries.
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CHAPTER THREE
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE AND COMPETITION
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2.0 ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the competitive conditions and the fortunes of the five UK
product sectors of the research. The decline in the indigenous British shares of UK
and world markets has been reflected in the overall pattern of relative demise in the
UK manufacturing industry in the 1970s and 1980s.
The findings of this chapter concluded that long-term marketing planning and product
innovation in British manufacturing industry suffered from a combination of factors
such as a lack of investment, poor demand under recessionary conditions, cost cutting
and rationalisation. There was an emphasis towards survival, short-term sales and
short-term profit considerations. The lack of confidence in British manufacturing
industry was in sharp contrast to the confidence of Japanese subsidiaries over
capturing market share in industries previously dominated by British and American
firms.
The analysis in this chapter of the reasons for the British manufacturing decline and
the impact of overseas competition with regard to the American and Japanese
competitors supported the UK hypotheses for investigation. These were based on
whether the marketing strategies of those companies highly oriented towards market
share, new environmental opportunities, fast market adaptation, aggressive use of
marketing tactics, more effective marketing organisation, entrepreneurship and
experimentation enabled them to become successful competitors in the industrial
sectors of the research. The analysis into the marketing competitiveness of the British
and foreign competitors also supported the investigation of the overseas hypotheses,
since the research sample included the UK subsidiaries with American and Japanese
parentage.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the U.K. competition in the audio/hi-fl, industrial bearings, machine
tools, microwave ovens and photocopier markets presented in this chapter along with
the comparative performance of American and Japanese firms. This is followed by an
analysis of UK manufacturing performance as a whole in order to put into perspective
the extent and intensity of the overseas competition.
The research samples were based on manufacturers and their subsidiaries. So the
contribution of this chapter in examining the market success or decline of American,
British and Japanese performances in the five UK industries is intended to aid the
analysis of the competitive market situation prior to subjecting the hypotheses for
investigation. The research is focussed primarily on the marketing aspects, but the
supporting functions of research and development, technology and investment have
been discussed in this chapter as they have an impact on the overall competitiveness
of the marketing strategies of firms.
3.2 COMPETITION IN THE FIVE UK MARKETS
This section presents the production and export figures in percentages for Japan and
the U.S.A. to show the sizes of output and shares of their exports on a comparative
basis. Manufacturing industry as a whole is very susceptible to the competitive
pressures exerted by international competitors and the figures indicating the markets
for the five industrial sectors are no exception. For the sake of consistency the 1984
and 1989 figures have been given to show the change in position over five years. The
market share figures of the leading producers for the UK market are shown. The
rankings provide an indication of the dominance of overseas competitors in the UK.
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3.2.1 The UK Audio/hill Market 
The audio/high fidelity market includes components eg. receivers and accessories,
and finished products such as tape recorders, compact disc players and packaged
audio systems (turntable with radio tuner/amplifier, plus cassettes or cartridges).
Within the consumer electronics industry the audio/high fidelity market represents an
important sector in the domestic and commercial environments where recording and
playback facilities are required for purposes such as entertainment.
This market in the U.K. has become dominated by foreign owned 'British' companies,
mainly Japanese. The audio/hi-fl figures are included by the Japanese industry under
'consumer electronics' which also include video recorders because the same
manufacturers usually produce both.
The industry is very competitive and the companies in the sample were not willing to
disclose actual sales figures. However, the rise to dominance of the Japanese firms in
the consumer electronics industry has been very significant increasing the pressures
on such western companies as ITT, Alba, and Binatrone. For example the Electronic
Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) in 1988 in its publication 'Investing in Britain':
Japan's Electronics Industry, stated:
'In 1971 not a single Japanese manufacturer was based in Britain. By
1987 there were 57 Japanese manufacturing companies 	 including 21
in the electronics industry 	 representing £75m worth of investment.'
A total UK market estimated by Mackintosh Ltd at US$ 1.2bn for the industry in
1990 seems highly lucrative to successful overseas companies such as the Japanese
audio/hi-fl manufacturers, which have set up subsidiaries in the U.K. U.K. figures are
shown in Table 16 for finished products in portable packaged and audio separate
systems given in market volumes and prices.
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TABLE 16
TI1E UK AUDIO-111-F1 MARKET
Actual	 Forecast
1985	 1986	 1988	 1990
Market Volumes (000's units)
Portable/Personal Audio	 9640	 10155	 8910
	 8305
Packaged Auclio/hif-fl systems 	 1310	 1500	 1450
	 1270
Audio separates system	 540	 530	 550	 590
Total	 11.490	 12J&5	 10.910	 10,165
Market Development at 1986 Trade Prices 
Portable/Personal Audio	 272	 289	 273	 282
Packaged Audio Hi-fl systems	 150	 171	 162	 150
Audio separates systems 	 206	 268	 363	 228
Total	 628	 728	 798	 857
Market Development at 1986 Retail Prices $m 
Portable/Personal Audio	 394	 417	 397	 410
Packaged Audio/Hi-fl systems
	 211	 240	 235	 210
Audio separate systems 	 306	 396	 541	 633
Total	 911
	
1.053	 1.173	 1,253
Source:	 Pioneer Inc, Japan (1988):-
Extracted from BIS Mackintosh Ltd, UK Audio Market Survey
(1988)
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As Table 17 shows, Japan has the largest production and export percentage of output
compared to the USA or the U.K. The U.K. figure of exports is high as the Japanese
manufacturing subsidiaries of Pioneer, Sharp, Sony, Akai, and Matsushita's National
Panasonic established in the UK, have all contributed to the production and exports of
the British consumer electronics industry. The U.K. market has been important and
attractive to Japan. Some of the reasons for this are: the UK's proximity to and
membership of the European Community, its political stability, its free markets and
the efforts of the British Government to attract foreign (including) Japanese
investment to the U.K. As stated by the Financial Times (1991),
"Investment in the UK rose 30% to $6.8bn
	 almost the same as
Japan's foreign investment in the whole of Asia	 The UK remains a
favourite within Europe because of the languages, the low cost of
labour in comparison with other North European states and because of
the many Japanese groups already using the U.K. as a base".
TABLE 17
and videos) Production and ExportsConsumer Electronics (audio/hill
Country
£M
Production
1984
Exports as a
percentage of
production
LM
production
1989
Exports as a
percentage of
production
Japan
USA
U.K.
19,920
5,990
940
70.1%
24.5%
43.8%
30,490
6,510
. 1,020
77.1%
30.1%
49.5%
Source: EIAJ, 1990.
There is no indigenous British producer of audio/hifi equipment. The largest
competitor of the Japanese manufacturers has been ITT, an American subsidiary.
Since the Japanese producers have been competing with one another in Japan and
overseas, they were understandably reluctant to disclose their own market shares.
The Japanese consumer electronics industry has continued to expand from £19.9m in
1984 to about £30.5m in 1989 with a high export figure to the rest of the world at
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U.K. Audio/1111i Market leaders	 1989 Rank Position
Matsushita (National Panasonic) 	 1
Sony	 2
Sharp	 3
ITT (US)	 4
Akai	 5
Sanyo	 6
Pioneer
	
7
Source: EIAJ, 1991
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77.1% as shown in Table 17. In comparison, U.K. exports also improved in 1989,
5.7% up on its 1984 position, though still behind the Japanese but ahead of the U.S.
Taking the 1989 production figures into account, the Japanese consumer electronics
industry is about five times bigger than that of the USA and thirty times bigger than
that of the U.K.
There is a difficulty in estimating the allocation of market shares between Japanese
and Western companies, and between Japanese companies as the product brand
leaders consistently claim to have significant and growing market shares. The
industry is very competitive and since the companies in the sample were unwilling to
disclose actual sales figures, rankings have been given in Table 18.
TABLE 18
National Panasonic, Sony, Sharp and ITT claimed over 12% of the market shares each
for audio/high equipment. However ITT claimed that its share was concentrated in
the prestigious end of the market for committed lovers of high quality sound
recordings and playback systems. Akai saw itself as following quite strongly with
over 5% market share, but could not compete in resources or size of organisation with
the top three market leaders. Pioneer considered itself to be a growing competitor in
the audio and recording facilities particularly with their development of compact disk
systems.
3.2.2 The U.K. Microwave Oven Market 
Microwaves cook food more quickly than conventional methods so that the appeal of
microwave ovens to customers is that of speed, convenience, versatility and
cleanliness. They can also be promoted as status symbols in the modem convenience
product range for households. Microwave ovens therefore have a distinct market
sector within the cooking appliances industry in both domestic and commercial
catering environments.
The UK market for microwave ovens, as has audio/hifi, has become dominated by
overseas competition particularly from the Japanese. A reason for this was given by
an ITT U.K. director interviewed during the course of the research in 1987. He
remarked that since irr was a large business conglomerate with concentration on its
high technology industries, telecommunications and military defence equipment, it
was not surprising that the company should put less emphasis on being the market
leader in the UK consumer electronics market. However this does not explain why
large Japanese organisations like Toshiba or Hitachi have been able to dominate these
UK markets as well as effectively competing in the high technology sectors.
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The microwave oven industry can perhaps reflect the difficulties faced by indigenous
British manufacturers of domestic home appliances. By 1975 the recessionary effects
in the U.K. from high interest rates, industrial relations problems relating to coal and
steel industry strikes and the introduction of the three day working week (1973 -
1974) had discouraged investment in product development. Table 19 shows the
production figures and exports percentages for microwave ovens. The Japanese
figures showed a growing trend in the exports of microwave ovens to over 60% in
1989, with much less change in the exporting performances of the USA and the U.K.
TABLE 19
and ExportsMicrowave Oven Production
Country
LM
Production
1984
Exports as a
percentage of
production
EM
production
1989
Exports as a
percentage of
production
Japan
USA
U.K.
270
9,100
220
59%
20.1%
1.8%
380
12,500
310
64.5%
21%
2.3%
Source: AMDEA, 1991
The UK Association of Manufacturers of Domestic Electrical Appliances (AMDEA)
in a telephone interview estimated the volume of annual sales to be growing at 1.4m
units from the mid to the late 1980s, and slowing down in 1990. UK manufacturers
had the technology to develop the microwave oven for the domestic market but had
not done so. The UK director of the US firm, Litton, claimed that they developed the
microwave concept for cookers. However, Toshiba's market success with the
domestic microwave oven in the U.K. in 1974 established a potential which Sharp and
Phillips were quick to follow. The other US manufacturers of microwave ovens along
with Litton had originally pioneered the microwave ovens for the catering trades in
industry and not for the domestic market, and this was their loss. The loss of failure
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to exploit the opportunity to dominate in this important sector of the domestic market
home appliance industry by indigenous British manufacturers or their US competitors
can be demonstrated in Table 20.
As in the audio/hifi industry, the ranking of the market leaders provided an indication
of the dominance of certain companies (see Table 20). The research interviews
appeared to indicate only that Sharp and Toshiba were the market leaders with over a
20% share each. Japanese manufacturers dominated the sector with Matsushita's
National Panasonic, Hitachi, Sanyo and Toshiba amongst them.
TABLE 20
U.K. Microwave Oven Market Leaders 	 1989 Rank Position
Sharp (Japanese)	 1
Toshiba (Japanese)	 2
Thom (British)	 3
Sanyo (Japan)	 4
Phillips (Dutch)	 5
National Panasonic (Japanese)
	 6
Hitachi (Japanese)
	 7
Source: The Japan Electrical Manufacturers Association, 1990
This ranking has continued without change since 1986 with the market leaders
continually striving to innovate the product features of microwave ovens. They were
also seeking to reassure both the new user and the replacement markets that home
cooking in such ovens was safe and highly satisfactory, given the adverse publicity in
the 'scares' over food poisoning in undercooked and frozen meals.
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3.2.3 The U.K.Pholocopier Market
Originally with its roots in xerography photocopiers are used to reproduce low,
medium and high volume copies from originals or copies of paperwork in office
environments for profit and non-profit making enterprises. The reduction in the size
of photocopiers from large floor standing machines to compact desk-top models to
meet modem office needs with a correspondingly larger price range has led to the
expansion in the market to small, medium and large businesses. While photocopiers
can be used in the domestic market, this market unlike the one for microwave ovens is
insignificant at present compared to the sales to the commercial and industrial sectors
concentrated upon by the photocopier manufacturers and dealers.
Japanese successes in the audio/hifi and microwave oven markets have been repeated
in the photocopier market. Actual market figures in terms of national sizes have been
difficult to ascertain due to their incorporation into the statistics for 'industrial
electronic equipment'. Table 21 gives the total figures for industrial electronic
equipment which includes wire and radio communications system, electronic
application, measuring and business equipment. The source of this information is The
Electronic Industries Association of Japan. This is followed by Table 22 on the unit
placements of photocopiers from Dataquest, London (1991). From this source the
size in volume terms for the U.K. photocopier market can be estimated at over 91,000
units.
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TABLE 21
and ExportsIndustrial Electronics Production
Country
EM
Production
1984
Exports as a
percentage of
production
EM
production
1989
Exports as a
percentage of
production
Japan
USA
U.K.
25,790
115,820
10,870
40.2%
19.4%
48.8%
78,450
156,660
19,030
58.2%
27.6%
30.2%
Source: EJAJ 'Facts & Figures', 1990
U.K. exports as a percentage of production declined to 30.2% in 1989 with the loss of
market shares from both Rank Xerox and Gestetner, both regarded as indigenous
British manufacturers. By 1983, Rank Xerox had been overtaken by Canon Inc,
Japan as the market leader whereas Gestetner became an Australian subsidiary in
1990.
The market leaders have branded each others' equipment. For example, Ricoh has an
exclusive dealership with Nashua Copycat, USA to sell both their equipment in the
USA whereas Kodak have been supplied by Canon for some of its copier equipment
and has been selling it under the Kodak name. The establishment and penetration of
the Japanese copier manufacturers in the USA may account in part for the increase in
the production and export figures for the USA in 1989 compared to 1984. IBM
withdrew from the manufacture of copiers in 1986 although it continued to support its
existing customers through the Nashua franchise.
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TABLE 22
U.K. Photocopier Market
Leaders
Placement of
Machines 1989 Rank Position
Canon 40,000 1
Rank Xerox 26,000 2
Sharp 15,000 3
Minolta 11,000 4
Gestetner 9,000 5
Source: Dataquest, London, 1990
These figures have been supported by Infosource SA. In its 1988 rankings the top ten
manufacturers included only one British firm (Rank Xerox), ranked second and one
American firm (Nashua Copycat), ranked ninth. The rest were Japanese. In 1983, the
UK market size was put at £560m and estimated to be over £750m from 1988. While
Japanese companies have set up manufacturing subsidiaries in the UK and the USA,
their exports have continued to rise to the USA, W-Europe and the newly
industrialising economies, especially in Asia. Japan's Business Machine Makers'
Association put Japanese exports at 1,801 units in 1984 rising to about 2,500 units in
1989. The UK market has represented a lucrative industry which has become
dominated by foreign owned enterprises. The growth of imports into, the U.K. has
also been accompanied by the import of components for assembly in U.K. plants.
This latter has been a subject for investigation by the European Commission since
1988 as part of its enquiry into foreign screwdriver operations to bypass European
tariffs and restrictions.
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3.2.4 The U.K.Machine Tool Market
Machine tools are treated as capital equipment in metal working industries, for
example those producing fabricated metal products, machinery and transportation
equipment. The industry covers the metal forming and metal cutting processes
divided into two major categories:- conventionally and numerically controlled
machines. Machine tools range from the stand alone machines to flexible
manufacturing systems used in the computerisation and automation of modem
production and assembly plants. The machine tool industry is essentially
infrastructural to a manufacturing nation.
As shown in Table 23, Japan's total production was the highest at £2,339m in 1989
compared to the USA at £1,408m and the U.K. at £263m. The U.S. machine tool
market has faced competitive pressures from leading Japanese and German producers.
U.K. exports as a percentage of production declined in 1989 to 41.2%
TABLE 23
and ExportsMachine Tools Production
Country
EM
Production
1984
Exports as a
percentage of
production
EM
production
1989
Exports as a
percentage of
production
Japan
USA
U.K.
2,339
1,408
497
35.7%
16.8%
45.5%
.	 5,993
1,996
969
38.4%
28.9%
41.2%
Source: MTTA, London, 1990
The Machine Tool Technologies Association (MTTA) stated in its 1990 'Machine
Tool Statistics' that the 1989 export and import values were the highest recorded.
With the removal of inflationary effects, exports were still well down on their record
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values while imports were the second highest recorded in the last twenty-five years.
The 1989 imports were put at over £519m compared with over £256m in 1984. U.K.
machine tool production and exports have been struggling to reach the previous levels
but these efforts have been progressively battered by consistent import penetration
through the 1980s. Such problems in international competitiveness in the machine
tool industry have been felt not only in the U.K. but also in the USA.
The Machine Tool Technologies Association (1991) estimated that there were at least
three thousand different types and sizes of machine tools, varying in value from under
£1,000 each to over £1,000,000. It is therefore very difficult to compare market
shares of machine tool manufacturers. The computerised numerically controlled
machines (CNC's) are custom-built individually for each large customer. Over the
past twenty-five years (CNC) machines have been developed in the form of
programmable units attached to machine tools which can be part programmed on-line
by the operator or off-line in the production engineering office. These may contain
more than one hundred cutting tools and perform the work of eight standard stand-
alone machine tools. From the mid-1980s CNC technology has been further
developed to incorporate the concept of the flexible manufacturing system (FMS)
which has two or more machining centres linked and controlled by a host computer.
The Japan Machine Tool Builders' Association claimed in a research interview that
nearly 80% of its machine tools built for Japanese and Western markets were CNC
machines with a rising proportion of FMS machines. Machine tool manufacturers
tend to produce for specialised segments and those in the research sample were not
necessarily producing machine tools that were directly comparable. This has been
complicated by customer organisations increasingly demanding, as their own product
technologies have matured, of machine tool manufacturers to produce equipment as
close as possible to their own particular specifications. This has made it difficult to
estimate actual market shares because of the need to compare equivalent types of
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machine tools. So the U.K. rankings taken for flexible manufacturing systems are
shown in Table 24.
TABLE 24
1989 Rank PositionU.K. Machine Tool Market Leaders
(for FMS systems)
Scharmarm (W. German) 1
Fritz Werner (W German) 2
Yamazaki-Mazak (Japan) 3
Kearney & Trecker Marwin (British) 4
Cincinnati, Milacron (US) 5
Source: Machine Tool Builders' Association, 1990
Other companies such as SMG (Sweden) and Mandelli (Italy) along with Japanese
firms Hitachi Seiki and Makin° have been in the international machine tool market
FMS systems. The companies in the research sample apart from Yamazalci-Mazak
and Cincinnati Milacron, (moving more towards sophisticated plastics technology),
have been primarily concerned with FMS and CNC machines. The FMS rankings
have been given however because the industry leaders in the U.K. and abroad would
have to be active at this top end of the market in order to retain dominant leadership.
The largest single user of machine tools is the automotive industry but there is a large
diversity of industries dependent on machine tools for their production facilities.
Machine tools are used for metal working purposes in the agricultural, construction,
heavy, general and precision engineering, electrical and electronics, aircraft and
aerospace industries. Adding sub-contractors and consumer products' manufacturers
to this list illustrates the extremely wide and varied end-user market for machine tools
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and the difficulties of producing directly comparable market share estimations of
manufacturers.
3.2.5 The U.K.Bearing Market
Bearings are used to reduce friction between moving parts of machines in various
types of equipment. The ball and roller bearings market is a diverse and vast one, as
many products in the modem world use them such as in the automobile, automotive,
aerospace and electronic industries. Unlike the other four product markets
researched, bearings are components and are not usually seen by end-user customers.
The recent economic trends may be summarised as:
a) Higher capital costs compared to the early 1980s.
b) Falling overall capital investment, but increasing investment in new
manufacturing technologies.
c) Uncertainty over the effects of rising interest rates and sterling's strength.
d) Intense price competition in major markets.
e) A relatively old capital stock, difficult to sell in open markets.
Overcapacity, and
g )	 Moderate decline in profits over the past few years.
Understandably U.K. manufacturers of ball bearings and machine tools are nervous of
Japanese penetration of their markets, having seen their impact on their car,
photocopier and consumer electronics industries. Evidence of this is shown by the
protectionist sentiments in the U.K. and USA presented by firms to the continual
enquiries of the European Commission and the US International Trade Commission
(1986) into dumping allegations by Far East exporters, notably Japan. For example,
the U.K. bearings industry in 1987 with sales of over £300m saw imports as a percent
of domestic bearing consumption increased to over 10% from 7% in 1980 from Japan.
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TABLE  26
U.K. Bearings' Market Leaders	 1989 Rank Position
SKF (Sweden)	 1
FAG (W Germany)
	
2
Ina (W Germany)	 3
SNR (France)	 4
Timken (USA)
	
5
NTN (Japan)
	
6
NSK (Japan)
	
7
Torrington (US)
	
8
UPI (U.K.)
	
9
Source: SKF, 1990
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The increase in the level of imports and the decline of the U.K. as a major bearing
manufacturer took place against the background of a poor investment climate,
retrenchment in the industry and a reduction in British workforces, as affirmed later in
the interviews with British Timken and Torrington in the U.K.
Table 25
Ball and Roller Bearings Production and Exports
Country
Em
Production Exports as a
EM
production Exports as a
1984 percentage of
production
1989 percentage of
production
Japan 2,125 37.8% 2,830 44%
USA 3,640 25% 3,920 28.6%
U.K. 292 22.3% 340 26%
Source: The Japan Bearing Industrial Association, 1990.
Table 25 shows the changes in the production figures of Japan from £2125m in 1984
to £2,830m with an increase in exports to 44% in 1989. This is still a higher
proportion than the US and the U.K. changes in both their production and export
performances.
Both British Timken and Torrington are US subsidiaries but regard themselves as
indigenous British producers. Another US subsidiary, Barden Precision Bearings also
regards itself as an indigenous producer because it was set up in the UK just after the
second world war. The Japanese and West German firms were regarded by them as
latecomers to the British market. Despite this, they have lost market shares to these
firms and as the rankings in Table 26 showed, the top four producers are non-British.
The ranking for the fifth position has undoubtedly altered after 1990. United
Precision Industries (UPI) was Britain's biggest manufacturer of bearings. This was
formerly known as Ransome Hoffman Pollard (RHP) which itself was a merger of 3
British bearings' producers. UPI was bought in January 1990 (FT,1990) by Japan's
largest bearings producer, Nippon Seiko (NSK). UPI had sales of £117m in 1989 and
a 2% share of European markets.
The combined sales of UPI and NSK amounted to £160m in 1989 in the world
bearings market. Compared to this, the U.K. bearings market amounted to about
£340m in 1989. Seen in this context the combined strength of UPI and NSK has
worried the remaining US subsidiaries in the U.K. because the Japanese producers
after 1990 owned more than a half of bearings manufacturing in the U.K. In addition
another Japanese producer, Minebea, a relatively latecomer to the U.K. market, had
bought Rose Bearings from APV, a food equipment maker in 1988. When the
research started with the companies in the sample, there was still at least one
significantly large British bearing manufacturer. By 1990, this situation has changed
as the Japanese producers have become much more dominant in the U.K. directly
through their acquisitions of British bearing producers.
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The state of competition in the five industry sectors examined has shown the
continued weakening position of U.K. manufacturers. On a national basis, the decline
in British manufacturing industry in general can be illustrated in Table 27. From its
peak in 1983, the decline in manufactured goods was reversed temporarily in 1985,
after which it sharply fell from 1986 to a deficit of over £16bn by 1989. This was the
background against which British producers in the five industrial sectors have had to
operate. Being part of this process, they too saw imports rise in their industries and
intensified competition in their domestic markets which was not alleviated by a much
smaller rise in exports. This section puts into a wider perspective the national
conditions and pressures under which the British producers in these five industrial
sectors have had to operate, as many of their domestic industrial customers were also
facing overseas competition, declining market shares and retrenchment.
TABLE 27
UK TRADE PATTERNS: BALANCES CURRENT PRICES
8 •
6 •
4 • N.
.
2
0 • -
—4.
-6 •
-8 •
-104
-12
-14 •
6
-16 •
- 1 8 :
-20;
Britain's Balance of Payments
Source: Central Statistical Office
1978
	
1980
	
1982
	
1984	 1986
	
1988	 1990
116
A comparative measure of the industrial production performances of the UK
compared to the USA and Japan is provided in Table 28. The index showed the
change in industrial production over six years. In the five years from 1985 to 1990
the largest change was for Japan 25.3%. For the USA it was 15.7% and for the UK
9.2%.
Table 28
Index of Industrial Production (1985 = 100)
USA UKJa pan
1984 96.4 98.3 84.8
1985 100.0 100.0 100.0
1986 99.7 100.9 102.9
1987 103.1 105.9 105.7
1988 112.9 111.6 109.6
1989 119.9 114.5 110.0
1990 125.3 115.7 109.2
Source: Extracted from the FT April 29 1991, p6
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The decline has spread to major sectors such as 'other visible goods' and 'services as
shown in the previous table. Business confidence in the manufacturing sector has
therefore been aggravated by the further loss of domestic demand. A Confederation
of British Industry survey (FT, 1991) charting 'producer confidence' is shown in the
accompanying table. Table 29 shows "Key answers compared with the corresponding
period of the 1980 recession 	 where there is a balance of pessimists over optimists".
The survey found that the pressure on margins dampened producer prices with "the
balance of companies expecting to raise prices at its lowest since 1967". The survey
also related to unemployment where its majority of respondents had expectation of
laying-off their employees, describing it as a "British disease of putting all the
pressure on staff numbers rather than pay costs".
TABLE 29
Two UK recessions: Balance of CBI replies
Percentage balance Jan '80 Apr '80 July '80 Oct '90 Jan '91 Apr '91
Business optimism -45 -41 -7- -47 -51 -17
Export optimism -30 -21 -57 -26 -26 - 8
Expected
employment -35 -40 -58 -37 -49
-39
Expected volume
of output -11 -14 -41 -17 -30 -8
Expected unit costs 76 72 63	 . 46 44 21
Expected domestic
prices 65 56 33 23 25 10
Source: FT, May 2, p.22
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This point can be examined with regard to the example of the machine tool industry.
Table 30 showed how the quarterly index of production (productivity defined in units
of production per employee) could be compared to the quarterly index of employment
from 1984 to 1989. From the start of 1985 to the end of 1987 the gaps between the
two indexes was less striking. However from the beginning of 1988 the machine tool
industry substantially raised its productivity level without a significant increase in
employment. Personal interviews with companies in the other four industry sectors
have also borne out this 'leaner' and 'fitter' trend. This has been due to a combination
of factors including rationalisation and cost cutting, but it has not protected British
industry from international competition.
TABLE 30
QUARTERLY INDICES OF EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION FOR THE
MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY 1984-1989 (1985 = 100) 
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120
Ho
11\
\
/t\	
!
INDEX OF PRODUCTION
I
/
N
Nir	
\
c
.41r1111111F111111.1--
/
INDEXI
A4111L
1
so
so .
:
I
•••i/
/ \/
OF EMPLOYMENT
I
/
/
/ 1
i
./
%
/
•
I
1
2	 3	 4
	
3	 4
	
2
	
3
	
4	 1
	
2	 3	 4
	
2	 3	 4
	
:	 3
1984
	
1985
	
1986
	
1987
	
19/38	 1989
Source: MTTA, 1990
119
As the examination of the five industry sectors has shown, the production and exports
of British goods compared less favourably with the performance of other nations, in
particular, Japan.
The view of the performance of IJK trade is supported in Table 31. The volumes of
IJK manufactured exports as a proportion of manufactured imports' can be seen to
decline through the 1980s, even though gross domestic product as a measure picked
up from 1980, although it tailed off in 1989.
TABLE 31 
UK GROWTH & TRADE PERFORMANCE
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The implication is that economic decline along with the inabilities of IJK firms to
match the production capacities and marketing skills of overseas firms in international
and domestic markets are a closely related phenomenon. The decline in British
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manufactured exports can be contrasted with the rising level of imports needed to
satisfy total domestic demand in the UK. This point is supported by the statistics in
Table 41 showing UK exports and imports on a geographical basis. The visible
balance of trade with 'other developed countries' which included Japan showed a
deficit of -£2,864m in 1987 and -£3,502m in 1988. The total visible balance on trade
showed the summary deficit rising from -£10,929m in 1987 to -£20.826m in 1988.
The total level of imports had steadily risen to £101,428m by 1988 contrasting with
exports lagging behind at £80,602m.
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It may be that the loss of industrial competitiveness in the UK, leading to its decline
as a major exporter of manufactured products, has helped to highlight the successes of
Japanese firms at the expense of British firms, albeit in a collective fashion.
However, American firms coming from the world's largest national industrial market
did not fare well in the collective sense compared to the Japanese (see Table 33).
TABLE 33 
KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS/PROJECTIONS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Output (real GDP) USA 3.4 3.9 3.0 1.0 0.2 2.7
annual % charge UK 4.7 4.8 3.0 0.6 -2.1 1.9
JAP 4.2 5.2 4.5 5.6 3.6 3.9
Unemployment rate USA 6.2 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.4 5.8
(% Change) UK 10.0 8.1 7.6 6.0 7.5 8.5
JAP 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.1
Current account USA -154.0 -132.0 -110.0 -99.3 -37.8 -98.5
payments balance UK -4.4 -25.5 -29.8 -22.8 -15.6 -19.9
(US Sim) JAP 87.0 79.0 74.0 35.7 42.0 58.0
Source: a)	 1987-1989 figures are compiled from Barclays Bank's
Country Reports. January 1989.
b)	 1990-1992 projections are from the 'IMF World Economic Outlook.
April 1991 (Financial Times, 1990. April 25, p.6)
The current accounts of the United Kingdom and the United States showed peak
deficits in 1987 and 1988, albeit with subsequent decreases (see Table 32). Barclays
Bank in 1989 stated that there would be continuing difficulties in making structural
adjustments to American and British industries as a result of the loss of export and
domestic markets. Despite the slow-down in the international economy from 1989,
Japanese gross domestic product (GDP) and employment were expected to perform
better than those of the UK and the USA. Consequently in contrast to the export-led
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economy of Japan, the problems of competitiveness in trade were expected to persist
into the 1990s for the UK and USA. As the earlier examination of the five industry
sectors (audio/hi-fl, bearings, machine tools, microwave ovens and photocopiers) in
this chapter has shown, the indications were that the successes of Japanese firms in
these industries would lead to problems of competitiveness for the UK.
TABLE 34
Britain's Trade with Japan and the USA
Value (fm)
Japan
1985	 1989
USA
1985	 1989
UK exports 1,850 7,900 13,295 14,435
UK imports 5,000 2,800 2,251 15,162
Source: Extracted from CSO Statistics, 1990.
The can be shown in Table 34. The steady rise in UK imports from Japan to nearly
£7,900m in 1989 contrasted strongly with UK exports at £2,800m. In 1989 UK
imports also rose from the USA to £15,162m. The retrenchment in British
manufacturing as forecast by the Oxford Review of Economic Policy in 1986 has
been borne out and can be seen to be hastened by a combination of a lack of
investment and an increased rate of liquidations. The impact of competition from
imports and periods of recession in the UK, eg. in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
appeared to have contributed to this prevailing lack of confidence in British
manufacturing, leading to underutilisation and the early scrapping of capital, as stated
by the Oxford Review.
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Table 35 illustrates that from 1984 as an overall indicator capital investment as a % of
GDP in the UK showed a more encouraging trend rising from 8.5% to 10.0% in 1988.
During these years the Japanese rise was more marked from 16.7% to 21.2%. In the
USA it declined to 11.8% in 1986, improving in 1988 at 12.3% and falling again in
1989 to 11.7%.
TABLE 35
Capital Investment as a percentage of GDP
Jam USA UK
1984 16.7 12.5 8.5
1985 18.0 12.5 9.2
1986 18.5 11.8 8.9
1987 19.2 11.8 9.0
1988 21.2 12.3 10.0
1989 23.2 111.7 10.2
1989 figures are annualised average based on 1st six months
Source: FT June 5 1990, p.22
As the Financial Times (1990) puts it, the profits of leading export-oriented Japanese
industrial companies were up by an average of 12% in 1989 which were attributable
to higher margins on exports due to the weak yen. Such profits had implications for
the US and European manufacturers as stated by the Financial Times,
"US and European manufacturers know from experience that a
good chunk of those profits will be put into new investments
that will make Japanese manufacturers even more competitive
than they are now".
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TABLE 36
R&D INVESTMENT
2.4% of domestic production (industry)
1985	 1986
	 1987	 1988
	 1989	 1990
Source: FT 1991 May 30, p.19
As Table 36 shows, Japan's non-defence R D spending had been rising since 1985,
apart from 1986. This was significantly higher than the UK levels which fell from
1988 while the US level fell from 1986. This is highly significant in marketing terms
for the application of new technology and the development of new products require
investment in R & D and human resources to increase competitiveness.
Since Japan was spending far less on its defence than the UK and the USA, it was
able to focus on advanced technologies for industrial applications. Maintaining this
theme, Patel and Paritt (1987) showed that from 1967 and 1983 the growth of UK
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output was slowest. However, they argued that even if the rate had been as good as
that of Japan, research and development would still have grown more slowly because
of the unwillingness or inability of British firms to conunit an increasing share of
output or profits to R & D and at the same rate as foreign competitors.
The Economist (1988) pointed out that high technology industries including those
making advanced machine tools or precision ball bearings for the aerospace industry,
were not created overnight. They required longer-term conunitment and investment
with UK and overseas institutional shareholders being prepared to take more account
of intangible investment in British firms rather than predatory profits in the short-
term, which interrupted R & D programmes. British products needed to be
engineered properly to ensure attractive, functionally competent designs associated
with innovative manufacturing technology. This could lead to quality production and
customers' satisfaction, thereby enhancing profitability.
The early 1980s saw gross fixed investment in plant and machinery by manufacturing
industry at its lowest over a period of eleven years to under £5bn (see Table 37),
peaking in 1989 at £9bn and falling in 1990 to £8.7bn.
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TABLE 37
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT
IN PLANT AND MACHINERY BY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 1979-1990
(in	 at 1985 prices, excluding leased assets)
E billion
9.0 —
8.0 —
7.0 —
6.0 —
4:t
5.0 —
0.0 
	
1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Notet 1990 value is provisional
Source: Basic Facts 1991, MTTA.
Any fall in gross investments is likely. to accelerate the decline in British
manufacturing and depress it even more. So the conclusion is that in order to
compete in the UK and overseas markets UK manufacturing industry needs
investment, properly engineered products, good R & D programmes and marketing
expertise, as indicated by The Economist. However the continuing strength of
imports has hampered the progress of manufacturing industry. For example, the
National Economic Development Council (NEDC 1989) identified three problematic
sectors where UK exports contrasted against imports had been weakest in the 1980s.
Comparing 1988 with 1987, these were in cars and car parts, (a 37% deficit rise to
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£5.3bn), clothing and textiles (a 30% deficit rise to £1.8bn, and consumer electronics
(a 44% deficit rise to £1.48bn).
These industrial sectors are very important to the audio/hi-fl, ball bearings, machine
tools, microwave ovens and photocopiers. For instance machine tools and bearings
are used in the production of cars and car parts, whilst audio/hi-fi and microwave
ovens are included in the statistics for consumer electronics, and industrial electronics
in photocopiers.
The NEDC's explanations for the poor international performance of these industries
were twofold:-
1. a domestic supply deficiency resulting form the inabilities of British
manufacturers to produce the right goods in appropriate quantities to
satisfy domestic demand;
2. a structural problem ie. the result of the progressive retrenchment or
complete withdrawal from such industries by indigenous British finns
because of the aggressive efforts of foreign competitors using UK
distributors or their own subsidiaries.
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The explanations suggests that 'weakness' in marketing, as indicated by the NEDC, is
a highly important factor in the demise of these industries. Domestic demand did not
appear to be satisfied by locally produced goods, hence the rise in consumption of
imports. This suggests a poor application of the marketing concept, satisfaction of
customer needs and weak targeting of customer segments through inadequate market
research and planning. In order to test these assumptions the research into the
marketing strategies of American, British and Japanese firms on a comparative basis
might indicate their relative strengths and weaknesses in marketing.
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From 1985 the volume of U.K. exports has been growing even though the rapid
growth in imported manufactured goods has continued. The import content of the
exports of manufactured goods is now higher with the sourcing of components from
abroad and the establishment in the U.K. of subsidiary operations by foreign firms,
notably the Japanese in preparation for the Single European Market in 1992. The
National Institute Economic Review (1987) noted that firms were using their better
profit margins for developing new products and markets for exports with improved
labour relations and lower unit costs. These have encouraged international firms to
invest in the U.K. for exporting to Europe.
To be successful in an integrated world economy Britain had to compete in the
growing areas of high technology goods, like chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronics,
telecommunications, motor vehicles and aerospace. These industries are large and
have to carry research and development costs far beyond the scope of small
companies, while the costs and risks involved could not be sustained by operating
only within the U.K. market. Therefore investment in U.K. manufacturing,
productivity improvements and marketing expertise appears highly important for
building a strong competitive base at home and for competing in global markets.
Marketing strategies and their applications need to be supported by investment in
plant, machinery, products and people. The combination of a lack of investment and
managerial commitment to production processes, product innovation and human
expertise, as indicated in the figures and discussion in this chapter, served to
'undermine' the marketing strategies and competitiveness of indigenous U.K.
producers. This has been reflected in the decline in the five specific industry sectors
(audio/hi-fi, bearings, machine tools, microwave ovens and photocopiers) and in the
overall picture of U.K. manufacturing industry. Moreover the U.K. and US measures
compared to Japan also indicated poorer performances. The research into their
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marketing strategies on a comparative basis is intended to examine relative resources
and commitment to the marketing of products and organisational support to the
marketing effort in strategic planning and applications.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY IN THE UK STUDY
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4.0 ABSTRACT 
This chapter explains the nature of the 'Prior Research', 'Rationale for Own Research
and The UK Methodology' for subsequent desk and field research.
The findings under 'Prior Research' indicated that Japanese subsidiaries possessed
greater marketing expertise and commitment to the goals of market share and
leadership than their British counterparts. However, there were similarities in the
organisational make-up such as the employment of British nationals in their
management. In the 'Rationale for Own Research', the bases upon which the ongoing
research proceeded are explained. The methodology for the ongoing research
included interviewing senior managers in American companies who were interviewed
on a personal basis with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire designed to enable
both exploratory and specific questions to be addressed. The appropriateness of using
the chi-square test and cluster analysis methods was discussed. It also enabled
comparability of results with those reported under 'Prior Research' to be analysed in
the following chapter.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is structured around three main sections to explain the prior research, the
rationale for ongoing research and the methodology for the UK study. In the prior
research, the hypotheses, methodology and findings of the ESRC study were
presented. This linked into the rationale for own research because it provided the
foundation upon which the ongoing research was built. The methodology for the
ongoing research in the UK is explained with regard to the selection of the American
sample. Use of a semi-structured questionnaire with personal interviews and the
appropriateness of using chi-square tests and cluster analysis methods for analysing
survey data are also explained.
4.2	 PRIOR RESEARCH: Hypotheses, Methodology and Findings 
The study on 'A Comparative Investigation of Japanese marketing Strategies in the
British Market' by Professors Doyle, Saunders and Dr Wong, Bradford Management
Centre (ESRC reference: F00232034) tested hypotheses about Japanese and British
Marketing and compared their organisational characteristics. IT e study took into
account the successes of Japanese manufacturers in capturing market share at the
expense of indigenous British firms. The hypotheses compared the orientations of
Japanese and British firms towards:-
1. market share versus short-term profits;
2. greater orientation to new environmental opportunites;
3. fast market adaptation rather than innovation;
4. more aggressive marketing tactics;
5. greater commitment to life-time employment;
6. market focussed rather than functionally organisational structures;
7. organisation, planning and control would be more informal;
8. a greater commitment to training, especially broad on the job
development; and
9. a stronger belief in experimentation and entrepreneurship.
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To test these hypotheses in the UK, thirty companies (Table 38) were chosen by
purposive sampling from the audio/hifi, machine tools, plain paper copiers,
microwave ovens and industrial bearings industries. The interviews took place in
1984. Selection of the industries were made on their national significance in growth
and size with 'sensitive product' inclusion in the EEC-Tokyo trade discussions of
1983-84. Their exports were amongst the top twenty UK imports from Japan with
local competitors to form comparisons. A semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 4)
was used to gather information and to obtain qualitative and quantitative data with
which to provide comparable measures. Companies were contacted by letter and
telephone for personal interviews. Confidentiality of responses was promised to the
respondents.
Therefore, the pre-testing and correction of the UK questionnaire i.e. the survey
instrument were carried out by Doyle, Saunders and Wong in their 'Prior Research'.
The overseas questionnaire incorporated some of their UK questions (2-10) which
constituted almost the first half of it. The second half of the overseas questionnaire on
headquarters orientations had also been pre-tested by the previous researchers for
other research which did not involve the author of this thesis. The author therefore
benefitted from the experiences and knowledge of the prior researchers when it came
to the application and conduct of the questionnaires in her field research.
The author of this thesis acknowledged that this was a limitation of her research
because this condition was imposed at the beginning of her research to ensure
comparability with the prior research activity. No tape recordings were used in any of
the personal interviews. Cross-checking of managers i.e. sending back questionnaires
to them to check the accuracy of their responses, was not carried out. However the
managers were invited to send the photocopies of their completed questionnaires back
especially if they had additional comments to make after the interviews. The response
rate on this was poor as only two of the American subsidiaries in the United Kingdom
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and four of the overseas firms did so, indicating that they might have felt that their
time had been generously given already and they had little further to add. However of
those returned, the results correlated well with the questionnaires completed by the
author at the time of the interviews. It was also acknowledged that a weakness of the
study was that the perception maps of senior managers interviewed were not checked
for consistency in their views as these managers did not want their individual views
Made known by an outsider to other managers in their own firms or in their
headquarters.
TABLE 38 COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY
Japanese: Akai, Canon, Hitachi-Seiki, Natamura Tome, Niigata, National Panasonic, NSK
Bearings, Pioneer, Ricoh, Sansui, Sharp, Sony, Takisawa, Toshiba, Yarnazaki-Mazak.
British: Alba, Amstrad, Beaver Machine Tools, Binatone, Colchester Lathe, Ferguson,
Fidelity Radio, Gestetner, Kearney and Trecker Marwin, Rank-Xerox, RHP Industrial
Bearings, TI Creda, TI Matrix and Herbert Churchill, Tricity, Wadkin.
The prior research findings supported the first four hypotheses that the marketing
strategies of Japanese companies were more aggressive, oriented towards long-term
market share, fast market adaptation and more effective at exploiting new
environmental opportunities.
Their cluster descriptions, (Appendix 3) showed the successful, moderate and less
successful types of companies according to product groups. More British companies
in contrast to the Japanese were shown in the cluster descriptions to be more financial
or production focussed rather than market focussed.
Successful Japanese firms were seen to be able to position their own products in the
market place as the more desirable or superior alternatives which could command the
higher prices and profit margins compared to weaker British ones. The weaknesses in
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such British firms appeared to be both internal ie. too product and production oriented
and external, with a lack of understanding and appreciation of successful growth
strategies for the marketplace.
Hypotheses 5,7 and 9 did not appear to apply in their findings as the Japanese
subsdiaries operating in the UK did not show a higher commitment to life-time
employment, training or greater effort to socialise personnel in shared organisational
values. Apart from the most senior levels, British managers were to be found in both
British and Japanese firms so that their background and experiences were comparable.
Hypotheses 6,8 and 10 seemed to have some support where the successful Japanese
subsidiaries appeared to demonstrate three important factors in their favour. These
were their more focussed product market divisional structures, their involvement of
management personnel, greater team effort, with the continual monitoring of progress
to encourage self-development and entrepreneurship.
4.3 RATIONALE FOR OWN RESEARCH 
The ESRC study provided the foundation for ongoing research. Its hypotheses,
methodology and findings are important to the ongoing research reported in this thesis
in the following ways:-
a) The four major hypotheses (1-4) in the ESRC study were adopted
without any change whilst the subsequent hypotheses (5-10) were
incorporated as hypothesis 5 and 6 in my own research. This meant
that a manageable number of hypotheses could be examined ie. six for
the field research in the United Kingdom and the addition of five new
hypotheses for the research in the United States and Japan.
b) The method of investigation through personal interviews with the use
of a semi-structured questionnaire was continued. The findings of the
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British and Japanese finis in the ESRC study were therefore directly
comparable to the findings of the American subsidiaries in the United
Kingdom research.
c) The selection of American subsidiaries was drawn from the same
industrial and consumer sectors as the Japanese and British firms to
enable similar hypotheses to be tested and comparisons of results to be
made for consistency and validity. This made possible a study of firms
from three 'Triad' nations, the United States, Japan and Britain.
i) The USA is the largest national industrial market in the world. Firms
wishing to become global market leaders would be likely to face
competitive pressures from American companies, their subsidiaries
and their technologies in industrial markets (The Economist, 1989).
ii) japan is a leading industrial nation with large surpluses in its trade
balances with the United States and Britain. Japanese firms in western
markets are successful global competitors (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989).
iii) Britain is a member of the European Economic Community. The
prospect of the large single European market in 1992 has attracted
growing investment from Japanese competitors (The Electronics
Industries Association of Japan, 1991).
d) A departure from the ESRC study was the overseas research carried
out to test the new hypotheses with regard to the headquarter
organisations of the American and Japanese subsidiaries from the
sample discussed in (b).	 This international element enabled
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comparisons to be drawn on the support from the parent organisations
for the strategies and effort of their UK subsidiaries :11 marketing.
4.4 THE UK NIETHODLOGY 
4.4.1	 Selection of American companies
The two major approaches in secondary and primary research were adopted to select
American owned companies operating in the United Kingdom producing audio/hifi,
industrial bearings, machine tools, microwave ovens and photocopier products.
The secondary research programme included a mix of library research at higher
educational institutions, the American Embassy in London and sources derived from
trade journal publications. The examples of secondary research sources are listed in
Appendix 1.
The primary research programme included contacting the trade associations and five
of the companies in the British and Japanese samples to soticit the names and
locations of relevant American competitors. By cross-checking with secondary
research sources, a list of the most likely American competitors was made. The
names of the directories checked for the American firms and the companies which
were contacted are listed in Appendix 1.
Random sampling was not viable as the populations of companies involved were
small and were spread across five separate industries. There was a need for the
sample to be representative of the attitudes and practices of firms which collectively
dominated their respective industries. In this respect, while the size of a company
was not used as the criterion for the selection of the sample, the resulting sample had
to include the large organisations such as ITT, Xerox, Toshiba and Canon ie.
companies with important market shares. Table 39 lists the American companies in
the last column in comparison with the British and Japanese firms.
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TABLE 39
JAPANESE, BRITISH AND AMERICAN COMPANIES
PARTICIPATING IN TIIE UK RESEARCH
Products Countries of Origin
Japanese	 British	 American
Consumer Electronics:
Audio/Hill
Akai
Hitachi-Seiki
National Panasonic
Pioneer
Sansui
Sharp
Sony
Alba
Amstrad
Binatone
Ferguson
Fidelity Radio
ITT
Household Cooking
Equipment:
Microwave Ovens
As above except
for Akai and Sony
Toshiba
TI Creda
Tricity
Litton
Office Equipment:
Photocopiers
As above list
(for M Ovens)
Cannon
Ricoh
Gestetner
Rank Xerox
Kodak
IBM (UK)
Nashua
copycat
Ball and Roller Bearings NSK Bearings RHP Industrial
Bearings
Barden
corporation
Torrington
Machine Tools Nakamura Tome
Niigata
Takisawa
Yamazald Mazak
Beaver
Colchester Lathe
Kearney & Tracker
Marwin
TI Matrix &
H Churchill
Wadkin
Bridgeport 
Brown &
Sharpe
Cincinnati
Milacron
Geo
Kingsbury
Giddings &
Lewis Fraser
Hahn & Kolb
4.4.2 The Survey Instrument - The Semi-Structured Ouestionnaire
The objective in using a semi-structured questionnaire is to obtain qualitative
responses and quantitative measurements with numerical ratings and rankings. Using
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the same questionnaire (Appendix 5) across all the companies would enable
comparability. Its semi-structured nature enabled respondents inter' , iewed to 'respond'
to planned questions and to further offer their own explanations of their company,
market & organisational dynamics. It enabled the exploratory study to be focussed by
enabling the attitudes and perceptions of managers within the particular industry
sectors to be examined. As Dickens (1982) stated, the problems that qualitative
research most frequently addressed are those of understanding as opposed to
assessment.
The survey method was to interview all the fifteen companies in the American
sample to obtain essential quantitative and qualitative data. To ensure that all
the questions would be answered by the Sales and Marketing Directors
concerned the questionnaire was used in conjunction with personal interviews.
The twenty nine pages questionnaire for the research was not distributed prior
to any interview in case managers became 'put-off at the number of questions
they had to answer and be unnecessarily concerned at the possiole length of
their interviews. In the event, each interview duration took two to three and a
half hours to enable all the questions and discussion to be completed.
A summary of the topics in the semi-structured questionnaire is given as:- company
background; performance over the last five years; market entry and expected future
growth; strategic objectives; strategic focus; strategic advantages; market
segmentation; competitor targets; competitive advantage; technology/market
strategies; marketing mix; future product/market problems and opportunities;
organisational structure and relationship between parent company; company policy on
training and employment; distinctive skills of managerial staff, innovation,
experimentation, and market contact; management styles; planning, control and
information systems; super-ordinate goals and shared values.
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4.4.3 Personal Interviews 
This section compared the benefits of personal interviews over other methods
of data collection e.g. postal/mail, telephone and action research. The
practicality of researching a small sample with in-depth interviews was seen to
have the following advantages over alternative approaches such as postal and
telephone survey methods because of the versatility in the types of data
capable of being generated. As Chematony (1987) pointed out, postal surveys
have limitations associated with low response rates.
A postal survey was not practical because there was a risk that some managers might
not return their lengthy questionnaires thereby jeopardising the carefully constructed
sample of firms as taken into account. Another risk was that managers might answer
questions routinely rather than generously reducing the qualitative information
obtained. They might suppress or find it difficult to give relevant information if they
misunderstood why questions were being asked. Further there was another risk that
managers might pass their questionnaires to their subordinates to answer when for
comparabilit, all the questionnaires should be answered by senior managers.
Telephone surveys would not have enabled the depth of interview required in the
twenty-nine pages of questions to be conducted. In addition, the importance of testing
the research hypotheses meant that as far as possible pertinent data relating to people
and situations in the real world had to be both systematically gathered and analysed.
A telephone survey would have been more flexible than a postal survey to gain
immediacy of answers but with only voice contact between the interviewer and the
responding manager, the latter would have been reluctant to stay on the telephone for
over two hours to complete the questionnaire. Comellan (1978) stated that people
should be able to "predict, measure, understand and control" the researches into and
the examination of human behaviour. So the postal and telephone survey methods did
not lend themselves to the practical conduct of the questionnaires in the UK and
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overseas research. However their uses in making direct contact with companies to
arrange the interviews were invaluable.
In a personal interview situation, hospitality and an indigenous courtesy can prevail to
the benefit of the interviewer. Managers were on the whole appreciative, particularly
those in the overseas headquarters, that an outsider could take the time, expense and
trouble to visit and learn about their organisations. Therefore they were prepared to
spend more time in the interview situation. Moreover tours of their premises including
factories were undertaken by the managers themselves in order to give a 'feel' of their
organisations and activities to the interviewer. This was something which postal and
telephone interviews could not substitute for, over the personal interviews.
Action research would not have been a good alternative over the personal interview
method either, because of the number of companies involved. There would have been
the problem of accessibility to company contacts and information in all the firms if
action research had been used. Action research involved the researcher working with
the company's management in a problem-solving context which could take weeks or
months with the researcher in a consulting role with the client company.
The research in this thesis did not lend itself to action research because all the
competing firms in the sample were needed to particpate. They agreed to
cooperate because there were no conditions attached, promises of
confidentiality and of possible publications arising from the overall research
effort, were given. Action research involved the researcher as a dynamic agent
in the subject of investigation. So the agent could plan, implement and
monitor change or take initiatives within the organisational structure. This
meant that an action researcher would become part of the situation which was
being researched. However, the advantage of using the personal interview
method over action research was that the researcher's role could be detached.
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This was important since it minimised disturbance of the market phenomena
being investigated. The terms of reference in this thesis was not concerned
with serving the sample of firms as clients. They were concerned with how the
individual firms in the sample through their own strategies and activities in the
marketplace competed with one another. Using the personal interview method,
problems of confidential access to client and competitor information with the
need to cover all firms in the sample within a time frame of three years, were
overcome.
TABLE 40 AMERICAN MANAGERS INTERVIEWED
Company Product Mangement level * Company name
Audio/hifi Sales and Market
Planning Manager
ITT
Microwave ovens Divisional Director
(in charge of all UK
and European operations)
Litton
Photocopier
'
Marketing Manager
Academic Systems
Marketing Manager
Marketing Manager
Kodak
IBM
Nashua copycat
Ball and Roller
Bearings
Marketing Service
Manager
Operations Manager
(overseeing the
marketing function)
Barden
Torrington
Machine tools Market Director
Marketing Director
Commercial Manager
Sales/Marketing
Manager
Sales and Export
Manager
Sales/Marketing
Manager
General Manager
(Sales)
Director
(Measurement and
Testing Division)
Bridgeport
Brown and Sharpe
Cincinnati Milacron
Devlieg
Ex-cell-0
Geo Kingsbury
Giddings and Lewis
Fraser
Hahn & Kolb
* Details of these 'American Companies in the UK Sample' are given in Appendix 2.
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A further aspect for adopting personal interviews with a questionnaire was the issue
of client confidentiality. A publication by the marketing staff at the University of
Ulster on 'Student Projects and assignments Involving Market Research' stated that:
In highly competitive environments, the client may not wish it to be
known that he is considering a new product or, interested in a new
market or market sector. ..A more usual situation arises in trade
' where a client does not wish his name to be revealed to particular
sections of the trade; for example sections of the retail or
distributive trades, potential customers or suppliers of goods and
services.
Client confidentiality is important where the respondent from a company may not
wish his name to be revealed in case of adverse reaction from superiors within the
subsidiary or parent organisation. As it turned out, all the respondents raised the
question of confidentiality in the interviews and needed to be personally assured that
their own names would not be revealed in any publications relating to the research
except those of their organisations.
4.4.4 Application of the Chi-Square test and Cluster Analysis
The purpose in performing quantitative analyses, apart from complementing the
qualitative inputs discussed in the findings, was to test the hypotheses concerning the
interview responses of firms. The research material which included the numerical
rating responses and the qualitative responses,provided rich insights into the complex
marketing managerial processes in competing organizations. The chi-square test and
cluster analysis provided suitable methods for the analyses of the data for the
following reasons.
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) had produced a wide range of
calculations for the chi-square (value and significance), Cramers v Kendall's tau b
and c (significance and outcome) and Pearson's R, based on the inputs from the UK
study. However the huge SPSS output was not adopted in this thesis because many of
146
the calculations were not relevant for the analyses in the thesis. For example
Kendall's tau b and c assumes that the variables are ordered ie. small, medium and
large, which is not true for the UK data input. (Kendall and Stuart, 1973). Pearson's
R assumes the variables are numeric or at least can reasonably be assigned the
numbers 1, 2, 3 (ordered, equal intervals) which is not the case for the UK , Japan and
USA input (Stoodley, Lewis and Stainton, 1980).
This chi-square test was preferred because in opting for the simplest form of
contingency (2 x 2) and the r x c tables, the interpretation of the chi-square test for
independence can be clear (Everitt, 1977). The chi-square test is suitable where the
desirability is to establish a significant difference between one distribution and
another, where expected values in all cells of the contingency tables are greater than
0.5. While the chi-square tests in the thesis did produce values less than 0.5 and 'not
significantly' different values, the analyses were still possible to show a 'less than
significant' difference, with the aid of the 'percentage' figures.
The benefit of using the cluster analysis technique on the comparative data of
American, British and Japanese firms is that the technique could help the focus in
identifying groups of entities with homogenous or common characteristics. In this
respect, it has helped to produce the classification of firms in the initial ESRC study,
that is the 'early birds, cruises, sprinters, price fighters, lemmings and master
craftsmen'. It has also helped to produce the* dendrogram in which new clusters of
American, British and Japanese firms were produced. These clusters are discussed in
the findings on the UK research along with the links to the cluster groupings in the
ESRC study.
An advantage of using cluster analysis is given by Punj and Stewart (1983),
"Cluster analysis is a statistical method for classification.
Unlike other statistical methods 
	  it makes no prior
assumptions about important differences within a population.
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Cluster analysis is a purely empirical method of classification
and as such is primarily an inductive technique"
In essence, the application of cluster analysis is therefore seen to provide an
empirically based method for explicitly classifying objects and the determination of
their relationships.
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The study reported in the prior research provided a firm foundation for future research
to be conducted and comparable methodologies to be used. With the incorporation of
the American companies in the UK study, the original study was widened in terms of
the number of companies which were researched and the comparison with a third
country. This opened up the opportunity for an international study to be conducted at
a later stage through the comparison of overseas headquarters companies in the
United States and Japan.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS IN THE UK STUDY
150
5.0 ABSTRACT 
This chapter introduces the results of the testing of the hypotheses on the
sampled forty-five companies comprising fifteen American, British and
Japanese companies in each of the five product-markets in the United
Kingdom. The research investigates the importance of strong marketing
orientations, objectives, organisation and expertise in American and Japanese
companies compared to indigenous British firms.
These findings showed that British companies had lost market share to
overseas competitors, notably the Japanese in the product-markets studied. In
contrast to the aggressive growth objectives of Japanese firms, British and
American firms were under increasing pressure to maintain their sales in a
competitive environment. American and Japanese companies considered
themselves better at new product and technological innovations but the
American companies seemed to lack a strong commitment to their long-term
investment. Japanese firms appeared to be skilled at spotting and adapting to
new environmental opportunities thereby cultivating new competitive
advantages. They appeared to have transcended organisational, national and
industrial bathers to compete effectively with both their American and British
competitors in the UK.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The hypotheses in the UK research aimed to test the importance of market
share versus short-term profit objectives, orientation to new environmental
opportunities, fast market adaptation compared to innovation, aggressive use
of marketing tactics, formality of organisation, planning and control
procedures, and entrepreneurship and experimentation in market focussed
structures. The companies' responses to the questions in the semi-structured
questionnaire are structured around the six hypotheses in the UK research in
order to test the validity or support for the hypotheses. Of the six hypotheses
tested hypotheses 1,2, 4 and 6 were supported.
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5.2 THE TESTS OF' THE HYPOTHESES I - 6 IN THE UK RESEARCH 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Successful companies are oriented to market share
rather than short-term profits.
Market growth and profitability are seen as long-term objectives in
comparison to the short-term sales and profit objectives. The sampled
companies oriented towards market share creation appeared to be those
prepared to invest long-term in their UK operations. Table 41 shows
that of the three nationalities, British firms were the only ones amongst
those trying to prevent decline (2(1%) or defend their market shares
(20%). Just under half of the American firms (47%). Like other
British firms 40% were satisfied if they could maintain their market
share positions. Significantly all the superior firms were aiming for
steady or aggressive growth or market domination. This was a far
more confident stance compared to the Americans (53%) or the British
(20%). It is interesting to note that despite the sustained poor
economic performances of the UK manufacturing sector (discussed in
chapter three), the Japanese companies in the sample managed to
expand their operations forcing retrenchment or the defense of the
status quo amongst British firms (80%) and American firms (47%).
TABLE 41
WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE MARKET SHARE/SALES STRATEGY? ***
Prevent	 Defensive Maintain Steady Aggressive Dominate
Decline	 Position Growth Growth	 Market
British % 20 20 40 0 13 7
US % 0 0 47 0 33 20
Japanese % 0 0 0 13 60 27
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
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The pursuance of the objectives of growth and domination seems to underline the
aggressiveness of overseas competitors in sharp contrast to the positions of those
British companies interested in survival by preventing decline. These firms were
therefore highly interested in any short-term profits.	 Short-term profits are
predominant objectives with 93% of the British and 73% of the US firms (see Table
42) but with only 40% of the Japanese firms, with a chi-square statistically significant
at the 5% level. The former were geared towards costs cutting and costs saving
measures with immediate importance placed on the sales orientation to maintain
survival. This can leads to serious reductions in market share in the long-term. Such
firms may find their positions in the future worse than those that they had stated in
Table 41.
TABLE 42
HOW IMPORTANT TO THE COMPANY WAS ACHIEVING A GOOD
CURRENT PROFIT PERFORMANCE? ***
British 93%
	 US	 73%	 Japanese
	 40%
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
Such differences in strategic objectives may help towards explaining the difficulties
faced by British manufacturing industry in defending its home market. Table 42
shows that an orientation to short-term sales and profits with the emphasis on cost-
cutting to defend existing markets has made the British firms in the sample (93%)
highly conscious of achieving current profit targets. This orientation has been shared
by 73% of the American companies. Their Japanese competitors in contrast, oriented
to long-term market share were more willing to look at current profits in a three year
cycle. Provided that sales volume was not static, Japanese firms were prepared to
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hold prices competitively in order to nurture their market share growth which had to
show some obvious improvement by the third year. But not all the Japanese firms
were able to keep this progress on stream. 40% of the Japanese firms were also keen
to achieve profit targets set by their headquarters like the American companies in this
respect.
TABLE 43
DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR COMPANY PERFORMANCE TO BE VERY
SUCCESSFUL? ***
British 33%
	 US	 33%	 Japanese	 80%
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
Table 43 presents the responses of the companies on their then current company
performance during 1985-1986. While both the British and US companies exhibited
good results with 33% considering their company performances to be very successful,
there were amongst the Japanese firms, a greater percentage, 80%, claiming such
success. However, when it came to greater market share in the short to medium-term
(see Table 44), there was a similarity in responses at 66%. This may be attributed in
part to the sharpened competitive profiles engendered by having to face international
competition and rationalisation by the western firms and the urge to consolidate their
advances by Japanese firms. Given the reactions of successful western finns to
reorganize and plan their marketing without ceding any more local advantages in
pricing, distribution or production strategies, competition was expected to be fiercer
in the future. Moreover, Japanese companies, as in the audio-hifi market, expected
competition to be mostly amongst themselves for market share in the UK, and
therefore saw competition as also being more difficult for themselves.
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TABLE 44
IN THE FUTURE, DO YOU EXPECT TO SEE MARKET SHARE MUCH
GREATER?
British 66%	 Japanese	 66%	 US	 66%
No Statistical significance
As hypothesized, successful companies build on market share and appear to invest in
their marketing effort towards such a goal at the expense of engendering profits for
the short-term. Short-term profit, as Table 42 had shown, had seemed twice as
important for the British and the Americans as it was for the Japanese. There were
more British companies (40%) which were willing to cut costs and allow their market
positions to erode if necessary in order to defend or prevent further decline, to bolster
short-term profitability and survival. All the companies recognised the importance of
market share and hoped for better market demand in the next three to five years, with
the result that the chi-square test showed a not statistically significant response.
Other reasons have been given by some respondents over the lack of investment by
their parent companies in the UK. For example, one British marketing director of a
US machine tool subsidiary commented that his parent company did not understand
the need to be aggressive in marketing in the UK, preferring to treat it within the
European context with standardised approaches. In contrast, the successful Japanese
companies noted that it was 'part of a planned global expansion' and that 'the potential
of the UK market' was a major attraction.
While it may appear to be a crude measure, it appears that the hypothesis that
successful companies are oriented to market share rather than the emphasis on short-
term profits is supported, given that the responses seemed to indicate such a focus
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behind the more successful firms. As Table 44 had shown that there were equal
percentages of respondents confident of attaining higher market shares in the future
though these predictions were not supported by the findings in Tables 42 and 43.
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2 Successful companies demonstrate greater orientation to new
environmental opportunities
Organizations which use effective product positioning and segmentation
methods eg psychographic, and benefit segmentation to target customer
groupings in national markets are seen to possess marketing strengths for
industrial success. Thus the hypothesis that successful companies orientate
more skilfully to their customers in a given national environment can be
tested.
Table 45 indicates the type of customer segments in terms of downmarket and
upmarket characteristics served by the companies. The chi-square test showed
a statistical significance at the 10% level. British companies (34%) were left
to the downmarket groups and American companies at the other extreme
(93%) were concentrating on finding high technology or specialist niches with
upmarket groups.
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TABLE 45
CHARAC1ERISTICS OF CUSTOMER TARGETS
Down-Market
1 2 3 4
Up-market
5
British % 7 27 53 13 0
US % 0 0 7 60 33
Japanese % 0 0 60 27 13
Statistical significance at the 10% ** level
The Japanese companies have been increasingly seen as a major threat by their
Western counterparts. In addition there seems to be rivalry amongst Japanese
companies for market share and leadership in the UK eg between Canon and Ricoh in
the photocopier market. Consolidating the middle ground with customer markets, as
in Table 45, Japanese companies have progressively directed their efforts at the
upmarket segments and emphasised their new product achievements, reliability
quality and image.
So the hypothesis that successful companies demonstrate greater orientation to new
environmental opportunities can be tested by looking at areas where a company can
gain a strategic advantage over competitors. Table 46 presents the responses from
companies when they were asked about their abilities to 'identify key factors for
success in the industry and the injection of resources to gain strategic advantages over
competitors'. While most of the British and Japanese companies (80%) felt they were
good at this, the American companies (87%) scored marginally higher. Perhaps this
is not surprising given that the American respondents still regarded the USA as a
major originator of product ideas and technological innovation.
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TABLE 46
GAINING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OVER COMPETITORS as
British 80%
	
US	 87%	 Japanese	 80%
No statistical significance
This appears borne out by the American responses in Table 47. When asked about
their abilities to 'develop significant new product groups, there were more American
companies which thought that one of their strengths lay in this. 66% of American
companies compared to 13% British and 47% Japanese thought that their success
partially lay in their development of new product groups.
TABLE 47
DEVELOPS SIGNIFICANT NEW PRODUCT GROUPS ***
British 13%
	 US	 66%	 Japanese	 47%
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
The responses in Tables 45 and 47 bear out the respondents' perceptions that British
companies were vulnerable and could be left to the cheaper end of the market but this
in itself necessitated production to keep up profit margins. This has been increasingly
difficult for British firms to do given the recession in the late 1980s. As Table 47
shows, investment and development of new products are vital in the competitive
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process. New products help the image of American and Japanese firms as offering
higher quality.
However, when it came to opening up new markets, (see Table 48) showed that the
Japanese companies (66%) saw themselves as being more successful compared to the
American (53%) and the British (27%). This seemed to indicate that successful
companies of whichever nationality, may see themselves either able to develop new
product groups or open new markets or both. The Japanese saw themselves as being
able to take advantage of many of the same commercial or government published
reports on industries and markets in the UK, as well as commissioning market studies
from British market research agencies. Backed up by research and development in
Japan and knowledge of the British market, the Japanese have been able to selectively
target the specific upmarket sectors in the UK. The American companies on the other
hand tended not to create such differentials between the UK market and other
Western European countries in which they had an interest. The lack of importance or
urgency placed by British and American companies on market research may be due to
a long involvement in the UK market, therefore presuming understanding of
customers even th, ough the market conditions have changed and competition has
intensified. Moreover market research has been a casualty of cuts by firms faced with
the need to cut company costs.
TABLE 48
OPENS UP NEW MARKETS ***
British 27%
	 US	 53%	 Japanese	 66%
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
The hypothesis that successful companies demonstrate greater orientation to new
environmental opportunities seems therefore to be supported. The successful
American firms saw their strengths as lying in their product development and
technological abilities to take advantage of emerging and existing market
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opportunities, ahead of competitors. The successful Japanese companies saw their
strengths in developing new markets and providing products which customers in
industrialised countries wanted. The successful British companies (though less
evident as the tables showed) appear to maintain their competitive edge by being
price-sensitive, innovative and consumer-oriented.
5.2.3 II ypothesis 3 Successful companies pursue fast market adaptation rather than
in
The above hypothesis that fast market adaptation rather than innovation is a
feature of successful firms does not appear to be supported by the findings. In
fact, the respondent companies which saw themselves as successful appeared
strongly orientated to both market adaptation and innovation. The findings
suggest that organizations which can combine both attributes can deploy
marketing and technical capabilities in their strategic focus for competitive
advantage.
For example, Table 50 shows that there were good American, British and
Japanese companies which considered that strength in innovation for product
differentiation, design, research, development, cost reduction and
manufacturing were as important. There appeared to be more Japanese
companies (at least over 53%) whith considered themselves as good at
possessing such differential advantages. This was followed by the American
companies which saw themselves as particularly strong on product design
(87%), large scale manufacturing, (80%) and process development and cost
reduction capabilities (93%). There were less than 50% of British firms which
considered themselves strong on such differential advantages. This was
represented in the chi-square statistically significant at the 20% and 5% levels.
Both the Japanese and American firms appeared conspicuously stronger in
numbers than their British counterparts.
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TABLE 49
110W WELL DO THESE STATEMENTS DESCRIBE YOUR DIFFERENTIAL
ADVANTAGES?
'Good at Product Differentiation'*
British 20%
British 13%
British 47%
US 40%
	
Japanese
	 53%
'Strong on Advanced Research Capabilities'***
US 53%
	
Japanese
	 66%
'Strong on Product Design Capabilities'*
US	 87%
	
Japanese
	 86%
'Strong on Process Development and Cost Reduction Capabilities'***
British 27%
	
US	 93%	 Japanese	 60%
'Strong on Efficient Large Scale Manufacturing'***
British 40%
	 US	 80%	 Japanese
	 93%
Statistical significance at the 20%* and 5%*** levels
However, market success and profit performance also depend upon the ability of
firms to match the needs of their customers more effectively than the competition. In
this respect, the ability of the firms to expand their markets by converting non-users
of the product (see Table 50) and their superior marketing mix (see Table 51) seemed
also important.
As Table 49 shows, the innovativeness of firms and their strategic focusses also seen
in Table 50 in their products and manufacturing capabilities seems to have also been
reflected in the aptitudes of firms to show fast market adaptation.
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TABLE 50
STRATEGIC FOCUS
'Expand market by converting non-users of product'
British 47%
	 US	 73%	 Japanese	 80%
'Expand market by creating new users for the product'
British 27%
	 US	 53%	 Japanese	 60%
Statistical significance at the 20%* and 5%*** levels
80% of the Japanese firms compared with just over half of the British firms at 47%
saw themselves strong in converting 'non-users of product'. However, when it came
to the expansion of the market by 'creating new users for the product' the Japanese
and the American firms had strong responses (at over 50%) with a smaller percentage
of British firms at 27% seeing themselves as successful at this.
This would seem to bear out the importance attached by successful firms to both fast
market adaptation and innovation. As Table 51 indicates, one of the methods used by
Japanese companies (83%) to adopt to UK market conditions was the monitoring and
support of the UK dealers. As a marketing mix entry strategy, distributors can
provide access to a wider customer basis and help overseas firms establish credibility
with domestic customers. In their dealer support, Japanese firms gave technical,
training, advertising and other promotional support to their dealers. The emphasis on
dealer support was seen to be less with American firms (44%) and in sharp contrast to
British firms (36%).
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TABLE 51
110W SUPERIOR IS YOUR MARKETING MIX TO COMPETITION
GENERALLY?
Product Range ***
British 27% US	 67% Japanese 74%
Product Quality ***
British 34% US	 87% Japanese 87%
Dealer Support *
British 36% US	 44% Japanese 83%
Statistical significance at the 20%* and 5%*** levels
In attempting to analyse the reasons for the lack of strategic thrust by the less
successful companies, it seems that those who were less successful could neither
innovate nor adapt to competitive market conditions. As Porter (1990) stated, it was
important for the management of companies to anticipate competitors' actions and to
build up their own competitive advantages such as the focus on good products or the
value added higher volume market niches. To do these, commitment to the market,
particularly taken in a long-term perspective was crucial. Firms which could not do
this invariably ceded more profitable segments to competitors who were prepared to
invest to achieve market share.
As an example of this, Textron sold off EX-Cell-0 and Bridgeport as it was under
significant profit pressure to scale down its investments in the UK by 1987.
Likewise, one Japanese firm (Sansui) had to sell its British subsidiary in 1988, after
scaling down investments in the UK. A problem faced by British companies was that
having gone through the recession in the 1970s and a period of rationalisation, it was
difficult to cut back even further in the 1980s, especially when they had lost
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customers to new competitors and had not built up specific competitive advantages in
costs, skills or resources. Moreover UK customers were prepared to buy overseas
products given the greater choice so that the 'Buy British' slogan did not seem to have
any significantly strong appeal. The hypothesis that successful companies pursue fast
market adaptation 'rather than' innovation is not supported. because it is a
combination of innovatory product and production expertise coupled with a strong
orientation to consumers eg, converting non-users which seems essential to give an
organization its competitive thrust.
5.2.4 Hypothesis 4: Successful companies are more aggressive in their use of
marketing tactics.
The fmdings appear to suggest that the 'aggressive' use of marketing tactics is
based around the ability of organizations at manipulating their marketing mix
tactics. Such tactics derived from responses to the market place which had
been part of the strategic focus ie, a proactive rather than a reactive strategy.
The strategic focus is directed at raising profitability both short and long-term
through the various means at an organization's disposal. For instance, the
planned development of the strategic focus can direct a company to invest in
its production processes, its employees, and its product qualities. A defensive
company seeking to prevent further decline of its market position would focus
on costs reduction and low prices to bolster its immediate sales volume.
Table 52 indicates that the biggest contrast was between the British and
Japanese companies. The British emphasis (86%) on 'cost reduction and
improved productivity' was greater than the emphasis on 'winning share by
beating competition' (53%). While the Japanese considered the former
important (53%), they were more significant in the latter along with the
American firms (at 87% respectively).
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TABLE 52
DESCRIIYHON OF THE STRATEGIC FOCUS
'Winning Share by Beating Competition'"
British 53%	 US	 87%	 Japanese	 87%
'Focus on Cost Reduction and Improved Productivity'*
British 86%	 US	 73%	 Japanese	 53%
Statistical significance at the 20%* and 10%** levels
In the case of the Japanese firms, there appeared to be a greater leaning towards the
combination of the abilities to 'stimulate primary demand (73%) and 'entering new
segments' (67%), as shown in Table 53. This meant that there were less Japanese
organizations which needed to obtain sales by relying mainly on competitive cut-rate
terms to enter and stay in markets. One of the suggestions made by US managers in
the personal interviews with the author eg, at Cincinnati Milacron, and Barden Inc
was that the Japanese competition had been 'unfair' by undercutting their prices to
obtain business at their firms' expense. The Japanese claimed that it was their
efficiency of operations which led to their competitive pricing policies. They felt they
were more aggressive in their use of marketing to achieve a competitive advantage as
indicated in Table 53 where they saw their firms as good at stimulating primary
demand (73%) and at entering newly emerging segments (67%).
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TABLE 53
WHICH OF TIIE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR FOCUS?
'Good at Stimulating Primary Demand'*
British 47%
	 US	 40%	 Japanese
	 73%
'Enter newly Emerging Market Segments'***
British 27%
	 US	 53%	 Japanese
	 67%
Statistical significance at the 20%* and 5%*** levels
In general, the US companies did not appear to demonstrate a greater focus towards
primary demand stimulation and new market segments. Only 40% and 53% of the
US companies respectively thought they were strong on such aspects. The British
position appeared weak with 27% demonstrating an orientation toward 'emerging
market segments'.
However, the US companies had been most self-confident about their marketing
performance as shown in Table 54. 80% of the US companies claimed to be 'good at
efficient sales and marketing compared to 66% of the Japanese and 34% of the British
firms.
TABLE 54
110W WELL DOES 'GOOD AT EFFICIENT SALES AND MARKETING'
DESCRIBE YOUR COMPANY? ***
British 34%	 US	 80%	 Japanese
	 66%
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
While there may be grounds for such optimism from US companies (as in Table 52),
more of the Japanese companies appeared to consider themselves better at marketing
(see Table 53). The successful companies amongst the British, American and
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Japanese organizations were seen to be those with strong marketing mixes directed at
targeted segments with careful positioning and support of their products on the
market.
The hypothesis that successful companies are more aggressive in their use of
marketing tactics therefore appears to be supported.
5.2.5 Hypothesis 5 Organization, planning and control procedures would be more
informal in successful firms.
The above hypothesis inferred that informality of organization, planning and
control procedures would be likely to be informal with successful firms.
Testing such a hypothesis meant that the responses of the planning and control
procedures could be analysed to assess the importance of formal rigid controls
with informal communications.
TABLE 55
WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES TIIE TYPE OF
PLANNING UNDERTAKEN?
'Formal long-term plans'***
British 60%
	 US	 66%	 Japanese	 40%
'Formal medium to short-term plans'***
British 53%	 US	 73%	 Japanese	 93%
Statistical significance at the 5% *** levels
As shown in Table 55, formal planning both for the long-term and medium to short-
term appeared important for at least 60% of the British and American firms. The
Japanese regarded formal long term plans (40%) as important but nearly all (93%)
placed reliance on formal medium to short-term plans. This may be indicative of the
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importance placed by Japanese organizations on flexibility to react to changing
conditions within the marketplace. The formality of planning rather than the
informality of it appeared to be the norm with the British, Japanese and American
firms.
In respect of the control procedures, Table 56 indicates the responses of the
companies over monitoring and controlling their planning with a chi-square
statistically significant at the 5% level. American firms' concentrated more emphasis
on the financial aspects such as budgeted annual profits with periodic monthly and
quarterly checks and return on investment targets. This put pressure on their
subsidiaries to achieve short-term profit targets to the detriment of longer term
marketing objectives. This left the subsidiaries vulnerable to the financial pressures
of their American headquarters firms when cut-backs were instigated.
TABLE 56
WIIAT CONTROL PROCEDURES DO YOU EMPLOY TO ENSURE TuAT
MARKETING PLANS/OBJECTIVES ARE BEING ACHIEVED?
'Periodical (monthly/Quarterly) checks' ns
British 87%
	 US	 93%	 Japanese
	 80%
'Specifying many rules and variables to be measured' ***
British 27%	 US	 73%	 Japanese
	 53%
ns = No Statistical significance
Statistical significance at the 5% *** level
As shown in Table 56 the respondents in American firms placed greatest emphasis on
periodical checks (93%) and the systematic specification of rules and variables to be
measured and filed, with the measurements providing a guide to action. The British
respondents whilst placing reliance on periodical checks (87%), nevertheless
appeared less bureaucratic in their control procedures (27%). The Japanese
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respondents also placed reliance on periodical checks (80%) but fewer of them (53%)
appeared to 'specify many rules and variables' compared to the Americans.
Formal control systems over planning and financial budgets went hand-in-hand with
regular periodic checks and reports to international divisions or direct to headquarters
firms overseas. This seemed to be the norm with all the firms in the sample.
In order to adapt to the conditions in the UK market, Japanese headquarters firms
were prepared to follow the international route by giving greater independence in
decision-making in management and marketing to their subsidiaries. Japanese
subsidiaries employed British nationals in their companies as did the American filMS.
However the most senior management positions were given to Japanese and
Americans in their respective companies. There is some thinking in the large
Japanese organisations of Canon and Sony, evidenced by interviews with these
companies in 1988 that they should employ more British nationals in the most senior
positions in their UK subsidiaries. American companies still maintained a higher
proportion of Americans in senior and line management positions eg Cincinatti-
Milacron and Barden Inc.
All the Japanese and the American companies emphasised the importance of regular
personal contact through annual company conferences and also meetings between
senior managers of headquarters and subsidiary companies at least four times a year.
Constant daily communications were via telephone, facsimile and telex which kept
the overseas headquarters informed of progress or problems.
Table 57 shows that the differences in management styles between companies from
the three nationalities were quite marked. While the British and American firms seem
to be more hierarchical in their management structures (60% respectively), Japanese
firms put far less emphasis on this and placed greater importance on committee
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responsibilities, group work and fostering team spirit (64%). Because of this, job
specifications were variable and ad hoc with more Japanese firms (73%) in order to
allow greater flexibility, independence and the cutting down of project time in
development work by groups. Project groups were encouraged to cross departmental
and management lines in order to get essential information and help to complete their
schedules. This is borne out by more Japanese firms (64%) encouraging top-down
and bottom-up communications compared to American (27%) and British firms (7%).
TABLE 57
HOW WELL DO THESE STATEMENTS DESCRIBE YOUR COMPANY'S
MANAGEMENT STYLE?
British 27%
British 60%
British 27%
British 7%
'Group Responsibility and Teamwork'**
US 43%	 Japanese	 64%
'Strong Hierarchical Distinctions in Management' ***
US 60%
	
Japanese	 18%
'Variable and ad hoc Job Specifications' ***
US	 13%
	
Japanese	 73%
'Both Top-Down and bottom-up Communications' ***
US 27%
	 Japanese	 64%
Statistical Significance at the 10% ** and 5% *** levels
The hypothesis that organization, planning and control procedures would be more
informal in successful firms is not supported. What appears to be supported is that
there is a mixture of formal and informal procedures to support the planning focus
and the operational day-to-day running of the businesses.
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5.2.6 Hypothesis 6 Entrepreneurship and experimentation is stronger in market
focussed rather than functionally focussed organizational structures.
The test of hypothesis 6 included the analyses of the encouragement of
entrepreneurship and experimentation with that of organizational structures to
determine whether the former was stronger in market or functional structures.
The responses in Table 58 showed a consensus amongst American and
Japanese firms where both loose supervision' and the encouragement of
'entrepreneurship , were concerned. There were fewer British companies
(27%) which indicated firm support for the encouragement of
entrepreneurship within the organization.
TABLE 58
AUTONOMY AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
'Loose supervision' **
British 47%
	 US	 66%	 Japanese
	 60%
'Support and encourage entrepreneurship'***
British 27%
	 US	 53%	 Japanese
	 53%
Statistical significance at the 10% ** and 5% *** levels
The responses in Table 59 this time showed a different consensus between the British
and Japanese firms (at 27%) while the Americans were more willing 'to try things out'
(at 53%)
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TABLE 59
IN COMPARISON TO COMPETITION, DO YOU TRY TIIINGS OUT (E(;
TESTING, EXPERIMENTATION)?***
British 27%	 US	 53%	 Japanese	 27%
Statistical significant at the 5% *** level
The importance of the entrepreneurial and experimental dimensions related to the
perfonnances of organisations in the marketplace is relevant if it encourages
innovativeness in company personnel. Such innovativeness may encourage
organizations to lean towards the market focussed rather than functional structures.
The findings of the research indicated that there were organizational differences
between the US, Japanese and British companies in addition to the managerial
differences shown in Table 57. In looking at effective organisational change as the
relationship between structure, strategy, systems, style, skills, staff and superonlinate
goals (Waterman, Peters and Phillips, 1988), Japanese organisational structure
differed from the American and British firms. While Japanese firms put greater
importance on skills and self development of individuals working in collective groups
or committees (Table 57), promotion was based on length of service, loyalty and not
merely on merit. Unlike the hiring and firing in American firms (Financial Times
1987), Japanese firms expected loyalty to their companies without pursuing the notion
of life-time employment in UK companies. This meant a reluctance to treat staff as
expendable but rather Japanese firms saw their employees as a resource to be trained
and supported. Since training and the skills development of employees were
expensive, the Japanese firms on the whole saw a need to keep their employees even
during difficult financial times. Besides all the firms in the samples employed British
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nationals whose background, qualifications, age and experience might be said not to
be vastly different in a free western labour market.
Expertise in strategy development (Tables 52, 53 and 54) and planning and control
systems (Tables 55 and 56) were important for all the firms concerned. However
while the American firms did not see themselves as poor at marketing or positioned at
the lower ends of their markets, their performance in these on the whole appeared
better than British firms despite a similarity in the existence of hierarchical
organisational structures. Therefore a hierarchical organisational structure may not
impede the effectiveness of marketing. What seems relevant is that a better focus on
more effective marketing organisation and customer needs appear to have served
Japanese organisations well, as indicated in their responses in Table 53.
The Japanese companies all treated the UK market as important with its own specific
requirements and their subsidiaries had clear responsibilities to this specific market.
In contrast, American subsidiaries felt that their headquarters organisations did not
adequately support the long term commitment of their strategies in the UK or gave the
UK market distinctive importance from the rest of Western Europe. For example
Giddings and Fraser (machine tools) and Torrington (bearings) felt that strategy
constraints were imposed upon them from the United States and information in
international divisions from France and Gerrriny inadequately passed onto them. So
in contrast, British organisational structures evolving from traditional functional lines
were less like Japanese firms which were driven along product and geographical
divisional lines and created a strong marketing organisation. This British weakness
could inherently be due in part to the reliance on specialisations and external
qualifications in British firms. For examples in the machine tool industry, British
Sales and Marketing managers in British firms tended to be recruited from other
British machine tool firms and had worked their way up in their respective
departments. But Japanese managers were expected to have a much wider knowledge
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of the products of their firms by having some training eg. technical training in
departments other than sales and marketing in order to understand company
operations as a whole. Japanese managers were expected to stay with their
organisations and poaching of managers between Japanese firms was not encouraged
because of the focus on self development and long term training needed to understand
the company philosophy and products.
This means that while shared values in British and American firms can be based upon
homogeneity in Western culture and language, the Japanese experience in shared
values extended to a need for managers and lower level employees to be informed of
the company's philosophy. This means that they should have some idea or belief of
the superordinate goals of the Japanese firms, as in the aspirations of their most senior
managers to take their firms to such stated goals as the improvement of the standard
of living in worldwide communities, by enhancing the quality of products and the
lives of the employees who produced them.
It therefore appears that successful companies should be market focussed rather than
oriented towards functionally focussed structures. 'Experimentation' did not appear to
be highly important except for the US firms. However, entrepreneurship as in Table
60 appeared important particularly for the Japanese and US firms. The hypothesis
that entrepreneurship and experimentation are stronger in market focussed rather than
in functionally focussed organizational structures seems to be supported.
5.3 THE CLUSTER GROUPINGS
Based on the input of the data from the UK Questionnaire used in American,
British and Japanese companies, the following clusters from the dendrogram
printout were formed. The companies in alphabetical order (as on the
dendogram print-out) were the Japanese (1 - 15), the British (16 - 30) and the
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American firms (31 - 45). The clusters formed from the dendrogram are
shown in the following table:-
Table 60 Dendrotwam Clusters 
Cluster 1 (group 1 - 8) 	 4 Japanese, 1 British and 3 American
firms
Cluster 2 (group 9 - 22)	 3 Japanese, 5 British and 6 American
firms
Cluster 3 (group 23 - 24)	 -	 2 British firms
Cluster 4 (group 25 - 26)
	 -	 2 American firms
Cluster 5 (group 27 - 36)
	 -	 7 Japanese and 3 British firms
Cluster 6 (group 37 - 45)
	 -	 1 Japanese, 4 British and 4 American
firms
A limitation of this cluster method is that companies like Gestetner and
Beaver (not seen amongst the top five market leaders in their industries) could
be placed in the same cluster goruping (cluster 2) as Hitachi and Sony which
are market leaders in the UK, by virture of some statistical similarity in their
'collective' data.
However it is interesting to note that in their composition clusters 3 and 4
contained two British and two American companies respectively, with relative
similarities in importance, in terms of their market sizes. The largest cluster
grouping of the most successful Japanese companies was found in cluster 5
along with three important British FITMS in the sample, but without the
presence of any American firms. Cluster 2 represented the greatest number of
British and American firms with relative similarities in market sizes. Clusters
1 and 6 consisted of American, British and Japanese firms which considered
themselves strong in marketing and innovation without being the number 1
market leaders.
Using the mnemonic terms to characterise the cluster descriptions (in the
ESRC study, see Appendix 3), the responses of the American firms on their
marketing performances were analysed with the aid of the dendogram
groupings) and presented in the following table:
TABLE 61
CLUSTER DESRIPTIONS
Mnemonic Descriptions
1	 Early Birds
(performance: very
Japanese British American
successful) 6 1 1
2	 Price fighter
(very successful) 0 1 2
3	 Cruisers
(good) 3 2 6
4	 Sprinters
(moderate) 3 3 3
5	 Mastercraftsmen
(poor) 3 2 1
6	 Lemmings
(bad) 1 5 2
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5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
It is acknowledged that the use of percentages given the small sample size of
fifteen firms for each nationality may be small. However taken in total, a
sample of forty-five competing companies, which include many leading
names in their respective product-markets in the United Kingdom, has enabled
an assessment of their attitudes to and conduct over marketing strategies to be
made.
Hypotheses 1 is supported because building market share in new or higher
growth markets is essentially a medium to long-term policy which seems
affordable by only the more successful companies. Preventing market share
erosion through an emphasis on short-term sales and profits to try to ensure
survival has left little room for less successful firms to put aside any profits for
investment. This had led to a lack of confidence and morale amongst such
firms, particularly the British and American subsidiaries over the long-term
objectives of their parent companies towards keeping them operational.
Whilst all the firms in the sample had hoped to see market share much greater
in the short to medium-term, the Japanese responses on their market shares
strategies and company performances were much better than either the
Americans or the British. The relationships between short-term profit
maximisation (93%) and protection . or defence of existing market shares
(80%) is best demonstrated by the positions of the British firms. The findings
show that market share rather than short-term profit orientations are pursued
by successful companies to build up their competitive advantages.
Hypothesis 2 is supported because successful companies seem to have
strengths in one or more areas such as new product development,
technological innovations, expertise in developing markets, strong consumer
orientations and price-sensitivity to take advantage of specific consumer needs
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and wants in targeted segments in the UK markets. Entry strategies of such
firms are marked by their commitment in financial and human resources to
markets and technologies after the identification of specific opportunities.
The British companies in the sample have seen their market shares eroded by
overseas Japanese competitors. They also have had to compete with
American firms for shrinking markets, as in the UK Machine Tool market.
The hypothesis that companies can fmd success through a greater orientation
to new environmental opportunities seems to be supported in many British
firms which are prepared to be very price competitive and to serve the market
segments in which they are most competent. As Table 48 showed, there were
more Japanese companies (66%) in comparison to American companies (53%)
which considered their success at opening up new markets to be better than
their British competitors (27%).
Hypothesis 3 is not supported, as those firms which regarded themselves as
strong on product differentiation, advanced research, product design, cost
reduction and process development with efficient large scale manufacturing
capabilities, saw a very strong need to innovate on production and product
facilities. There was less 'adaptation' to markets as this focus on innovation
was brought through to the marketplace. New development in product line
extension or new techniques in servicing and selling to markets for example
necessitated in their views a higher degree of innovation than adaptation. This
is seen in the strategic focus of these firms where the expansion of markets by
converting non-users and creating new users (Table 50) were considered very
important by the more successful American British and Japanese firms.
Likewise the superiority of marketing mix techniques was considered
important in Table 51. The hypothesis that successful companies pursue fast
market adaptation rather than innovation does not appear to hold true.
Hypothesis 4 is supported because successful companies seem more
aggressive in their use of marketing tactics. The ability to produce good
quality products such as those produced by many British firms in the sample
did not seem enough to heat off American or Japanese competitors. The
marketing skills needed to exploit growth opportunities by clear positioning
and segmentation strategies with strong company and dealer support were
essential to sell good products in highly competitive markets today. In
looking at winning share by beating competition or being good at efficient
sales and marketing, the American and Japanese companies have appeared to
perform better than most British firms (Tables 52 and 53). Such British firms
underperformed as they were neither able to support nor to follow up
predictable trends in market segments or product developments. There were
however some successful British firms which saw themselves as good at
stimulating primary demand (47%) and at entering new market segments
(27%) as shown in Table 53. The findings indicated support for hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5 is not supported because organisation, planning tild control
procedures are not more lam mai in successful lions. Informal monitoring of
progress in the market via the personal contact or on telephone, faxes, telexes
uicl mail and has followed the adherence to formal written plans. This has
been the noon with all the companies. As the findings in Tables 55 and 56
show, the American (73%), British (53%) and Japanese (93%) companies all
placed importance on formal short to medium planning as an important part of
their strategic processes with a high incidence of periodic checks. The
majority of Japanese firms (64%) favour more a system of top-down, bottom-
up communications iind group teamwork which combined informal and formal
contact in their organisations (Table 57). Their belief in group teamwork and
use of committees to arrive at joint decision-making for strategy formulation
is combined with a continuous formal and informal monitoring of their firms'
progress in the marketplace, relating strategy to systems and staff. Hypothesis
5 is not supported as the informality of organisational processes has been
allowed only where it has been of value as an additional source of information
and necessary contact to support strategic and operational requirements.
Hypothesis 6 is supported because entrepreneurship and experimentation have
been found to be stronger in companies which see themselves as market
focussed rather than functionally focussed in their organisational structures.
The findings indicated that experimentation and entrepreneurship were
favoured by more American firms (53%) is shown in Tables 58 and 59 than by
Japanese and British firms. However the Japanese firms saw loose
supervision (60%) and the encouragement of entrepreneurship (53%) as more
important than most British firms. The companies that saw their organisations
as developed along individual product and geographic lines, rather than
mainly on functional groupings or departments, were amongst those that
supported greater entrepreneurship and experimentation. This was in tune
with their ambitious market share objectives and product development
programmes to develop broad product lines and marketing strategies to
achieve such objectives in the longer term. The relationships between skills
and structure to achieve strategic objectives is seen to be fostered when
companies allow a greater degree of self-development by individuals and
more tolerance of mistakes.
REFER ENCES
Drucker, P., (1980), Management London, Penguin Books.
The Economist, (1986), American Multinationals: The urge to go home.
Financial Times, (1987), Caterpillar to axe Scottish plant, January, 15, 1.
Porter, M. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations Macmillan Press Ltd.
Watennan, R., Peters, I., and Phillips, J., (1988), The 7-S Framework in The Strategy
Process edited by Quinn, J., Mintzberg, H., and James, R., Prentice-Hall Inc.
183
CHAPTER SIX
METHODOLOGY IN THE OVERSEAS RESEARCH
184
6.0 ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the method of approach for the investigation of the
marketing strategies and organisation of the participating companies in the
United States in August 1987, and in Japan in May 1988. The research
programmes included personal visits to the trade associations in the relevant
industries. The questionnaire for this overseas research built upon the
perceived advantage of using semi-structured questions gained from the
experiences of the UK research.
It was found that contacting these overseas companies through their UK
subsidiaries was not productive because of the wary attitudes of the UK
managers over arranging research interviews with their 'bosses in both the
United States and Japan. There were the exceptions such as DeVlieg and
Yamazaki-Mazak. Moreover contacting overseas companies and their trade
associations directly shortened the communication process and helped to
establish a personal relationship prior to the interviews. It was also found that
since both the American and Japanese overseas companies were keenly
interested in the affairs of their UK subsidiaries they were willing to cooperate
with the research, especially if the products of the research from the of
published findings could be made available to them.
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6.1	 INTRODUCTION 
The American and Japanese studies undertaken in the United States and Japan
respectively were ongoing research efforts proceeding from the analyses and
conclusions of the UK research. The research efforts in both countries
attempted to extend the major areas investigated in the UK by including the
overseas dimensions. These included the factors in overseas parent and UK
subsidiary relationship which affected their marketing performances.
The literature review with the formulation of the hypotheses had indicated that
'marketing was important for the global competitiveness of firms (Abernathy.
Clark and Kantrow 1981, Kotler and Fahey 1982). The overall perfonmuice
of American manufacturing businesses compared to their Japanese
competitors in exports had for instance reflected poorly on the former, the
evidence for which was a trade deficit of $159.2 bn compared to the Japanese
surplus of £96.5 bn in 1987 (Barclays Bank 1988).
It was hoped that the overseas research could help to shed light on how
established Western companies with good reputations for their products Lunt
customer support could have lost market share to Japanese competitors. For
example, American companies such as Cincinnati-Milacron and Barden had
established subsidiaries in the UK before Japanese competitors came on the
scene and threatened their markets. Amongst the American companies in the
sample were those which were the first to develop and market the precursors
to the mature technologies of today (eg xerography). Whilst competition in
the product areas of the research had intensified from countries such as West
Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, Taiwan and Korea. Japanese companies
had appeared to have been major beneficiaries of the contraction by less
successful American and British competitors. (Financial Times 1987). It was
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hoped that the overseas research could demonstrate the marketing elements
which helped successful Japanese and American companies increase or
maintain their market shares and their reputations as technologically
innovative market leaders, despite the intensification of competition. On the
other hand, research could also help to indicate the reasons for the
retrenchment of companies in the UK back to their home markets abroad in
the face of such competitive pressures. The resulting effects on UK
employment over such retrenchment have been given much publicity in the
business media (eg The Economist 1986), but much less has been explained of
the marketing/corporate strategies behind them.
6.2 METHOD OF APPROACH TO THE US COMPANIES 
The fifteen US parent organisations of the fifteen UK subsidiaries included in
the earlier study were targeted for research. The senior management in
marketing and sales of the US parent companies were approached directly by
letter, telexes and telephone. The interviews were not arranged through their
UK subsidiaries for the following reasons:- two out of fifteen had been
instructed not to encourage such research interviews due to the competitive
nature of their industries; three others explained that their US managements
expected their senior marketing and sales executives to leave interviews to
their personnel departments because of the cost in management time, and five
were apprehensive of the reactions of their US managers. It was felt that the
direct approach to the US companies was less time consuming and more
productive, with two UK companies volunteering the names of contacts.
The initial response to the letters explaining the research brought in offers of
six interviews. Others had to be followed up by telexes which brought in the
rest of their replies. The interview arrangements with the last two copier firms
were fixed by telephone. In all, personal interviews were conducted with
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twelve companies using a semi-structured questionnaire (see Appendix 6).
The thirteenth company had to answer the questionnaire by post as its
marketing executives were not in the USA at the time of the research. In total
thirteen of the fifteen US companies were happy to participate in the research.
Two others were not interviewed because one had disposed of its machine tool
interests in the UK while the other had its UK operations controlled entirely in
Europe.
The sample of companies was drawn from the machine tool, bearing,
audio/hifi, household appliances and photocopier sectors. Additional and very
helpful information on these sectors was provided through personal interviews
with the National Machine Tool Builders' Association, the Electronic
Industries Association, The Anti-Friction Bearing Manufacturers Association
and by telephone and post, due to the lack of time in the USA, with the
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers.
Interest in the research outcomes was expressed by all the US managers
interviewed who were surprised about the wary attitude of some UK
respondents over giving help towards arranging the overseas interviews with
the former. Confidentiality of responses in the US study and the offer of the
published findings were made to the participating US companies.
6.3 METII01) OF APPROACH TO TIIE JAPANESE COMPANIES 
As with the American subsidiaries in the UK, the Japanese subsidiaries were
initially contacted for help in arranging interviews with their parent
organisations in Japan. Letters were sent to the managing directors of the
fifteen Japanese firms in the UK. Prior to this, telephone calls ascertaining
correct personal names and company addresses had been made. Only one
interview had been arranged successfully in this way by one company
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(Yamazald-Mazak). Four other firms responded directly with interviews from
Japan.
In the meantime, the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) in London
had been contacted. It circulated the requests for interviews to the relevant
officials in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the
trade associations (Japan Machine Tool Builders' Association, Electronic
Industries Association of Japan, Japan Bearing Industrial Association and
Japan Electrical Manufacturers Association). Three individual managers
from each of the first three trade associations were highly instrumental and
tireless in their efforts to secure the rest of the interviews. Credibility for the
research purpose had also been aided by an introduction from a director of the
National Machine Tool Builders' Association (NMTBA), USA to the Director
of the Japan Machine Tool Builders' Association.
With the one Japanese exception which had sold its UK subsidiary (Sansui)
fourteen of the fifteen firms gave interviews. However, only thirteen Japanese
responses were taken for comparability purposes with the American ones as
thirteen US firms participated.
6.4 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS 
Since thirteen firms in the USA participated in the research, thirteen responses
from Japanese firms were therefore taken for comparability purposes. Table
63 lists the names of the participating organisations.
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TABLE 63
COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN TIIE RESEARCII
JAPANESE
Akai, Canon, Hitachi, Matsushita, Minebea, NSK Bearings, Pioneer, Ricoh.
Sharp, Sony, Toshiba (copiers)*, Toshiba (microwave ovens), Yamazaki-
Mazak.
US
Barden, Brown and Sharpe, Bridgeport, Cincinnati-Millacron, DeVleig,
Ex-Cell 0, Giddings and Lewis-Fraser, IBM, Kodak, Litton, Nashua,
Torrington, Xerox.
* Since Toshiba is an important large company in the sample and the interviews were
conducted with two distinctly different divisions, both responses are included.
Unlike the British and US firms where interviews were usually conducted on a
one to one basis there were two or more respondents at an interview in Japan,
with a secretary at times to note the proceedings. Their careful approach and
the interest generated in the research meant that more than one manager was
usually present at the interview.
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Table 64 lists the trade associations in the USA and Japan which were
interviewed to gain valuable background information on industries and the
business environments of the two countries.
TABLE 64
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS PARTICIPATING' IN THE RESEARCH
US
Electronic Industries' Association, Anti-Frictions Bearing Manufacturers'
Association, National Machine Tool Builders' Association, Association of
Home Appliance Manufacturers
JAPANESE
Electronic Industries' Association of Japan, Japan Bearing Industrial
Association, Japan Machine Tool Builders' Association, Japan Electrical
Manufacturers' Association
Note: The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Japan was also
interviewed. The US Embassy (in the UK) had also helped on information on US
interest in the UK markets.
Confidentiality of responses from individual participants was observed at all
times. The semi-structured questionnaire required no information of a
confidential nature. A summary of the research topics covered by the
questionnaire is given in the following list. The semi-structured nature of the
questionnaire enabled discussion over the interview topics (see Table 65) to be
prompted.
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TABLE 65
INTERVIEW TOPICS
Country Importance 
Importance of the UK market.
Significant investment or disinvestment in the UK market.
Rationalisation and redundancies over the previous five years.
Satisfaction with UK management-worker relations.
Importance of 'ideas' contact with UK for marketing and product innovation.
Corporate Structure
Where the UK subsidiary fits into the corporate organisation.
Dissatisfaction/satisfaction with existing structure.
Likely changes to structure.
Marketing Objectives 
Types of marketing objectives set.
Responsibility for setting UK marketing objectives.
Performance 
Sales growth, market share gains and profitability over the previous five years.
Short to medium term expectations of market share and profitability.
Reasons for UK performance.
Competitors' Targets 
Major competitors and country of origin.
Aggressiveness of competitors.
Importance of marketing mix elements for competitors.
Technology/Market Strategies
Market entry, timing and skill.
R & D capability and cost reduction process.
Marketing strengths.
Budget/Performance Scrutiny 
On profitability, costs, market share and cash flow.
Financial Backing
Financial backing/investment to UK firms.
Contact Between UK Firm and Overseas Parent
Reporting functions.
Responsibilities for content and feedback.
Method/frequency of contact.
Orientations 
The EPRG orientations.
Product, promotion, pricing and distribution policies.
Autonomy/dependence of subsidiary.
Retaliatory attacks on aggressive competitors.
Composition of top management.
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6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The promise of confidentiality, the guarantee of a published paper on the
overseas field study and the 'comparative' nature of the research with its
practical fieldwork spanning three countries, were strong inducements for
firms to participate. Both the Americans and the Japanese firms were
favourably disposed towards an overseas researcher who had taken an interest
in their organisations. The Japanese in particular appeared to want to
encourage more overseas researchers from Western institutions to help foster
their attempts to show a more 'open' business environment and to explain
Japanese methods. Much time and effort had to be spent in arranging and
conducting the interviews. The cooperation of the firms and the trade
associations were forthcoming from the early stages of the research.
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CHAPTER 7
FINDINGS IN THE OVERSEAS RESEARCH
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7.0 ABSTRACT
This chapter presents the results of the testing of the hypotheses 7-11 in the overseas
research. The twenty-six headquarters organisations of the UK firms in the sample
were personally interviewed and their responses to the questionnaire for the overseas
research were analysed using the 2 x 2 contingency tables for the chi-square tests and
percentages. The analysis of the overseas research is followed by a comparison of the
response of headquarters firms and their UK subsidiaries where questions common to
both had been asked.
The overseas fmdings showed that firms with planned programmes for expansion in
the UK market regarded their marketing support to their UK subsidiaries as crucial
with a long-term perspective to make their marketing effective for UK and European
markets. Firms which were highly ethnocentric and placed more importance on
defending their own national market in the United States or Japan had little support to
give to their UK subsidiaries in new investment, products, services and innovations in
marketing or products. Improved market segmentation and positioning tactics were
considered more crucial to growth than low pricing tactics. Low pricing had possible
political repercussions especially for Japanese firms where allegations by American
and British companies of unfair trading practices by the Japanese still persisted.
Closer relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries were seen to be enhanced
by the presence of their own nationals as chief executives of UK subsidiaries.
Headquarters were found to be keen to have closer relationships with their
subsidiaries to oversee the achievement of their UK market positions with the greatest
emphasis on costs and short-term cashflows. These findings and conclusions are
presented in this chapter.
7.1	 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is organised around the hypotheses for the overseas research. The
hypotheses tested covered the attitudes orientations and support of the headquarters
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firms in the United States and Japan to the marketing operations of their UK
subsidiaries. The relationships between the headquarters firms and their UK
subsidiaries are also examined.
Each section starts with a hypothesis to be tested. The results of the interviews with
American and Japanese firms are compared and the fmdings discussed with reference
to the specific hypothesis tested. A further section presents a comparison of the
headquarters and subsidiary responses where questions common to both had been
asked in the questionnaires. The main conclusions for all these sections are presented
at the end of this chapter.
7.2 THE TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 7 - 11 IN THE OVERSEAS RESEARCH
7.2	 Hypothesis 7 Effective marketing is a factor of critical importance in asserting the
successful global competition of firms
An important influence on the success of a company in an overseas market is the
investment of resources to develop and maintain such a market. The test of
hypothesis 7 seeks to examine the attitudes of parent organisations towards the
commitment of resources to marketing in the UK and the effect of this commitment
on the effectiveness of marketing by its UK subsidiary.
Responses were invited from the American and Japanese companies concerning the
importance of the UK market to their organizations and the impact this had on their
commitments towards the UK subsidiaries to develop their marketing and competitive
strategies. The table below presents their responses with regard to the importance of
the UK market to their businesses.
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'Fable 66A
CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE UK MARKET TO CORPORATE SUCCESS
US	 Japanese
69%	 69%
No statistical significance.
The identical responses (69%) with a non-significant chi-square level showed that the
UK market was of considerable importance to both sides. In response to the question
of which other markets were more important than the UK in Western Europe, West
Germany was considered more crucial, especially for those who also had subsidiaries
in West Germany as well. However the home markets of both the United States and
Japan were regarded as their most important.
Given such similarities in responses from both US and Japanese firms, it seemed
necessary to examine whether the higher percentage of Japanese firms compared to
American ones which had increased their investment in the UK had also performed
better.
Not all the Japanese and American companies had experienced sustained marketing
successes in the UK. One Japanese parent firm in audio/hi-fl products had incurred
heavy liabilities and financial difficulties at home, a fact corroborated by its
competitors in Japan, and these led to the sale of its UK subsidiary in the earlier part
of 1988. One US parent firm had divested off its UK plant for machine tools by 1987
in preference to concentrating new product development in the USA and consequently
pushing its UK subsidiary towards a distributive rather than a wholly manufacturing
role. Another US parent firm had sold off its two UK machine tool subsidiaries by
1987. These companies were therefore not included in the overseas research which
led to thirteen and not fifteen of the American and Japanese HQ organisations being
interviewed abroad.
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Marketing to be effective requires the input of resources. All but one of the US
companies had invested in new technologies and new product development in the UK
itself alongside the rationalisation process. However no major investment or
expansion plans were deemed necessary in the short to medium-term period. This
may possibly be indicative of the lack of sustained effort by many US companies to
follow up technological leadership in overseas markets and the emphasis placed on
short term profits.
In contrast five Japanese companies stated that major investment in new plant and
equipment had been made in their UK operations. The other Japanese firms indicated
that investment in their subsidiaries would be maintained and acquisitions in the UK
to gain new products and markets would be encouraged. One firm indicated that its
new UK Worcester plant was a long term commitment to European industry and
would focus on products in greatest demand and of maximum productivity benefits to
its European partners.
The continual anti-dumping investigations by the American and European
Commissions had made a strong impact on the Japanese respondents who felt the
need to consolidate and expand their UK operations as a safety measure to overcome
trade hostilities and restrictive quotas. Some of these trade investigations had been
seen to be at the instigation of their US competitors even in the minority of cases
where joint venture agreements in Europe and in Japan had been undertaken between
Japanese and US companies. The Japanese respondents had seen these attempts as
unfair political pressure to raise their costs where American marketing had been
ineffective. While four American firms supported political pressure to halt Japanese
economic expansion, the rest had responded with the need to match Japanese
capabilities on a more aggressively competitive footing.
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While the intensive knowledge technology base in Europe could arguably be seen to
be more accessible to the Americans and the Japanese, given their presence, all the
Japanese respondents had stressed the importance of being closer to their European
customers particularly in their technological requirements in industrial markets, as
was the situation with their customer relationships in Japan. They saw their
competitive technologies in the product sectors of the research as superior in some
areas and as good in others compared to the Americans. This was in contrast to the
view of the US respondents that US technologies were more advanced and that the
US home market and customer base in terms of its size was of the utmost importance.
Hypothesis 7 that effective marketing is of critical importance in asserting the global
competitiveness of firms appears to be sustained. The identification of opportunities
and threats and the implications for the present and future location of a company's
business add to the effectiveness of the global marketing strategy. The results
indicated that those companies which had maintained or increased their investment in
their UK operations were more confident of continued marketing success in the UK
market.
7.2.2 Hypothesis  8: Ethnocentricity is a factor of critical importance in asserting the
successful global competition of firms
Hypothesis 8 researched the impact of ethnocentrism on the competitiveness of firms.
The numerical ratings and the qualitative responses to questions 11A a,b,c and d,
were taken.
Using the EPRG orientations, (ethnocentrism, polycentrism, regiocentrism and
geocentrism), American and Japanese respondents were asked about their bias and
aspirations regarding the flexibility and responsiveness of their organisational
structures to local market needs. EPRG orientation, first identified by Perlmutter in
1969, were associated with management attitude or orientations toward successive
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stages in evolving international operations. Ethnocentrism referred to a home country
approach contrasting with polycentrism which had a host country orientation.
Regiocentrism was associated with a regional orientation and geocentrism to a world
orientation. Dahringer and Miilbacher (1991) stated their beliefs that a firm's view of
its markets was essentially more important than the form of its organisation and
supported the EPRG orientations to classify a firm's views.
Table 66B summarises the responses from the US and Japanese parent organizations
as to their EPRG orientations.
Whilst the American companies did not consider their organisations to be primarily
home country orientated to the exclusion of the importance of overseas markets, only
85% saw the US market and strategies developed for it as a prime importance.
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'FABLE 66B
THE PARENT COMPANY'S PHILOSOPHY ON OVERSEAS MARKETS
1. Not at all home country
oriented
2. Overseas strategies
similar to home with
slight modifications
3. Overseas strategies
significantly modified
for overseas opportunities
4. Globally oriented to
world market opportunities
US JAP
15% 54%
62% 31%
46% 23%
23% 54%
1 and 4 = Statistical significance at the 5% level
2 and 3 = no statistical significance
This contrasted with 46% of the Japanese firms showing that there was a higher
percentage of Japanese firms which did not regard themselves at ethnocentric at all.
However the responses show that there were in both US and Japanese responses,
firms which did appear more ethnocentrically inclined with a chi-square significance
at the 5% level.
The Chi-square tests showed no statistical significance for strategies developed along
lines similar to those for the home market where there were 'slight' or 'significant'
modifications to meet overseas opportunities. However when it came to the global
orientation, 77% of the US firms had strategies with major priority to their home
market. Only 23% of the US firms indicated that they were globally oriented
compared to 54% of Japanese firms. Perhaps this may not be surprising given that
Japanese firms to compete successfully abroad on a global basis would have to
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compete in the US market too. The hypothesis that ethnocentricity may therefore be a
factor limiting the abilities of US and Japanese companies to be internationally
competitive appears to have been sustained.
Some of the reasons for this may be indicated in their qualitative responses. The US
companies thought that they were often competing with the same major overseas
competitors and their subsidiaries in both the UK and the US markets. It was
significant to note that the US parent companies did not appear to fare better against
their overseas competitors, notably the Japanese compared to their UK subsidiaries.
In some cases the deterioration was even worse as one US marketing Director
remarked,
"Our machine tool companies don't even have the capacity
anymore, shrunk so much that there is no US manufacturer of
general types of lathes except the specialist CNC ones. As the
US has shrunk Asian producers have stepped in."
The Japanese respondents were no less protective of their domestic market. The
Japanese companies appeared wary of any increase in competition at home or abroad.
Trade hostilities abroad provoked by the Japanese trade surpluses had led to Japanese
governments being inclined towards the opening of Japan's markets to the west.
However the Japanese firms felt that they were competing with indigenous companies
for market leadership in the important export markets of the UK, in products such as
audio/hifi and photocopiers. Such Japanese firms attached importance towards
identifying common elements in changing customer tastes and preferences and in
technological requirements in their competition with other Japanese firms at home
and abroad. In contrast, the American firms (77%) attached importance to
development of technology, product and market strategies at home, which would form
the competitive basis for overseas markets. They were however, handicapped by the
fact that in the product areas of the research more globally oriented Japanese firms, as
indicated in the 54%, had made significant market gains.
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Moreover, the Japanese government had attempted to increase imports, particularly in
manufacturing, which were at odds with the aspirations of Japanese finns. The
Japanese respondents were in general agreement that their government's actions to
create the appropriate balance in direct overseas investment between developed and
developing nations to avoid further trade frictions were good for Japan. However,
while the Japanese companies had given the additional function of 'imported' business
to individual managers, all the respondents felt that it was not practical to import from
their UK subsidiaries or liaise as domestic distributors for overseas companies. In
terms of product and market development in the five industries studied, they saw the
trend towards expansion from their production points continuing. In practice
therefore, the Japanese firms did not see any major shifts in their management
policies or in their competitive market stances in the UK.
As the respondents from one large audio/hifi company Matsushita pointed out:
"Western manufacturers do not realise that the Japanese had to
lay the groundwork overseas for many years. Our company
established its plan in Switzerland in 1963 and we had had a
presence in European markets for over twenty years".
As indicated in Table 66, 23% thought that company strategies had been significantly
modified to meet overseas opportunities rather than along lines similar to the home
market. 54% of the respondents saw themselves strong on the global orientation and
had to be to safeguard growth prospect.
With the increasing technological sophistication of Japanese products, traditional
supply functions were changing. For instance, customisation on the technological
front in the machine tools and bearings markets required setting up near overseas
customers.
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In contrast, 77% of the American firms which had set up overseas subsidiaries in
post-war UK originally to dispose off surplus production to use the early stages of the
Perlmutter's EPRG scheme still saw their domestic American operations as the most
important. Later Japanese firms having already established demand for their products
in the UK set up subsidiaries to strengthen their marketing export successes abroad
and were more able to develop polycentric and geocentric rather than ethnocentric
orientations.
The hypothesis that ethnocentrism presents a barrier for global competitiveness
therefore appears valid.
The difficulties in the market place faced by American firms were compounded by
the recessionary factors in the USA and the growth of overseas penetration in its
already saturated markets.. This had made it less easy for American firms to keep
ahead in the drive for technological and market supremacy compared to Japanese
companies already successfully established in its overseas UK markets.
7.2.3 Hypothesis 9 Globally successful firms have clearly focussed marketing
strategies targeted at opportunities in national markets leading to the development of
competitive global advantages.
The focus of a competitive strategy concentrating on specific market segments by
serving them more effectively than other competitors can yield better results and raise
the profitability of a company. The tests for hypothesis 9 centred around the
following areas of company objectives and performance (questions 3 and 4 in the
questionnaire) and retaliatory actions against competitors (question 11a).
Researching these areas raised the possibility of understanding how companies
develop their competitive advantages.
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Table 67 indicates the responses of American and Japanese companies over their
strategic focus.
TABLE 67
STRATEGIC FOCUS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE COMPANIES
US	 JAP
Very good at:
1. new emerging segments 	 8%	 54%
2. stimulating primary demand 	 8%	 31%
3. product differentiation 	 15%	 54%
4. segmentation positioning	 3 1%	 69%
1, 3 and 4 = statistical significance at the 5% level
2 = No statistical significance
Supported by the chi-square, significant at the 0.05 levels, the American responses
compared unfavourably with the Japanese competitors. Only 8% of the American
firms saw themselves as very good at entering new market segments and very
effective in stimulating primary demand, compared with the Japanese firms at 54%
and 31% respectively. The rest of the American firms admitted to a stronger
tendency towards the sales rather than the marketing orientation. The strengths in
technical development and excellence were at the forefront of emphasis for all
companies which wish to stay as market leaders. Only 15% of the US companies saw
themselves as good at product differentiation but the smaller number of 31% said they
were effective at segmentation and positioning. These compared unfavourably with
the higher percentages of Japanese firms at (54% and 69% respectively)
206
It may be significant that both the US and Japanese respondents thought that they
were better at entering new market segments with growth potential rather than
segmentation to consolidate with growth market positions and customer targets. One
third of the less successful American companies admitted that they did not enter
markets very early on in the product life cycles, tending to enter established markets
during the growth stage.
The expansion in market share gains and profitability of the successful Japanese
companies had in part been attributed to their reputations for effective market
segmentation. The rivalry between competitors in market segments pushes the
strategic focus on to the development of competitive advantages. None of the
Japanese companies thought that they were any better at market segmentation than
their British or American competitors, especially when they had benefited from
applying segmentation ideas learnt from the USA. However, by concentrating on
product innovations and product line extensions with the committed focus towards
exploiting existing and new segments, the successful Japanese firms felt that they
might have created the overall impression that they were good at segmentation given
their market share achievements.
Table 68 reinforced the assessments of the respondents over the performances of their
UK subsidiaries taking the last five years intd account in this respect.
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rery successful in:
;ales growth
)rofitability
narket share gains
o statistical significance
31% 46%
38% 70%
38% 46%
TABLE 68
SUCCESS OF THE UK OPERATION OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS
US	 JAP
Though the chi-square tests did not indicate significance levels, what appeared
interesting was that the Japanese companies (70%) placed profitability of their UK
operations over the last five years as an important element in their success. This
contrasted with 38% of the American firms. Where the sales growth and market share
gains were concerned there were successful American companies though fewer
compared to Japanese ones. The Japanese respondents all indicated that they took a
long term view of profit. Even when demand fell, manning was still kept in line with
medium to long term objectives because investing and training to build a skilled
labour force and taking account of the expanded aspirations of customers are strategic
marketing decisions.
Invariably, US companies found that despite their government's and Industrial
Associations' protectionist sentiments, customers did not automatically revert hack to
'buying American' or 'buying British'. US firms had to be internationally competitive.
The overseas Japanese competitors became indigenous suppliers by setting up UK
and US subsidiaries to overcome external trade restrictions, or focussed on easier
markets elsewhere by competing with other US subsidiaries abroad. Industrial
customers were not unaware of developments in and the applications from the
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convergence of new technologies. US companies had to prove their quality image
according to the standards of international competition.
As shown in Table 69 only 23% of the US companies compared with 92% of the
Japanese companies were confident that their market shares would be much greater,
supported by the chi-square test showing a significance at the 0.005 level. A similar
projection was made for profitability by the respondents.
TABLE 69
MEDIUM TERM EXPECTATIONS OF UK SUBSIDIARY'S PERFORMANCE
JAP	 US
Greater market share	 92%	 23%
Stronger profitability	 92%	 23%
Significant at the 0.005 level
Both sides appeared to expect this trend to continue. This is despite the American
insistence that having gone through the difficulties of adjustments with the processes
of cutbacks, rationalisation and targeting investment in new plant and product
technologies, the US firms were far better pOised to win back market share. This
might not be the complete recipe needed for success as the Americans still expected
to see lower market shares and profitability in their medium term forecasts compared
to their Japanese counterparts.
There were successful companies in both the US and Japanese samples although as
indicated by the responses, they were comparatively fewer in the former. Successful
companies tended to have reputations for aggressive marketing as they could set
prevailing market prices within their industries, offer higher discounts and dealer
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incentives, afford more funds for investment to maintain technological supremacy and
support a greater network for sales and after-sales facilities. However retaliatory
attacks on identified aggressors in their markets were not encouraged.
The responses for the establishment of retaliatory strategies and tactics, and the
commitment of cash for them are shown in Table 70. None of the Japanese firms
advocated financing their UK subsidiaries for such strategies whereas 54% did not
lend HQ support. Sustaining the quality image of Japanese firms abroad was seen as
critically important in view of their sensitivity over western allegations of Japanese
'unfair trading practices.' US firms gave little support, preferring that UK subsidiaries
should organise their own competitive responses, as they themselves had to in their
US market.
TABLE 70
RETALIATORY ATTACKS ON AN AGGRESSOR IN TIIE UK MARKET
JAP
	
US	 ADJ X2
I. Little HQ involvement
in establishing
retaliatory strategy	 54%	 100%	 5.34
2. No cash commitment
to finance the
retaliatory strategy	 100%	 31%	 11.14a
Significant at the 0.0051evel.
The American companies had faced the pressures exerted by the Japanese
competition on their home market and were themselves looking at methods of
counteracting Japanese advances. Even with the downturns in demand, as in the
machine tool and bearing markets in 1987, the Japanese competitors were seen to
have kept their manning levels and output consistent despite American cutbacks.
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This in turn fuelled suspicion of hidden government subsidies and offloading of
surplus output onto markets in developing countries, but these wer ,:. rejected by the
Japanese respondents.
The tests for hypothesis 9 appear to indicate that globally competitive firms had to
have clearly focussed long-term marketing strategies aimed at opportunities in
national markets. Sales turnover, market share gains and profitability remained very
important ongoing objectives. Growth in healthy conditions included the strategic
siting and aggressiveness of their overseas ventures to take advantage of favourable
indigenous conditions and the enhancing productivity as crucial for long-term
profitability on the medium to long-term basis. Hypothesis 9 therefore appeared valid
given that to be successful in the UK market, American and Japanese firms had to be
good at developing strategies in their UK market segments.
7.2.4 Hypothesis  10 Globally successful firms are strong market and technological
innovators prepared to invest in international markets with less dependence upon low
prices as one element of the marketing mix to gain and sustain market entry.
Hypotheses 10 took into account the responses to questions 6c, 7a, b, c, and 11b, c, d,
e, to examine the competitive stances of US and Japanese firms to competitors
targets, differential advantages and marketing mix variables. For example, the ability
of a company to control its marketing variables, taking into consideration the
international market environment, reflects its success to develop and maintain
effective transactions with its overseas customer targets. Both the polycentric and
geocentric orientations call for the adaption of successive mixes to the conditions
within national markets where indigenous requirements can differ.
The test of hypothesis 10 included the examination of the responses to question 11b,
c, d, and e to take into consideration the overseas orientations of the parent companies
reflected in their polycentric adaptation to national market conditions. For instance,
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the combination of the marketing mix elements has a different impact in one national
market compared to another because of competitive tactics and varying indigenous
requirements. The suitability of the transfer of an appropriate or complementary mix
are important considerations for the international operations of a firm.
TABLE 71
NOT AT ALL DEVELOPED BY I-1( FOR WORLD MARKETS
JAP Us
1. Product 69% 61%
2. Promotion 31% 62%
3. Place 76% 76%
4. Price 38% 85%
1 and 3 = No statistical significance
2 = Significant at the 0.2 level
4 = Significant at the 0.05 level
In terms of product and place in (Table 71), the chi-square values showed no levels of
significance. Where promotion and price were concerned, they were significant at the
0.2 and 0.05 levels respectively. 62% of American firms stated that their subsidiaries
had greater autonomy on promotion as this was a matter left to their subsidiaries.
There was greater control over price by 85% of American firms compared to 38% of
Japanese firms. The degree of modification to adapt to UK market conditions is
shown in Table 72.
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TABLE 72
MODIFIED TO MEET SPECIFIC UK NEEDS
JAP US
1.	 Product 46% 31%
2.	 Promotion 67% 62%
3.	 Place 54% 46%
Price 46% 69%
No statistical significance
Therefore both the American and Japanese firms saw their subsidiaries as having
some autonomy in marketing mix decisions in the UK market. While no major
modifications in their approaches were being considered given that promotion and
channel decisions were often independently adjusted to indigenous UK requirements,
there were explanations for the differences in focus on product and pricing policies
between the American and Japanese firms.
The American firms tended to focus on the requirements for greater control in their
priorities for research and development and the need to maintain price levels which
were competitive because of the 'package' offered to customers. Price cutting was
seen as counterproductive to the needs of their industries and their image creation.
The Japanese firms appeared to be searching for a balanced approach towards pricing,
as any suggestion of price cutting brought allegations of 'unfair trading practices' from
their western competitors. At the same time they sought to maintain their image of
efficiency in operation on which their claims for their price competitiveness were
based. The preference to concentrate new product testing in Japan was, in their view,
supported by the fact that they were competing with other Japanese firms eg,
photocopiers, both in Japan and overseas.
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A ranking method was used to identify the competitive emphasis of rivals because in
strategy analysis, competitors are concerned with the extent of rivalry between
themselves in their market segments when developing competitive advantages.
Each US and Japanese firm was asked to rank in order of importance, the strategies
that its major competitor was concerned with. The initial response that they were all
relatively important at various times was quickly overcome and respondents were
able to give positive answers to each. Although averages can be misleading, there
was a consistency in the responses in (Table 73) supported by the prevailing practices
within the industries.
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"FABLE 73
MEAN SCORES
Competitors' strategy
JAP US
1.	 Low prices 3.69 1.92
2. Product quality 2.38 2.46
3. Product innovation 3.15 2.38
4. Advertising/promotion 4.29 4.62
5. Good distribution 3.62 5.08
6. Powerful salesforce 3.78 4.54
1 and 5 = significant at the 0.05 level
2 and 3 = no statistical significance
4 = significant at the 0.2 level
6 = significant at the 0.2 level
The responses seemed to show that importance was attached by competitors to match
the Japanese in being cost effective in supply provision at low cost, increased focus
on product quality, and investment in the product innovation process. Though they
achieved lower rankings, good distribution channels and powerful salesforces were
important particularly in promoting good support and liaison with customers.
Advertising and promotion by competitors appeared to be seen as having a higher
emphasis compared to sales and distribution.
The findings confirm that low prices, product innovation and product quality are
closely related in today's market conditions. The high costs of product innovation and
the consistent maintenance of quality have to be matched to the competitive price
levels prevailing within the industries. Having an effective and powerful salesforce
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and good distribution channels are important. These achieved similar though lower
rankings. In industrial markets advertising and promotion play a vital role in
supporting the development of closer supplier to customer contacts and in building an
effective corporate image.
As shown in Table 73, the mean of the rank responses was taken. American and
Japanese responses were not significantly different for product quality and product
innovation. However they were significant for low prices good distribution,
advertising promotion and powerful sales force which were easier for companies to
manipulate so as to adjust to market conditions within the short-term.
The respondents were able to assign positive rankings to the variables in terms of the
prevailing practices of their competitors. There was a consistency in their responses
which confirmed the need to match product quality and innovation to keen pricing
with lower rankings for advertising, promotion, sales and distribution channels.
The need to understand competitive behaviour based on adequate information about
changing conditions in the markets and in the industries concerned is an essential
requirement of the strategy process. In order to sustain their differential advantages,
firms therefore needed to match or overtake their competitors offerings. While the
Japanese firms claimed that their product • designs were as well made and as
technologically ahead as those of western products, the successful American firms
insisted that their strengths in advanced research and product design capabilities over
that of their competitors had been maintained. It is therefore not surprising that the
chi-square tests in Table 74 showed 'not significant' levels between the Japanese and
the American responses.
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TABLE 74
DIFFERENTIAL ADVANTAGES
Very strong capabilities on:-
1. advanced research
2. product design
3. flexible & responsive R&D
4. process development and
cost reduction
1, 2 and 4 = no statistical significance
3 = Statistically significant at the 0.2 level
JAP US
46% 23%
38% 31%
38% 8%
31% 31%
US firms saw themselves as strong on advanced research and product design
capabilities which were consistent with the image of technical development and
product quality. However it was significant that a third of the US firms felt that they
had a long way to go before the requirements to tailor their research and development
programmes towards the changing needs of the marketplace were substantially met.
The Japanese respondents did not see their level of manufacturing technology to be
any lower than that of their counterparts in the West. Their product designs were
claimed to be well made and as technologically competitive as those abroad. One
large trading company in the sample bemoaned that in contrast Western
manufacturers did not pay greater need to the particular requirements of the Japanese
market and too often standardised their product offerings when selling to a discerning
Japanese public.
The quality of Japanese management and workers made it possible to improve
productivity and to utilise equipment and technological know-how to better effect.
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The company's objectives of quality design, productivity, cost reductions and general
well-being were expected of all employees and inculcated in each company's
philosophy. What was not guaranteed was the system of 'lifetime employment' in
both parent and subsidiary organizations alike, but employees were encouraged to
stay through company benefit schemes such as subsidised allowances and pensions
schemes.
Japanese management provisions such as simple status roles, quality circles,
employee participation and flexible working conditions have earned respect from both
managers and unions in the West. However, while these are transferable practices
based on good management principles, the Japanese respondents were conscious of
their positions within the organisational structures. Deference, acceptance of
authority, the stress on continual improvement, even reserved car parking spaces can
suggest that Japanese managers are no less status conscious than in the West.
American corporate culture encouraged open competition such as the labour mobility
of high calibre managers and employees between firms and the cross-fertilisation of
ideas. Japanese firms tended to be self-sufficient in terms of developing human
resources internally with the stress on self-development and the good of the
organization inculcated in company philosophies. There seem to be observable
differences in the extrogenous and endogenbus contexts where American firms are
more outward looking to the external environment, whereas Japanese firms exhibit a
greater inward looking approach to the development of their human and technological
resources. The Japanese firms regarded one element in their success as the capability
to see long-term projects through by the scrupulous ploughing back of their financial
resources to support development. The validity of hypothesis 10 through the testing
of the marketing mix elements, the competitors targets and the differential advantages
between US and Japanese firms appear to have been sustained. Globally competitive
firms have less dependence on low prices as an element of the marketing mix to gain
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and sustain market entry. The combination of skills in human and technological
capabilities with long-term investment in international markets appear to be more
important in laying the foundation for successful marketing.
7.2.5 Hypothesis 11 Globally successful firms encourage closer relationships with
their subsidiaries and maintain greater scrutiny and evaluation of their subsidiaries'
marketing performance.
The test for hypothesis 11 included the numerical ratings and qualitative responses to
question le and f, and 8,9, and 10, covering UK management relations with workers,
interchange of ideas between UK subsidiary and parent company, financial scrutiny
and reporting functions.
While these may seem a broad remit to cover and may entail problems for depth of
coverage, it appeared reasonable to consider such questions relative to the overall
hypothesis that globally competitive firms built closer relationships through the
monitoring of their subsidiaries' marketing activities.
For example, over the question of satisfaction with management and worker relations
in the UK, the Japanese rather than the US companies all appeared to be very satisfied
with the situation in the UK. This could help to indicate their stability of operations
and productivity but was not in itself enough to sustain the overall hypothesis.
Therefore the aspects covered in the other questions asked helped to present an
overall picture of global competitiveness linked to close contact and evaluation of
subsidiaries' performances.
The US respondents all indicated that 'retrenchment' in the UK market was not a
deliberate policy pursued by them. What had happened was that the recessionary
effects in the UK market with the consequent low demand and intensive competition
not only from British, West German, Italian, French, Japanese and Korean
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manufacturers, but also from other US subsidiaries, had made it necessary to
rationalise and streamline their UK operations. UK subsidiaries had not been as
profitable as hoped for and had lost market shares to overseas competitors.
Management restructuring and redundancies had been necessary to ensure the
survival and prospects of their subsidiaries.
In contrast, the Japanese parent companies interviewed felt that they did not
experience the factory closures and redundancies in the UK, or the acute industrial
relations problems faced by British firms in the 1970s. They had also tried to adapt to
British conditions by showing a flexibility and understanding of the needs of their
workforces, by appointing British managers and offering good working conditions.
TABLE 75
VERY SATISFIED WITH UK MANAGEMENT-WORKER-RELATIONS
Japanese	 US
100%
	 46%
Significant at the 0.01 level
In terms of their satisfaction with UK management and worker relations, the chi-
square test for the Japanese and US responses did show a 0.01 significance as in
Table 75. While it is acknowledged that there were statistical limitations due to the
small cell size, it did indicate on the whole that Japanese companies were more
fortunate in their labour relations compared to the Americans. Both sought a no-
union or single union agreement with their workforces, common to the practice in
Japan and the USA. It could be that managerial and technological changes are easier
to implement in subsidiaries where the corporate objectives for growth rather than for
retrenchment and market survival are in place. It could also be argued that one factor
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might have been the acceptability and adaptability of Japanese managerial practices
for employee and customer care to western conditions compared with the US
streamlining of operations in pursuit of short-term profit maximisation objectives.
Therefore satisfaction with UK management-worker relations would help a
competitive firm build a closer relationship with its subsidiary where growth
prospects were evident.
The Japanese senior management did not appear to have inflicted on their western
managers and staff the traditional Japanese preference for the training of their
management graduates in a wide range of company functions. In Japan this has
contributed to a slowness up the corporate ladder. Labour mobility is restricted as it
is not expected of Japanese managers to look for changes in employment with other
firms within the same industry. Learning about a company's products and its
company ethos is seen to be an ongoing long term commitment for Japanese
managers and their staff. In the West this lifelong association has been seen to be a
strength of the Japanese because the flexibility of its management has been given as
an important reason for Japan's success in trade. It may be that the longer hours put in
by Japanese employees result in increased output for the time spent with possible
adverse consequences in quality of life and work related stress. Therefore those with
previous experience in the UK as senior managers or as managing directors found that
they preferred the style of decision making in'the subsidiaries, adapted on the western
model of the American and the British managerial and workforce styles.
In organisational cultures the improvement of communications and the
encouragement of innovation could be as important, with less secrecy and more
interchange of ideas between different operating units. So the interchange of ideas
can contribute to encourage multiple perspectives and creativity between people in
different functions through more effective cooperation for developing and
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implementing policies and operating norms, thus aiding the competitiveness of
international and multinational firms.
Table 76 indicates the responses of the Japanese and US management regarding the
contact between themselves and their subsidiaries on the interchange of ideas on
marketing and product innovation.
TABLE 76
IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTACT IN STIMULATING THE INTERCHANGE OF
IDEAS
JAP	 US
Very important for
1. Marketing	 85%	 38%
2. Product innovation	 46%	 54%
1 = Statistical significance at the 0.025 level
2 = No statistical significance
Whilst 85% of the Japanese companies saw the close contact on marketing issues and
decisions between HQ and subsidiaries as crucial, only 46% thought that the inputs on
product innovation could be strengthened by further contact. This would appear to
bear out the Japanese views that it was essential and desirable to keep their
knowledge and development of high technology products and applications close to
home. This approach may contribute to the difficulty which the Japanese have in
shaking off their 'copying' image. The tests revealed no significant difference
between the Japanese and the Americans on 'product innovation' hut did show
significance for 'marketing'. The positions appeared reversed with the Americans
putting more emphasis on the technological contact than the marketing ones.
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The significance of this finding for hypothesis 11 maybe that more Japanese
companies (85%) compared to the US companies (38%) found that where marketing
was concerned, a greater contact in stimulating ideas had helped towards a
contribution to overall competitiveness. It can perhaps be said to encourage creativity
and multiple perspectives on business.
All the US companies indicated that the profitability of their subsidiaries was
paramount with the analysis of the cost and efficiency of operations as critical.
Market share considerations had to take account of the vagaries of national market
conditions. Likewise cash flow considerations were important but the price of
autonomy meant that subsidiaries had to aim for overall profitability whilst left to
their own devices to ensure the continuing day-to-day operations. The more rigidly
formal systems of reporting and contacts favoured between the senior levels of US
and UK management in the scrutiny of such matters were followed by all the US
parent organizations.
With the Japanese companies, market share and profitability had been regarded as
important in their strategic focus in the medium to long-term consideration.
In Table 77 the analysis of costs as seen by 46% merited less critical scrutiny as the
object for overall profitability had to be • balanced against short-term financial
constraints. Similarly, cash flow analysis with sales turnover measures was regarded
by 38% in this light. However, formal budget and performance systems were applied
as rigidly in Japanese HQ firms as with their British and US competitors.
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TABLE 77
IIQ SCRUTINY ON BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
Very much scrutiny on
JAP US
1.	 Profitability 38% 54%
2. Costs 46% 76%
3. Market share 92% 62%
4. Cash flow 38% 31%
No statistical significance
The responses in Table 77 indicated the high importance allocated by the Japanese
firms (92%) to the market share objectives on which their medium and long term
profit projections had also been geared. American firms correspondingly showed
quite a high response (62%) on the market share criterion though not surprisingly
76% were concerned over costs, given some of their difficulties in restructuring both
their UK and US operations. This seems to indicate that the aggressive market share
criterion of Japanese firms (92%) and the costs orientations of American firms (76%)
might have hampered the competitiveness of the latter to the advantage of the former.
The chi-square tests however did not show any statistical significance for each
category scrutinised.
Costs and profitability concerns were central to the US requirements that their UK
firms should demonstrate self-sufficiency and generate their own financial solutions
to their problems. This was borne out in Table 78 where much financial backing and
investment were considered in the larger US firms (38%). The Japanese firms had set
their sights on expansion into the UK and from UK markets into European ones.
Therefore a higher proportion (62%) conceded that recent investment had been made
and while more investment was not deemed necessary in the short-term, the returns
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were expected to be recouped with their consolidated presence in the UK and
European markets.
TABLE 78
FINANCIAL BACKING/INVESTMENT FROM IIQ
JAP	 US
Much financial backing	 63%	 38%
No statistical significance
Like their US competitors, the Japanese companies expected their subsidiaries to
display considerable self-sufficiency and autonomy in local operations as illustrated
in Table 78 63% of the Japanese firms were prepared to give much financial backing
to their UK subsidiaries when needed, compared to 38% American firms. The chi-
square was not statistically significant. The firms advocated little financial aid in
preference to their subsidiaries meeting their own financial obligations as a price of
autonomy. This would also encourage such subsidiaries to be more individually
responsive to national market conditions, hence contributing to the overall
effectiveness in the global competitiveness of the respective organizations.
The US subsidiaries had indicated that their . parent organizations did not understand
the differences between the US and European markets. In comparison, the Japanese
parent organizations did not appear to understand the different cultural implications of
the impact on their Japanese managers of working in Western firms, preferring to
concentrate on the efficiency of reports rather than the understanding of the socio-
cultural norms abroad.
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TABLE 79
REPORTING FUNCTIONS BETWEEN !IQ AND THE UK
JAP	 US
I. Very formal
	 38%	 38%
2. At a very senior level only	 31%	 46%
No statistical significance
The comparisons between the American and Japanese firms as shown in Table 79
showed no significant differences. Reporting functions were normally on a fomilil
basis in line with targets and planning requirements. Day-to-day contacts were
maintained by telephone and facsimile. Japanese managers in the UK had to maintain
close contact with their superiors in Japan, conscious that they would have to fit into
the management hierarchy in Japan when they finished their spells abroad. Visits of
overseas managers to conference meetings in Japan on an annual basis were normal.
The Americans also had close contacts with their senior managers on a formal basis
and in periodic visits three to four times a year. With the larger organizations the
engineering, production, marketing and sales personnel reported an encouraging trend
in greater contacts with managers whose assigned geographical responsibilities
included the relevant functional or product areas.
The chi-square tests showed significant differences in respect of the reporting
functions. However as in Table 79 only 31% of the Japanese companies compared to
46% of the American finns saw the reporting functions carried out 'at a very senior
level only'. Both employed host country managers except at the very senior level in
the UK companies where home country nationals 'oversaw' the overall direction of the
business. The employment of indigenous managers helped to encourage the fostering
of a common organisational ethos within the business, although the Japanese firms
thought that they were good at promoting shared values. For example the Japmese
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view of harmony as a company trait was aided by employees identifying with the
company as an 'extended family'.
The identification with corporate objectives and shared values in the broad sense
seem to lead to homogeneity in Japan. This harmonious element was seen to be
breaking down with the increasing 'westernisation of Japanese managers and
company acquisitions abroad with the employment of more overseas nationals. The
tests for Hypothesis 11 showed that globally competitive firms encouraged closer
relationships with their subsidiaries
7.3 CONCLUSIONS
All the hypotheses 7-11 in the overseas research were found to be supported.
Hypothesis 7 examined the importance of effective marketing in the context of global
competitiveness. It was found that with regard to the importance of the UK market
and its membership of the European Community, there was no statistically significant
difference between American and Japanese firms. Both were keen to maintain the
location of their businesses in the United Kingdom partly because of the prospect of
access to the larger European market.
However marketing operations require instrumental support from headquarters. None
of the Japanese companies in contact with the American firms (with two exceptions)
had instigated or exerted pressure on their UK subsidiaries to impose cutbacks in
manpower and costs. The Japanese companies had a planned programme of
expansion by investing manufacturing facilities and sales, marketing and distribution
networks. In contrast, the lack of investment by the American headquarters
organisations was exacerbated by the redundancy and rationalisation programmes in
their UK subsidiaries. This had an adverse effect on their market shares as discussed
under hypothesis 1, where there was more confidence from Japanese subsidiaries over
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their goals for 'market domination' compared to American firms settling for
'maintenance' of market position. This implies that there were more Japanese firms
which placed importance on effective marketing in order to compete globally.
Hypothesis 8 focussed on exploring the ethnocentricity of the sampled companies and
its effect on their competitiveness overseas. All the companies had regarded their
own domestic markets as of the most importance including multinational firms like
IBM and Toshiba. The reasons given by American firms included America's size as
the largest single industrial market in the world and its world class technologies so
that any foreign firm wishing to become a truly global competitor would have to
compete successfully in the United States. The reasons given by Japanese firms was
the reliance placed on their research, design and development facilities, quality and
reliability of supplies and that Japanese companies already provided leading
consumer and industrial products for their Japanese customers. This meant that they
were already competing with other Japanese companies at home as well as abroad and
did not wish to see competition from foreign competitors increasing in an already
intensified Japanese market. As shown in Table 66, 54% of the Japanese firms and
only 23% of the American firms considered their organisations as globally oriented to
world market opportunities. This position was reversed with regard to overseas
strategies significantly modified for overseas opportunities where more American
firms (46%) than Japanese firms (23%) saw this as important to them. The findings
showed that there were more Japanese firms with geocentric ambitions than American
ones. Others were restricted by their ethnocentric orientation with regard to their own
domestic markets in Japan or the United States.
Hypothesis 9 looked at whether competitive firms have clearly focussed marketing
strategies to spot opportunities and develop them for global advantages. As Table 67
had shown, there were more Japanese than American companies in the sample which
saw themselves as very good at developing new emerging segments, stimulating
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primary demand, differentiating and positioning their products for specific segments.
The findings indicated that where market segmentation was concerned neither the
Japanese nor the Americans thought that they were better than the other at it. The
Japanese companies (69%) compared to the Americans (31%) thought that a
determined strategy backed by specific commitment in investment, development and
marketing, after identifying the right product lines or product innovations to pursue,
helped them to exploit the right national markets or the appropriate segments within
such markets. Their strategies in doing so helped them towards the achievement of
their sales growth, profitability and market share gains as shown in Table 68 and
greater confidence for the Japanese companies as seen in Table 69. Such strategies
meant that the emphasis on the effectiveness of their marketing did not lead them to
pursue retaliatory attacks on aggressors in their UK markets because of their
confidence and commitment to their marketing strategies and tactics.
Hypothesis 10 examined whether competitive firms were less dependent on price to
gain and sustain market entry by being strong market and technological innovators.
With regard to the marketing mix elements, there were some similarities in responses
with Japanese and American firms.
In their responses to the marketing mix elements, which were not developed by their
headquarters for world markets, over 60% .and over 70% in both samples of finis
stated that this was the case with 'product' and 'place respectively as shown in Table
71. On the modifications to suit the needs of the UK market shown in Table 72,
American firms (69%) saw this as highly important because of their emphasis on cost
efficiencies in operations. Like the American, Japanese firms saw promotion as a
variable factor which could easily be geared to suit national market needs. However
on price, Japanese reasons differed. The findings showed that Japanese firms were
politically sensitive on the issue of pricing in the UK market because of fears of heing
accused of dumping or unfairly undercutting the prices of indigenous UK producers.
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Japanese firms saw themselves as able to compete effectively on price because of
their claims to be more efficient in their production and distribution systems
compared to their western rivals.
As shown in Table 73, the mean responses indicated a need by American competitors
to match the Japanese in good distribution and sales. Hypothesis 9 was supported
because the strategies of successful Japanese and American companies were
emphasising quality such as in product design and advanced research (Table 74)
rather than in low prices to establish dominant market positions.
Hypothesis 11 looked at the relationships between the headquarters firms and their
subsidiaries to examine if the headquarters firms pursued greater scrutiny and
evaluation of their UK subsidiaries in order to encourage and assess their marketing
performances. There was satisfaction with management and worker relations in the
UK from all the Japanese organisations who had not experienced strikes or
redundancies in their UK firms. Not surprisingly where American headquarters firms
had influenced or instigated cutbacks in their UK plants, satisfaction with
management and worker relations was not as high. British managers were employed
in both American and Japanese firms except at the most senior positions of Managing
Director, Deputy Managing Director and Chairman. This suggested a need for
control at the very top as well as the need for cultural empathy from the viewpoint of
the headquarters firms. The Japanese headquarters firms stated that this situation
helped them in feedback and communication because the top managers of their UK
subsidiaries could communicate in both Japanese and English to their headquarters
and understood the chain of command and internal managerial system at
headquarters. American senior managers were seen to maintain the American identity
and conformity with American corporate strategy. Japanese and American responses
both showed a strong level of scrutiny on the performances of their subsidiaries and
their budgets. While more Japanese firms (63%) were prepared to give financial
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backing to their UK subsidiaries, as shown in Table 78, there were fewer American
firms (38%) able or prepared to do so. Both the Japanese and American headquarters
firms were willing to encourage their subsidiaries to be self-sufficient and to have
autonomy in their day-to-day operations, but the findings suggested that these were
seen within the confines of the formal corporate planning objectives and targets set.
This seemed to imply that the successful marketing performances of the UK
subsidiaries were part of the overall global strategies of their headquarters firms,
while those that were less successful were not able to obtain the financial instruments
or marketing support from their headquarters organisations.
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8.0 ABSTRACT 
The review of the literature and the discussion of the hypotheses established the main
tenets upon which the research investigation was to proceed. The research
investigation was centred around the personal interviews with senior managers in the
United Kingdom, the United States and Japan using the semi-structured
questionnaires. The field research was directed at generating responses so that the
validation of the hypotheses could be carried out. It is the conclusions of this research
which is presented in this chapter.
The conclusions from the prior research and the literature review pointed to strengths
in the Japanese corporate culture and marketing strategies which seemed to have
served Japanese firms well in competition with western firms. The research
conclusions in this chapter supported these views about the strengths of Japanese
business culture and marketing strategies. All the hypotheses except hypothesis 3 and
5 were supported.
The comparison with American and British firms highlighted the similarities and
differences between companies in the sample from the three nations. The similarities
were derived from the need to match and improve upon their competing products and
services in the marketplace. The differences were in their commitment to market
share, profitability and investment of resources, their marketing and technological
skills, and the orientations of headquarters towards their subsidiaries' markets. In
terms of the support from their headquarters, the Japanese subsidiaries in the UK were
found to have fared significantly better than their western competitors and were able
to build effectively upon their competitive advantages.
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the research structured around the similarities
and differences in the marketing strategies and corporate cultures of American,
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British and Japanese firms, and the recommendations to British firms seeking to
improve their marketing.
Corporate culture in the context of this research is taken to mean a company's
superordinate goals, systems and management style, the aspirations and skills of its
organisation and staff in providing good products and services, and the willingness
and ability to invest in its marketing operations to fulfil its marketing strategies.
Marketing strategies take into account the setting of marketing objectives, planning,
strategic focus and implementation by the use of marketing mix, segmenting and
positioning techniques in targeted markets. The conclusions centre on the
effectiveness of the marketing strategies of the sampled firms and the influences of
their corporate cultures which differentiate their approach to strategic thinking. This
is followed by recommendations to British firms seeking to emulate the successes of
the market leaders.
8.2 CONCLUSIONS 
The findings and summaries in chapters five and seven were supportive of the
findings in the prior research in chapter four that British competitors in the five UK
product-markets were losing market shares, profits and high technology market
segments to their Japanese competitors. The British performance in this thesis'
research when compared with those of the American subsidiaries was also poor. A
revealing assessment of their own company performances made by the managers in
all the responding firms showed that the majority of Japanese companies (80%)
compared with the minority of British and American companies (30% respectively)
considered their performances to be very successful.
In the analyses for hypothesis 1, although all the respondents similarly expected to see
market share much greater in the future, there was less ground for optimism with
British firms which saw their strategies for market share and sales designed towards
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averting decline, defending or maintaining their positions. All the Japanese and over
fifty percent of the American firms aimed for aggressive growth and market
domination. There were some British firms in the sample (20%) which were highly
competitive with the best of the British and American firms but they were in the
minority.
The orientations of western firms towards short-term sales and profits discussed in the
literature review e.g. Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak (1985) were supported in the
analyses for hypothesis I. The loss of market share to Japanese competitors focussed
British firms on averting decline for survival purposes, which in turn led to a sales
and not a marketing orientation with adverse implications for their remaining market
shares.
These implications can be seen in the analyses for hypothesis 2. The majority of
British firms (87%) found themselves serving the down and middle market segments.
The American firms held the belief that they were still at the forefront of technology
in the five product-markets e.g. ITT in its audio/hifi equipment, and could develop
significant new product groups. This meant that they wanted to concentrate their
strategies on serving the up-market segments despite the short-term orientations to
sales and profits in order to satisfy western shareholders and creditors. Japanese firms
saw their capabilities in opening up new markets (66%) and new product groups
(47%) as they had done in the ball bearings market.
The analyses for hypothesis 3 showed that in advanced research, product
differentiation, large-scale manufacturing and expanding markets, Japanese firms
consistently scored higher than their American or British competitors. There were
similarities with American firms in product design and large scale manufacturing e.g.
for machine tool technologies, but the American firms were able to hold their own in
product design (87%), process development and cost reduction capabilities (93%). So
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while Japanese firms were shown to be more successful at opening up new markets,
the competitive American firms were concentrating on the high technology market
niches in the hope of expanding their markets through new product applications.
Japanese firms' abilities to implement their marketing strategies successfully are
supported in the findings for hypotheses 3 and 4. The successes of the Japanese firms
in the five product-markets gave credence to their claims that they were able to
support their marketing strategies with investment in products and production
processes and effective marketing to carry through the benefits to their customers.
Examples can be seen in the photocopier and microwave oven markets where they
pioneered compact designs affordable to the mass market.
Their strategic focuses were directed in at least three specific ways:- 'stimulating
primary demand' with innovative products, competitive pricing and promotion;
'exploiting newly emerging market segments' by careful examination of new market
opportunities and investment required; and 'enhancing corporate reputation' through
high productivity, rigorous product standards such as their zero defect policy in
quality control.
Faced with Japanese strengths in these areas of their strategies, a minority of British
firms (34%) found themselves good at efficient sales and marketing in competition
with the. American firrns with their focus on cost reduction and innovation
maintained that they were good at efficient sales and marketing, but fared less well on
their abilities to stimulate primary demand (40%) or newly emerging market
segments (53%). The findings for hypotheses 3 and 4 therefore suggested that
Japanese firms in the sample possessed specific strengths in their marketing strategies
which the less competitive American and British firms did not have.
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Criticism of a western orientation towards long-term planning has been given by
some authors in the literature e.g. Hamel and Prahalad (1989). The Japanese firms
favoured short to medium-term planning to achieve flexibility in adapting to
environmental changes without undue adherence to long-term plans. Formalised long-
term planning were used by all the firms in the sample. The findings in hypothesis 5
indicated the importance of formal organizational and marketing planning with
periodic monthly or quarterly checks backed up by formal correspondence via faxes,
letters, informal use of telephone and personal contact in annual meetings with senior
overseas staff.
These procedures meant that the planning and implementation of marketing strategies
were subjected to formal planning checks. However in the case of the Japanese
companies, the emphasis on short to medium-term planning with regard to their
markets meant that management horizons were placed on the achievement of
marketing targets and profitability within three years. Managers were therefore not
constrained to achieve high profitability in the first two years of the plan but were
expected to achieve the basis for profitability by the third year. This has been
supported by Japanese headquarters' responses in the personal interviews. Monitoring
and reporting processes were intensive. This provides evidence of some transfer of
management styles to overseas subsidiaries in contrast to what Hamel and Prahalad
(1989) saw as the 'strategic strait-jacket' effects of long-term planning on western
corporate managers.
At the operations level, the Japanese subsidiaries outwardly display the indigenous
ethos of the country in which they operate because British operatives are responsible
to British managers who speak their own language. On the one hand, this makes
Japanese ownership and control acceptable to British employees. On the other hand,
the Japanese subsidiaries get the benefits of Japanese investment, quality control in
marketing techniques, strategic planning and manufacturing processes. The
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management style of Japanese subsidiaries is therefore heavily influenced by
Japanese business culture, its aspirations and its processes where markets are
concerned. Japanese managers in the UK have to return to Japan so that there is a
greater tendency to conform to Japanese headquarters demands. This view of the
Japanese management structure, style and systems is supported in the findings in
hypothesis 6. For example, the strong hierarchical distinctions in management
favoured by British and American companies (60% respectively) are less important to
Japanese companies.
Top-down and bottom-up communications and acceptance of ad-hoc job
specifications fitted the needs of Japanese firms because of the emphases on group
responsibilities, teamwork, loose supervision and encouragement of entrepreneurship.
These have encouraged cooperative attitudes and a high degree of acceptance of
management skills and expertise by employees. By taking account of the views of
their workforces during the development of their corporate plans, senior Japanese
managers in UK subsidiaries were able to achieve acceptance of Japanese
management styles and objectives.
This has created the realism of superordinate goals in their corporate mission
statements, an example of which is the enhancement of the well-being of employees,
customers and the world community at large "through lifting the quality standards of
their industries in the provision of products and services worldwide. Good
management worker relations were seen as very important to such efforts. The
assimilation of Japanese corporate culture has contributed to the differences between
the systems and marketing strategies of Japanese firms and their American and British
competitors. Satisfaction with UK management-worker relations was expressed by
all the Japanese headquarters firms but this was not the case with American
headquarters firms as demonstrated in hypothesis 11.
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The analyses in the UK research in Chapter five had shown that there were more
differences than similarities between American, British and Japanese subsidiaries in
their differential advantages and market strengths. The overseas research showed that
similarities existed between American and Japanese headquarters firms in large
organisational size and resources, market leadership, strengths in advanced research
and product innovation and global presence in world markets. These are exemplified
by IBM, Xerox, Eastman Kodak, ITT, Toshiba, Canon, Matushita and Sony. Both the
American and Japanese headquarters finns sought to build upon their presence in the
UK market, as supported in the fmdings for hypothesis 7. The UK with its political
stability, developed industrial commercial and financial infrastructures and its free
markets, close proximity to and membership of the European Economic Community
was considered a highly important market opportunity to both the American and
Japanese firms.
Protectionist sentiments were voiced in the interviews by American and Japanese
respondents who did not want to see more overseas competitors in their domestic
markets in the United States and Japan. With regard to their presence in overseas
markets, ethnocentrism was also a relevant factor for some. In the findings in
hypothesis 8, a majority of American firms (62%) regarded their overseas marketing
strategies as similar to those at home. Only 46% had significantly modified them for
overseas opportunities. A majority of Japanese firms (54%) compared to the
American firms (23%) regarded themselves as globally oriented American firms in
the sample, the findings for hypothesis 8 have shown that there were more American
compared to Japanese companies which displayed ethnocentric attitudes to their
overseas markets.
One explanation as to why American firms appeared more ethnocentric than their
Japanese rivals was provided by the companies themselves. Respondents in the
American subsidiaries did not hold to their headquarters' view of their UK markets as
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part of the larger European market. For example their headquarters firms saw
machine tool technologies and applications as crucial to the needs of all industrialised
Western European countries, but their UK subsidiaries saw it as important that their
headquarters firms should put priority on understanding the different requirements of
each national market in Europe.
US ethnocentric rather than the polycentric orientations tended invariably to influence
the perceptions of their subsidiaries in the British market. A stronger organisational
commitment by their parent organisations was urgently needed to fight off the
challenges posed by aggressive Japanese firms. These were reinforced by the ability
of Japanese firms to focus and evaluate managerial responsibilities on the overall
performance of their products with a mixture of continual formal and informal
feedback and information as shown in the findings for hypothesis 5. American firms
had placed a greater reliance on their divisional structures allocating responsibilities
across European subsidiaries with formal planning, controls and personal contacts.
The findings in hypothesis 8 supported those in hypothesis 9 where globally oriented
firms clearly wanted to focus their marketing strategies according to the differing
requirements of national market conditions.
However those American headquarters organisations which saw the USA as the
largest industrialised market in the world thought that global competition could be
more effectively assessed at their own doorstep. In contrast, Japanese organisations
saw the merits of assessing each European market as well as the United States as
having individual importance to their operations, backed by necessary strategic
investments to maintain access to markets, technologies and skills. There was a
fundamental difference in outlook because US firms had a large domestic market
while Japan had to look for external markets through the constraints of its
geographical size and limited natural resources.
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The strategic thinking in each country could be said to have started from a different
base with many principles and techniques on marketing pioneered by American
research and adapted in Japan and in the West. Japanese firms were able to use their
limited home market more effectively as a base for global expansion (Porter, 1991)
and to compete effectively with their American rivals, as demonstrated in the UK
audio/hifi, ball bearings, machine tools, microwave ovens and photocopier markets.
This was discussed in Chapter Three.
When asked to indicate the successes of their UK operations over the last five years
and the short to medium term expectations of their subsidiaries performances, the
findings for hypothesis 9 showed that American headquarters firms had far less
confidence than Japanese headquarters firms on market share growth or profitability.
The majority of Japanese firms saw themselves as very good in their marketing
strategies, developing new emerging segments (54%), product differentiation (54%)
segmentation and positioning (69%). Comparing these to the American responses,
the findings gave further support to those for hypotheses 3 and 4 on perceived
Japanese marketing capabilities.
The successful US firms in the sample did not accept that their Japanese competitors
were better at marketing planning or segmentation techniques than they were.
However Japanese firms did see effective marketing as one of their major strengths
since it incorporated greater attention to details in their marketing strategies and
mixes. There were no secrets or magic formulae in their prescriptions for their
successes. What was significant was that in a more ordered organisational and social
culture, Japanese headquarters firms could develop their individual recipes for 'long-
tennism'. This meant matching more effectively their products to their customers by
detailed and continual observance. They placed marketing applications at the heart of
their corporate functions and by building strong marketing and R & D relationships as
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opposed to the production orientation they proceeded to maintain and to crate new
competitive advantages. American headquarters firms stated that the US corporate
culture in which shareholders and financial institutions looked for short-term profit
maximisation did not encourage such long-termism'. In this respect, American
companies appear increasingly vulnerable to the market advances of Japanese firms.
Whilst the sample size was a limited one across five product sectors, the consistencies
in their responses showed that to be globally competitive, marketing strategies and
their implementation had to be clearly focussed and directed otherwise weaknesses
would be exploited by competitors looking to establish themselves quickly in specific
niches. As the findings in hypothesis 10 and 11 showed, the leaders in global markets
would have to display a greater degree of expertise and mix in their marketing and
technological strengths, and in their allocation of resources.
Such competitive firms sought to improve their technological capabilities in advanced
research, product design, and cost reduction with efficient use of resources. There
were strong American and Japanese firms, but more of the latter. American finis
rejected the notion of low prices as a means of market entry, fearing that it would be
counter-productive to their market image as product innovators. Japanese firms
rejected their Western competitors' claim about their aggressive pricing policies,
pointing to the incremental gains from their grobal network of activities in which they
moved production to low labour cost countries such as Thailand while keeping to
their assembly plants in Europe. Japanese firms were sensitive to competitors'
charges about their 'alleged' low pricing or dumping tactics as discussed in the
findings relevant to hypothesis 10.
While the American firms were not prepared to finance the retaliatory strategies of
their subsidiaries, they were prepared to discuss tactics with them. All the Japanese
Firms in contrast did not wish to be seen to be involved in such subsidiary retaliatory
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strategies, although only 31% reportedly did not have cash commitments to finance
such retaliation against competitors. These findings are supported for hypothesis 11
where 63% of the Japanese firms stated that they gave much financial backing and
investment to their UK subsidiaries. The scrutiny by Japanese headquarters firms of
market share was high (92%) compared to the American (62%). Japanese firms were
prepared to forgo short-term profitability (38%) and costs (46%) to support their
market shares. American firms (76%) rated costs as very important in their scrutiny
of their subsidiaries' activities.
The findings for hypothesis 11 showed that the contact between headquarters and
subsidiary levels for stimulating the interchange of ideas was high in marketing for
Japanese firms (85%) and lower on product innovation (46%). This contrasted with
the American firms at 38% and 54% respectively because the majority of Japanese
firms adhered to the marketing concept on cultivating customers' needs and being
close to the marketplace. Product design and advanced research however were still
kept in Japan as perogatives of Japanese headquarters firms. One reason given by the
Japanese respondents was that they were increasingly competing with other Japanese
firms in world markets so that research and development could be just as applicable at
home. This resolved the requirements of secrecy and control over new product
innovations, thus ensuring that these functions were held tightly within the Japanese
headquarters firms.
The UK remains an attractive market to American and Japanese companies. In the
March budget (1990), the Chancellor of the Exchequer when forecasting a current
account deficit of fl5bn made the point about high domestic demand and imports.
Indigenous British companies may therefore find it increasingly difficult to emulate
the market successes of their overseas competitors which are themselves seeking to
tighten and consolidate their market and technological leads in the United Kingdom.
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8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Indigenous British firms need to employ professional marketing skills to retain and
expand customer loyalties. This is because in highly competitive markets, resources
must be applied to the whole of the marketing mix however good the quality of their
products may be. British firms wishing to improve their marketing performances in
competition with American and Japanese competitors in the five product-markets
seemed weak in the application of marketing strategies and therefore there is a need to
develop their expertise and techniques. Both abroad and in the United Kingdom the
headquarters organisations and their subsidiary companies had access to bought-in
market research services from well known consultancy groups operating in diverse
national markets. So a method of obtaining expertise in marketing strategies by
British films finding it expensive to develop it in-house, would be to buy in external
consultancy services.
The American companies did not accept that the Japanese were more skilled at
marketing than they were, as many of the marketing concepts and techniques were
pioneered in the United States and developed in business schools there and in the
United Kingdom. However the Japanese firms saw themselves as competent at
marketing. It is significant that firms which consider themselves successful, attribute
their success in their strategies and market shares to a consolidated mix of
management and labour expertise in production and marketing with unremitting
attention to quality, innovation, cost effectiveness and investment. These are key
areas in which British firms can seek to make improvements.
Successful firms place importance on well conceived and effective marketing
strategies. Their market entry strategies are developed early on in the planning
process so that the required skills, foresight teamwork and implementation systems
can be developed for identified market opportunities. Thus British firms seeking to
improve their marketing need to develop their marketing planning and organisational
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functions so as to be capable of placing their desired products into effectively planned
and controlled marketing mixes.
This means that it is important for British firms to examine their marketing and
technical capabilities to assess the gaps between themselves and their major
competitors. The willingness and ability of senior management to develop marketing
expertise and to put resources into strategy formulation and implementation are
necessary in order to achieve corporate business goals. The research fmdings showed
that companies with perceived marketing strengths demonstrated strong customer
orientations with market share and profitability as important long-term objectives.
Those British firms which pursued short-term profit objectives oriented to the selling
concept therefore need to re-assess their strategic priorities.
To do this, British firms seeking to improve their marketing performances need also
to examine their hierarchical organisational structures with their commitment to
managerial status and privilege. This follows from the need to achieve corporate
consensus, synergy and entrepreneurial corporate culture. Less reliance on formal
hierarchical structures centred around functionally focussed specialisms may be
desirable as improved internal communications and multi-level contacts can foster the
interchange and stimulation of ideas in marketing and product innovation.
Membership of the corporate organisation should be seen to be important to
employees at all levels. British firms need to promote good management and labour
relations both at home and abroad. The satisfaction of Japanese headquarters with
their UK management and labour relations was high in contrast to the American and
British firms. For example, in the machine tool industry, the American headquarters
approach towards redundancies and rationalisation affected morale and the
entrepreneurial spirit of their UK subsidiaries. In contrast good employees were kept
and self development encouraged in Japanese machine tool firms. These are
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important considerations. If British firms lay off their managers and operatives in
times of recession, they may find it difficult to recruit those with the right
qualifications, experience and skills when they need to expand. This interrupts the
commitment to long-term objectives with adverse effects on marketing strategies. So
key employees should be kept and self-development encouraged to foster creativity.
The study of marketing strategies has included a broad perspective because the
research sample consists of medium sized firms and multinational corporations. The
latter have the capacities to develop higher levels of technological innovations for
world markets. Their geocentric orientations and their dispersal of production,
marketing and distribution activities to off-shore or foreign locations also facilitate
greater proximity to important markets, technologies and skills. In addition,
technological innovation is expensive and international alliances between firms of
different nationalities, as between British and Japanese companies, may therefore
increase. Opportunities therefore exist for British firms to supply large corporations
by targeting the latters' needs either in the revitalisation of established mature
industries or in the creation of new markets. At the same time, British firms need to
improve their reliability and product qualities to the standards required by customers
who have seen what the competition can provide. Therefore there is a need to devise
and implement effective marketing strategies to take account of the dynamic
conditions and sensitivities of the marketplace.
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APPENDIX I
EXAMPLES OF SECONDARY RESEARCH SOURCES
Directories checked for American Companies operating in the five UK product sectors. 
American International Traders Register, March 1974, (US Dept of Commerce)
Anglo-American Trade Directory, 1985.
C.S.O. Indexes to the standard Industrial Classification (UK), revised 1980
Directory of British Associations (for the names and addresses of trade associations), 1984.
Directory of Importers & Directory of Exporters, 1985.
Electronic Buyers Guide, 1985/1986.
Extel, UK, 1984.
Extel, USA, 1984.
Key Business Enterprises, 1985.
Kompass, 1985.
Standard and Poor, 1984.
Thomas Register of American Manufacturers, and
Thomas Register Catalogue File (for names under product listing), 1984.
Who Owns Whom (N. American), 1981.
American SIC Index Used From the Anglo-American Trade Directory 1985.
3541 Machine Tools
3562 Ball & Roller Bearings
3579 Office Machines
3631 Household Cooking equipment
3651 Radio and TV receiving sets
Since the British and the American standard Industrial Classifications differ, the above
American SIC product codes were used to locate company names in the American
directories. The American directories proved invaluable in obtaining the final list of names
of companies.
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APPENDIX 2
EXAMPLES OF PRIMARY RESEARCH SOURCES
Field research sources contacted to check names of American Companies operating in the
five UK product sectors.
The British Association of Print and copyshops (BAPC) London.
The Ball and Roller Bearing Manufacturers' Association (BRBMA), Birmingham Branch.
The Microwave Association, London.
The Association of Manufacturers of Domestic Electrical Appliances (AMDEA), London.
(This Association claimed most membership of microwave oven manufacturers and were
more helpful than the Microwave Association).
The Radio, Electrical and Television Retailers Association (RETRA), London
The British Radio, Electronic and Equipment Manufacturers' Association (BREEMA)
London.
The Machine Tool Trades Association (MTTA), London (This Association was very helpful
with information, advice and publications).
The Trade Officer, US Embassy, London.
Further cross-checking of company names were carried out on the telephone with: 
Rank Xerox
Toshiba
Canon
Yarnazaki-Mazak
ITT
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APPENDIX THREE
CLUSTERING BY STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION



6 Lemmings
	 (Bad; 5 British and 1 Japanese; hi-fi, microwaves and copiers.)
Mostly older, declining British companies.
	 Like the Mastercraftsmen, they
lack any marketing skills, but unlike them they have no advantages in product
quality. Sometimes pulled into new markets, but without marketing,
technological or innovative capabilities they make little progress. Their
products invariably become positioned at the lower-price, commodity end of
the market.
In contrasting the successful and unsuccessful groups four central differences
emerge:
1	 Professional Marketing. Good quality products are insufficient for success in
today's highly competitive markets. The Mastercraftsmen had these, but
lacked the professional marketing skills to exploit them via forceful
segmentation and positioning strategies. Both failing clusters were alike in an
apparent complete absence of professional marketing capabilities.
2	 Decisive entry strategies.
	
Successful companies enter markets or
technologies earlier because they identify clear opportunities. The
unsuccessful ones tend to be sucked in reluctantly in a vain attempt to defend
their businesses.
3 Commitment to market share. All the successes had ambitious share
obje€tives and developed broad product ranges and marketing policies to
achieve these goals over the longer run. An over-focus on short-term profits,
especially in the growth markets, invariably meant losing market position to
mor•!, aggressive competitors.
Organizational commitment. 	 Successful managements exhibited greater
professionalism and commitment. This appeared to De the result of
organizations structured around product/markets, a belief in group
involvement in strategy formulation and continuous, informal monitoring of
progress in the market.
Finally, the clusters show that strategies are not industry or nationality specific.
Successful professional, committed British companies are more likely to use the
strategies and structures of the better Japanese than their British compatriots.
Similarly, the weaker Japanese competitors have more in common with the weak
British ones than with the other Japanese subsidiaries.
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APPENDIX 4
DETAILS OF THE AMERICAN COMPANIES IN THE
SAMPLE
The UK Research: American Companies 
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Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study
Barden Corporation (UK) Ltd
Western Road
Bracknell
RG12 1LX
21.10.86
Precision Ball Bearings
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
The subsidiary was tentatively rooted in the UK in 1942 to help with the USA's
military effort, and firmly expanded in 1948 with the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
orders. Barden Corporation (UK) prides itself on its 'precision ball bearings because
of its need to nurture its defence and aerospace contracts
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 300+
Turnover
	 10m
UK market share:	 70% for precision ball bearings only
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Nlanufacturer in the UK / Distributor / ;Agent
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Company Name: 	 Bridgeport Machines Division of
Textron Ltd
Company Address	 PO Box 22
Forest Road
Leicester
LE5 OFJ
Date of Interview 	 10.10.86
Product Focus for the Study
	
Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
Bridgeport was founded in the UK in 1914 and was taken over in 1972. Textron
provided investment and built a new factory in Bridlington for expansion purposes.
Bridgeport licensed US products because of product compatibility with US parent.
There was a management buy-out in 1987 from Textron Inc.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):
	 950
Turnover (£): 	 50m+
UK market share:	 For its medium size machines for a small
specialised market niche, the market share was
estimated to be 80%, and small in others.
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Nianufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A)	 History 
Brown and Sharpe Ltd
Chapel Street
Melbourne
Derby
1.12.1986
Machine Tools
The company was set up by the US firm in the early 1960s to sell machine tools in the
UK and European markets. It underwent substantial restructuring by the loss of its
factory site at Plymouth, with redundancies. The present company has been trimmed
to a sales and service operation based at Melbourne in Derby, to carry the US parent's
products. It is also a distributor for two Japanese machine tool companies
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 189 (from 400)
Turnover (E):	 5% (falling)
UK market share:
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Vent
(up to 1985)
	
(from 1986)
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Company Name: 
	
Cincinnati Milacron
Company Address 
	
PO Box 505
Kingsbury Road
Birmingham
B24 OQU
Date of Interview	 27.3.1986
Product Focus for the Study	 Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
The only manufacturing plant apart from the USA is the UK subsidiary. Cincinnati
Milacron withdrew its manufacturing operations in West Germany in the early 1980s
to consolidate its manufacturing in the UK for its European markets as well.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 500
Turnover (£):	 40m +
UK market share:	 12%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor 1 Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A)	 History 
DeVlieg Machine Company Ltd
Leicester Road
Lutterworth
LE17 4HE
22.10.1986
Machine Tools
The company was established in the early 1950s when DeVlieg (USA) products in the
1950s. DeVlieg (UK) was originally owned by the Alfred Herbert Company.
Coventry and was taken over by DeVlieg (USA) in 1980. DeVlieg (UK) is also a
distributor for a Japanese Company for its Ok-umo line of machine tools.
B) Current Size 
Employee (numbers):	 220
Turnover (f.):	 9m
UK market share: 	 About 10% on its main product lines
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK I Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Ex-Cell-0 Corporation (England) Ltd
PO Box 133
Hastings Road
Leicester
LE5 OHT
10.11.1986
Machine Tools
Ex-Cell-0 was established in the UK in 1952. It manufactures a wide range of high
technology machine tools for the automotive and aerospace industries. Its parent
company, Textron eventually sold Ex-Cell-0 in 1987 (there was a management buy-
out).
A) History
B) Current Size 
Employee (numbers):	 350 +
Turnover (f):	 18m
UK market share:	 30% in special machine tools - borers
and transfers
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Compan_y Name: 	 George Kingsbury & Co (Machine
Tools) Ltd
Company Address 	 The Causeway
Staines
Middlesex
Tw18 3AQ
Date of Interview 	 4.11.1986
Product Focus for the Study	 Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
The George Kingsbury Company was set up in 1967. It had two machine tool plants
in the UK. The Staines plant assembled and carried out special purpose manufacture. The
Gosport plant manufactured cnc lathes and grinding machines. Although it was not a US
subsidiary and was still owned by the Kingsbury family, it had a strong US connection. It
manufactured under licence, drilling heads and bought technology from the US firm.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):
Turnover (i):
UK market share:
40 in Staines
60 in Gosport
3m +
The company would not give this
information but did say the market share
was small
C)	 Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
Gosport branch	 Staines branch
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Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Giddings and Lewis-Fraser Ltd
PO Box 6
Arbroath
Angus DD11 3U
Scotland
12.9.1986
cnc Machine Tools
A) History 
The company was established by Douglas Fraser in 1832 for the textile machinery
market. The first Fraser designed machine tool was produced in 1954. From an
association with Gidding and Lewis (USA) in August 1989. Fraser produced machine
tools. Both organizations were acquired by AMCA International in late 1982 and
known as Giddings and Lewis Fraser.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers): 	 370
Turnover (f.): 	 12m
UK market share: 50% in main product lines in the UK for
a specialised sector. Exports 60% of its
machine tools
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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EBM
The Science Park
Cambridge
21.8.1986
Plain paper photocopiers
Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A)	 History 
The UK photocopier division was very small in comparison to other IBM main
product divisions. IBM had not expanded the photocopier division since it was set up
in the 1970s. Its computer business was considered far more important.
Consequently from mid 1986 onwards, IBM appointed Nashua Copycat as its original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) and distributor, branding the IBM name.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers): 	 15
Turnover (f):	 3m
UK market share:	 5%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Nlanufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
up to 1986
	 from 1986
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Company Name: 
Company Address
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
ITT Consumer Products (UK)
Paycocke Road
Basildon
Essex
SS14 3DR
11.11.1986
Audio/hifi
The US parent company set up this UK subsidiary for the UK/Europe potential. In
the consumer market it is the only US subsidiary for audio/hill (excluding Motorola-
cars). Its products are considered by itself to be very upmarket and expensive. It
works through strong supplier relationships in the UK and works closely with its
retailers. It is stronger in the UK on televisions and videos than audio/hill. It has
been more successful with auclio/hifi products in Western Europe.
A) History 
B) Current Size 
Employee (numbers): 	 150
Turnover (#2):	 Not specifically given for audio/hifi. For
total ITT (UK) operations it was
approximately £50m
UK market share:	 This was given as very small by the
respondent for audio/hill products
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 	 Kodak Ltd
Company Address	 PO Box 66
Kodak House
Station Road
Hemel Hempstead
LIP1 1JU
Date of Interview 	 18.11.86
Product Focus for the Study
	 Plain Paper Photocopiers
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
Kodak's first factory was built in 1891 in Wealdstone, Middlesex, UK. The company
manufactured photographic films, papers and photographic chemicals. In 1980, it
launched its photocopier division for the UK and European markets.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 350 for photocopiers
Turnover (f):
	
24m
UK market share: 	 21% on high volume copiers
2 - 3% on medium volume copiers
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A)	 History 
Litton ( UK) Ltd
Mint House
6 Stanley Park Road
Wallington
Surrey
28.8.1986
Microwave Ovens
Litton regards itself as a technological and production pioneer in the USA for the
defence industry. The microwave oven division does not sit easily with its core
activities. The UK microwave oven subsidiary was set up in the 1950s. It had a
contract with a British firm to produce its microwave ovens int he UK but after 1987,
the UK subsidiary was to take on its own production. Litton is the only US subsidiary
producing microwave ovens in the UK.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 100 +
Turnover (L):	 14m
UK market share:	 4%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your compan_y's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name:	 Nashua Copycat Ltd
Company Address	 Cory House
The Ring
Bracknell
Berkshire
RG 12 lET
Date of Interview 
	
4.11.1986
Product Focus for the Study 	 Plain paper photocopiers
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
The company became a subsidiary of Nashua Copycat in New Hampshire USA in
1963. It is a major distributor for the parent company (with 13 subsidiaries and over
90 distributors worldwide). It is also a distributor and original equipment
manufacturer for IBM photocopiers.
B) Current Size 
Employee (numbers): 	 300
Turnover (i.):	 25m
UK market share: 	 9% (sliding from 12% in previous years)
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
The Torrington Company Ltd
Torrington Avenue
Coventry
CV4 9AE
23.12.1986
Roller and ball bearings
A) History 
The present company set up premises in Torrington Avenue, Coventry. It was
founded in 1985 as a needles bearings manufacturer like its parent company originally. It
went into needle and roller bearings production. It is the sole agent for NSK (Japan) ball
bearings in the UK.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 900
Turnover (E):	 25m
UK market share:	 over 12%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Nlanufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Hahn and Kolb (GB) LtdCompany Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A)	 1-listory 
Leicester Road
Rugby
CV21 1NY
7.3.1986
Machine Tools
Hahn and Kolb was established int he late 1960s. It has four divisions - measurement
and testing, Machine Tools, Robotics and Handling, and Cutting Tools. The product
range is mostly German and American. Although its parentage is German, it handles
a lot of American products and license American technology.
B) Current Size 
Employee (numbers): 	 125
Turnover (f):	 urn
UK market share:	 Over 20% in total for all of its divisions.
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
Barden Corporation (UK) Ltd
Western Road
Bracknell
RG12 1LX
21.10.86
Precision Ball Bearings
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
The subsidiary was tentatively rooted in the UK in 1942 to help with the USA's
military effort, and firmly expanded in 1948 with the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
orders. Barden Corporation (UK) prides itself on its 'precision' ball bearings because
of its need to nurture its defence and aerospace contracts
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 300+
Turnover (E):	 10m
UK market share:
	
70% for precision ball bearings only
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
270
Company Name: 
	
Bridgeport Machines Division of
Textron Ltd
Company Address 
	
PO Box 22
Forest Road
Leicester
LE5 OFJ
Date of Interview 
	
10.10.86
Product Focus for the Study	 Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
Bridgeport was founded in the UK in 1914 and was taken over in 1972. Textron
provided investment and built a new factory in Bridlington for expansion purposes.
Bridgeport licensed US products because of product compatibility with US parent.
There was a management buy-out in 1987 from Textron Inc.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers): 	 950
Turnover (f):	 50m+
UK market share:	 For its medium size machines for a small
specialised market niche, the market share was
estimated to be 80%, and small in others.
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Nlanufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
Company Address
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Brown and Sharpe Ltd
Chapel Street
Melbourne
Derby
1.12.1986
Machine Tools
A) Histoa
The company was set up by the US finn in the early 1960s to sell machine tools in the
UK and European markets. It underwent substantial restructuring by the loss of its
factory site at Plymouth, with redundancies. The present company has been trimmed
to a sales and service operation based at Melbourne in Derby, to carry the US parent's
products. It is also a distributor for two Japanese machine tool companies
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers): 	 189 (from 400)
Turnover (E):	 5% (falling)
UK market share:
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Nlatitilacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
(up to 1985)
	 (from 1986)
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Company Name: 
Company Address
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Cincinnati Milacron
PO Box 505
Kingsbury Road
Birmingham
B24 OQU
27.3.1986
Machine Tools
A) History
The only manufacturing plant apart from the USA is the UK subsidiary. Cincinnati
Milacron withdrew its manufacturing operations in West Germany in the early 1980s
to consolidate its manufacturing in the UK for its European markets as well.
B) Current Size 
Employee (numbers): 	 500
Turnover (f):	 40m +
UK market share:	 12%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 	 DeVlieg Machine Company Ltd
Company Address 	 Leicester Road
Lutterworth
LE17 4HE
Date of Interview 	 22.10.1986
Product Focus for the Study 	 Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
The company was established in the early 1950s when DeVlieg (USA) products in the
1950s. DeVlieg (UK) was originally owned by the Alfred Herbert Company,
Coventry and was taken over by DeVlieg (USA) in 1980. DeVlieg (UK) is also a
distributor for a Japanese Company for its Okumo line of machine tools.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 220
Turnover (f):	 9m
UK market share:	 About 10% on its main product lines
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 	 Ex-Cell-0 Corporation (England) Ltd
Company Address 	 PO Box 133
Hastings Road
Leicester
LE5 OHT
Date of Interview 	 10.11.1986
Product Focus for the Study 	 Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Ex-Cell-0 was established in the UK in 1952. It manufactures a wide range of high
technology machine tools for the automotive and aerospace industries. Its parent
company, Textron eventually sold Ex-Cell-0 in 1987 (there was a management buy-
out).
A) History 
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 350 +
Turnover (£):	 18m
UK market share:	 30% in special machine tools - borers
and transfers
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
275
Company Name: 	 George Kingsbury & Co (Machine
Tools) Ltd
Company Address	 The Causeway
Staines
Middlesex
TWI8 3AQ
Date of Interview 
	
4.11.1986
Product Focus for the Study	 Machine Tools
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
The George Kingsbury Company was set up in 1967. It had two machine tool plants
in the UK. The Staines plant assembled and carried out special purpose manufacture. The
Gosport plant manufactured cnc lathes and grinding machines. Although it was not a US
subsidiary and was still owned by the Kingsbury family, it had a strong US connection. It
manufactured under licence, drilling heads and bought technology from the US firm.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):
	 40 in Staines
60 in Gosport
Turnover (f):	 3m +
UK market share:	 The company would not give this
infonnation but did say the market share
was small
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
Gosport branch
	 Staines branch
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Company Name:
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Giddings and Lewis-Fraser Ltd
PO Box 6
Arbroath
Angus DD I I 3AU
Scotland
12.9.1986
cnc Machine Tools
A) History
The company was established by Douglas Fraser in 1832 for the textile machinery
market. The first Fraser designed machine tool was produced in 1954. From an
association with Gidding and Lewis (USA) in August 1989, Fraser produced machine
tools. Both organizations were acquired by AMCA international in late 1982 and
known as Giddings and Lewis Fraser.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):
	
370
Turnover (f.):	 I 2in
UK market share: 50% in main product lines in the UK for
a specialised sector. Exports 60% of its
machine tools
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 	 IBM
Company_Address.	 The Science Park
Cambridge
Date of Interview 	 21.8.1986
Product Focus for the Study	 Plain paper photocopiers
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
The UK photocopier division was very small in comparison to other IBM main
product divisions. IBM had not expanded the photocopier division since it was set up
in the 1970s. Its computer business was considered far more important.
Consequently from mid 1986 onwards, IBM appointed Nashua Copycat as its original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) and distributor, branding the IBM name.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 15
Turnover (f):	 3m
UK market share:	 5%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
up to 1986	 from 1986
278
Company Name: 
Company Address 
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
ITT Consumer Products (UK)
Paycocke Road
Basildon
Essex
SS14 3DR
11.11.1986
Audio/hifi
The US parent company set up this UK subsidiary for the UK/Europe potential. In
the consumer market it is the only US subsidiary for audio/hifi (excluding Motorola-
cars). Its products are considered by itself to be very upmarket and expensive. It
works through strong supplier relationships in the UK and works closely with its
retailers. It is stronger in the UK on televisions and videos than audio/hifi. It has
been more successful with audio/hifi products in Western Europe.
A) History 
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 150
Turnover (f):	 Not specifically given for audio/hifi. For
total ITT (UK) operations it was
approximately £50m
UK market share:
	
This was given as very small by the
respondent for audio/hifi products
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name:	 Kodak Ltd
Company Address	 PO Box 66
Kodak House
Station Road
Hemel Hempstead
HP1 1JU
Date of Interview	 18.11.86
Product Focus for the Study	 Plain Paper Photocopiers
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
Kodak's first factory was built in 1891 in Wealdstone, Middlesex, UK. The company
manufactured photographic films, papers and photographic chemicals. In 1980, it
launched its photocopier division for the UK and European markets.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 350 for photocopiers
Turnover (f):	 24m
UK market share:	 21% on high volume copiers
2 - 3% on medium volume copiers
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Nlanufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 
	
Litton (UK) Ltd
Company Address
	 Mint House
6 Stanley Park Road
Wallington
Surrey
Date of Interview 
	
28.8.1986
Product Focus for the Study	 Microwave Ovens
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History 
Litton regards itself as a technological and production pioneer in the USA for the
defence industry. The microwave oven division does not sit easily with its core
activities. The UK microwave oven subsidiary was set up in the 1950s. It had a
contract with a British firm to produce its microwave ovens int he UK but after 1987,
the UK subsidiary was to take on its own production. Litton is the only US subsidiary
producing microwave ovens in the UK.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):
	
100 +
Turnover (f):	 14m
UK market share:	 4%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Nlanulacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name: 	 Nashua Copycat Ltd
Company Address	 Cory House
The Ring
Bracknell
Berkshire
RG 12 1ET
Date of Interview 	 4.11.1986
Product Focus for the Study	 Plain paper photocopiers
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
The company became a subsidiary of Nashua Copycat in New Hampshire USA in
1963. It is a major distributor for the parent company (with 13 subsidiaries and over
90 distributors worldwide). It is also a distributor and original equipment
manufacturer for IBM photocopiers.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers): 	 300
Turnover (f):	 25m
UK market share:	 9% (sliding from 12% in previous years)
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name:
Company Address
Date of Interview 
Product Focus for the Study
The Torrington Company Ltd
Torrington Avenue
Coventry
CV4 9AE
23.12.1986
Roller and ball bearings
COMPANY BACKGROUND
A) History
The present company set up premises in Torrington Avenue, Coventry. It was
founded in 1985 as a needles bearings manufacturer like its parent company originally. It
went into needle and roller bearings production. It is the sole agent for NSK (Japan) ball
bearings in the UK.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers):	 900
Turnover (f):	 25m
UK market share:	 over 12%
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your coinpany's main
activity
Nlanufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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Company Name:
Company Address
Date of Interview
Product Focus for the Study 
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Hahn and Kolb (GB) Ltd
Leicester Road
Rugby
CV21 1NY
7.3.1986
Machine Tools
A) History -
Hahn and Kolb was established int he late 1960s. It has four divisions - measurement
and testing, Machine Tools, Robotics and Handling, and Cutting Tools. The product
range is mostly German and American. Although its parentage is German, it handles
a lot of American products and license American technology.
B) Current Size
Employee (numbers): 	 125
Turnover (f): 	 llm
UK market share:	 Over 20% in total for all of its divisions.
C) Product/Company Base - which of the following best describes your company's main
activity 
Manufacturer in the UK / Distributor / Agent
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APPENDIX FIVE
THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE UK RESEARCH
AMERICAN MARKETING STRATEGIES IN TEE UK
COMPANY:
PRODUCT FOCUS FOR STUDY:
INTERVIEWEE AND RESPONSIBILITY:
1. COMPANY BACKGOUND
A. History
3 Current Size
Employees nos.
?roduct Rangel
Focus producb significance and background
7'.-.rnover E
•••• • ?roduct/companv base - which of the following test describes your
company 's main activity:
Xanufacturer	 U.K.,Cistributcr/Agent
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PERFORMANCE (Focus Product).
How successful has it been over last five years? Criteria used to
measure success?
A. Sales and market shares:
B. Total profitability and margin (NPMBT):
C. Do you consider your company performance to be
2	 3	 4	 3Very unsuccessful 	  Very successful
COMME:NTS:
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3. MARKET MARACTERISTICS 
A. Why did you enter this market?
B. What made the market attractive?
C. What key trends do you see in the market?
D. What has been the a pproximate growth rate per annum of the
total market over the last five years'?
% p.a.(Units)
% p.a.(E)
E. What do you expect the growth to be over the next five years ?
% p.a.(Units)
% p.a.()
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4. STRArEuIC OBJECTIVES 
A. Were specific marketing objectives established? What were they?
3. Which best describes the sales/market share strategy? Cy>
Prevent decline
Defensive
Maintain position
Aggressive growth
Dominate market
Other
C. How important to the company was achieving a good current profit
performance?
3Unimportant 
	
 Crucial
COMMENTS:
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5. STRATEGIC FOCU.7:,
A. Which of the following best describes your focus? (Rare. each
in order of importance; 1 = most important) (Rate: at all;
5 = Exactly)
1	 ,L	 1	 4 i.	 Expand market by converting non-users of product.
./ t iii- Expand market by creating new uses for the product.'
	
l
L 3
	 •r-	 
iii- Enter newly emerging market segments.
	
I	 1	 1 
iv.	 Enter segments already established in the market 	 /	 2. 1
but are new to our company.
L	 -i	 (n
v. Increasing usage rate of product. 	 1	 1 
/	 A 2
vi. Winning share by beating competition. 	 1	 1	 i
a	 t.	 .1--
	
Vii...	 Focus on cost reduction and improved productivity. 	 1	 1 
3. Would you primArily describe your focus as:
PUSH Winning dealer support for them to promote product for you
to find consumer.
PULL Primarily appealing direct to consumer to create preference. L.__
BOTH Focus is equally balanced between Push and pull.	 L--
6. STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES
How much does the following describe the strategy of your business
(1 = not at all, 5 = exactly)
A.	 Identifies key factors for success in the industry
and then inject resources where the compan y
 can 	
3
gain strategic advantages over competitors.
B. Concentrates upon products that are not competing
directly with key competitors.
C. Concentrates upon those areas where your business
has an advantage over competitors.
D. Uses unconventional strategies that upset the
established order in the industry.
3
-a
E. Develops significant new product groups.
F. Opens up new markets. I	 .1
7. CUSTOMER TARGETS 
A. What do you perceive are the main segments in the market?
B. What bases do you use for segmentation?
C. Which segments do you appeal to?
For Consumer Goods Companies 
A.	 Are your consumers socially/economically
1	 23	 4Down-Market	
	  -.3o-Market
Average
3.	 Are they relatively
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
	
Late Adopters /	  4 ImaginativeAverage
C.	 Is your particular brand seen more as meeting
Luxury
	 Basic Product1	 3	 4	 5Needs
	 A NeedsAverage
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8. COMPETITOR TARGETS 
A. Is your major competitor 	 British
Japanese
Other (State) 2
B. Would you say competition in your market is, (relative to ther markets)
Mostly	 Highly1	 2	 3	 4	 5Weak or	 k Aggressive
AverageUaggressive
C. Is your major competitor concern with their strategies in terms of
(rank)
Low Prices
Product Quality
Product Innovation
Advertising / Promotion
Good Distribution
Powerful Salesforce
Other (State)
No better
Than Others
Markedly
Superior
9. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
What is your USP or competitive advantage?
A. The major benefit(s) we. offer thetarget customer segment is(are):
B. Our major advantage over competition is:
C. The customer benefit is along a dimension which they regard as:
Unimportant	 4 5' Very ImportantAverage
D. Our advantage over competition is seen by customers
E. What are the advantages of your major competitor? How im portant to
the customers are they?
10. TECHNOLOGY/MARKET STRATEGIES
How much do the following describe your company? (Rater 1 =Not at all,
5 = Describes it best)
A. When do you enter markets:
First to market (initiates market)
Early to market (early in the PLC)
Established markets (during the growth
stage)
Late to market (late growth or early
majority)
B. R & D Capability 
Strong on advanced research capability
Flexible and responsive R & D capability
Strong product design capability
Strong process development and cost
reduction capability
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
C.	 Manufacturing Emphasis 
Pilot and medium scale manufacturing
Agile at setting up medium scale runs
Flexible with medium scale runs
Efficient with medium large-scale
production
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 1	 1
D.	 Marketing Strengths 
Good at stimulating primary demand
Good at product differentiations
Good at segmentation and positioning
Good at efficient sales and marketing
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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E. Financial Resources
Easy access to risk capital
Makes rapid commitment to medium and large
quantities of capital
Access to capital in moderate auantities
Access to caPtial in large quantities
F. Organisation 
Emphasis on flexibility over efficiency
and encouraging risk taking
Combines flexibility and efficiency
Combines flexibility and control
Combines efficiency and control
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411 • Very ImportantVery Unimportant
Much Broader
Very Important
Much Newer
Very Important
11. MARKETING MIX
How important are the following in understanding your Performance? How
do they compare to competitors?
A. PRODUCT POLICY
PRODUCT QUALITY
(i.e. reliability, maintenance-free)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Significantly 	 I	 I	 I	 k More Superior
Inferior
PRODUCT RANGE
1 5
Much Narrower
2 5
Very Unimportant
INNOVATION
1 2
Much Older
2 5
Very Unimportant ;
PRODUCT PERFORMANCE
(i.e. Out- put, Efficiency)
Much Worse
	
;	 4 Much setter
Very Unimportant 1
	
2	
Very Important
PRODUCT DESIGN
(aesthetics, ergonomics)
1 4	 3Significantly	 L	 I 	 More Superior
Inferior
5Very Unimportant 1	 2	 3 Very Important
S.	 PRICING POLICY
i. Consumer Prices
Much Lower
Very Unimportant
Much Higher
3	 i	 p Very Important
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41 3Much Lower Much Higher
ii. 'Extras! offered free or at low cost
Much Smaller
	 34 5 
Much Greater
Very Unimportant 11 Very Important4	 5
C. ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION 
ADVERTISING
2	 3	 4	 5Much Lower	 Much_Higher
4	 5Very Unimportant 1. 2 Very Important
PROMOTION
Very Unimportant 1 2 3 4
	
Very Important
2
PERSONAL SELLING
Much Lower	 1	 2	 3	  Much Higher
2	 4	 5Very Unimportant
	 ; Very Important
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Much Less 3	
*
Much More
D.	 DISTRIBUTION
DISTRIBUTION EFFECTIVENESS GENERALLY
Much Worse Much Better
3 *Very Unimportant Very Important
DEALER % MARGINS
i a 3 (F SMuch Lower 1 1 A i	 Much Higher
Very Unimportant /l
3
‘f• .5 Very Important
I
DEALER TOTAL PROFIT
Much Lower 1
1 3 4 SI	 Much Higher
Very Unimportant I
u 1 4 ."
i	 Very Important
DEALER SUPPORT
i
Much 7mal1er	 1	 I Much Greater
3Very Unimportant i	 Very Important
SHORTER DISTRIBUTION CHAIN EMPLOYED
3
7er7 Thimoortant	 7ery Important
Descrlbe any uniaue characteristics of distribution system.
a	 At-
! Much Better
Very Important
E. SERVICE AND OTHER CUSTOMER SUPPORT
SERVICE
Much Worse 4	 3 Much Better
Very Unimportant
CUSTOMER SUPPORT
Much Worse
Very Unimportant
COMMENTS:
	
 Very Important
a	 1-
HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE MARKETING MIX ELEMENTS  TO ACHIEVEING OVERALL
SALES/MARKET GOALS (Rank: I = most important)
PRODUCT
PRICING
ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION
DISTRIBUTION
SERVICE/CUSTOMER SUPPORT
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PROBLEMS/OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FUTURE 
In the future, do you expect to see:
MARKET SHARE
i	 .
...	
,
.a	
.4-	 C
Much Smaller 
	 1	 1	 i	
I Much Greater
PROFITIBILITY
1	 1
Much Weaker	 I Much StrongerL	
THIS PRODUCT/MARKET FOR THE COMPANY IS EXPECTED TO BE STRATEGICALLY
1	 3
Less Important 	 I 	 More Important
FOCUS
More on Costs
:USTOMER TARGETS
2	 a
1
▪ 
More on Value
▪ 3
Very Different 1	
1 Very Similar
to Now
COMPETITION
Much Weaker
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Much Worse
?RODUCT VALITY
Less Important
a	 3	 4-	 5-
	 I Much Tougher
3
Much Better
%
1	 	 More Important
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(all instructions for
marketing action have
to come from Head/
Parent office in U.SA
and action taken only
after approval from
the Latter)
(make "big" decisions as
well as on-the-soot "small"
decisions without the need
for prior, consultation and
full approval from Head/
Parent office inu-Sii )
For WSA	 Subsidiary Only:
Relationship
 between U.K. Branch and Parent Comnanv 
i. Who, in your comapny (U.K.) is/are responsible for reporting to
the parent company in user ? How Frequently?
Comments and Explain:
LI.	 Are you responsible for making your own decisions in relation to
the marketing and distribution of your product Cs)? (Rate along
the following scale).
3	 4	
.S"Not Responsible	 1I 	 Solely Responsible
E.	 Autcmomv and Encouragement of Entrepreneurship:
How would you describe the degree of su pervision and control within
your company?
1	 3Very Close/Tight i 	
• 
Very Loose
Your Company believe in supporting and encouraging entrepreneurshin.
Not At All )
▪
Very Strongly
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14.	 STAFF
A. TRAIN/
i. Does Your company regard staff training as
aVery Unimportant 	 1 L 	1 Very Important
How much do the following describe the type of training provided
a.
b.
to staff. (1 = very little, 5 = very much)
Early, on-the-job training a 9-
Training in selected jobs specific
to one function only (i.e. sales 	 i
engineers get sales training only)
I 3
1 a 3 *.
c.
d.
Broad, all round training 	 I i I
Training takes Place externally sr
e. Internal training is conducted
4 Jr
f. Constant training of employees who 3
are moving higher up the promotionall	
ladder
7- Retraining staff when job reauirements 3	 S7
change
3. SOCIALIZAT/ON OF MANAGERIAL STAFF
How many times do you interview potential recruits for
managerial positions?
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Which best describes the typical starting job of incoming
aspiring managers?
(1 = very little, 5 = exactly)
a. Bottom "line" jobs (e.g. production 	 1	 3	 4
line/making or selling parts; new
product introductions; hands-dirty
 jobs)
b. "Staff" jobs (e.g. in "home" office,
or headquarters, planning, market research,
management systems) 3	 tt-
C. TIME WITH COMPANY
i(a).
	
What is the company's policy on "life-time employment"?
i(b).	 How important is it for your company to provide long term job
security to employees in your company?
a 3	 Y
Very Unimportant 	 1 	 Crucial
When recruiting new meanie for the commany, is there any
creference in terms of their age?
What is the aoe/group preferred?
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Would you describe top management of your company as being
composed of:	 (rate 1 = very little; 5 = mainly)
a. People recruited to the job
from outside
b. People who have climbed up the
promotional ladder and reached
the top that way
I	 a	 3	 tt
1	 I 	I
a	 3	 4 s
I 
15. SKILLS 
A. HOMOGENEITY 
Your managerial staff consist primarily of:
a 3i. People, all of whom have a ir i .1 People from a wide
similar background	 range of backgrounds
1
ii. People trained to do
only their own job well in
the company
D-
'People who have received4 
a broad, general trainin
in the company
1iii. People who have all gone
through identical training
in the company
3 4- 4r
1	 1People who have
undergone different
training in the company
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Markedly Inferior Markedly Superior
,Informality is the norm
(no agenda, no minutes,
meetings, get-togethers
coffee-?; intense free-
flowing)
Too executive meetings
	 1	 -
are regular
a 3
,Top management - employees
down the line contact is
regular
3. DISTINCTIVE SKILLS OF KEY INDIVIDUALS OR COMPANY
1.	 What would you regard as the distinctive skill(s) or ability(ies)
of key individuals in your company or of your comnany as a whole?
How does (do) it (they) compare to competition?
STYLE
A. DISTINCTIVE STYLE OF TOP EXECUTIVE
How much do the following describe the way your company is run.
a. Senior Management communicate/
exchange/receive information
through formal channels
(meetings with proper agendas
in writing, formal presenta-
tions, polite comments; fear
of the Chairman/President)
Tom executive meetings are
rare
To management - employees
down the line contact is
infrequent
(Direct communications 	 (Direct communications
between top executive and
	 between .... are regular)
down the line people are
infrequent)
306
Sales calls made by salesmen
Sales or customer calls made by to p executives
Professionals/too executives visiting customers/
dealers/user sites
Customers/dealers invited into the company
Top management - employee
contact is formal
(weekly/monthly inspections,
floor visits by plant
manager always in a suit)
e.	 Information is never :,brought
down to and shares with
field staff/shoo floor/down
the line employees
3
I t  1Too management -
employee contact is
informal (a lot of
wandering around,
management making on
the s pot decisions,
answering queries and
complaints, 'plain
talking' to employees
visit stores/factory
floors
I	 ,A	 1	 't	 ;
1	 1	 1	 'Information is frequently
brought down to and
shared with field staff/
shop
 floor/down the line
employees
Group resoonsibilities or
teamwork is rare
, Group responsibilities
or team work is common
CONTACT WITH CUSTOMERS/DEALERS 
i.	 How important to your company is customer/dealer contact?
	
/	 4	 3
	
Unimportant I	 I 
	 Very important
If customer contact exists, would you reaard i= as bein g maintained on:
Short-term transient
	 ,1 1 -4-	 lona-term continuina
basis	 basis
;;;.	 Which of the following best describes the way in which customer/dealer
contact is made? (Rate: = Not at all; 3 = mainly)
Other:
1 1 , r. s"
1 3
1...
S-
! 1
/ .1 3 t.i.. s-
1 I
-A. 3
I. ..T
[ I
'4-
With little customer
narticipation
	
 Always in conjunction with
customers or users
Very high
(Encourages mistakes,
don't believe in
nunishing those making
mistakes in the course
of exploration and
experimentation)
3
Very low
(Demand nunishment for a
mistake, no matter how small,
invisible, or useful)
C. INNOVATION AND EXPERIMENTATION
i.	 Do you encourage middle managers to innovate in the market?
i 4 .	 How much encouragement is there?
-2	 3	 4-
Very little
1	 I t A lot
In comparison to competition, do you try things out
(testing, experiment)?
Much less	 Much more
iv. Are tests/experiments (prototyre testing, pricing testing, consumer
nanels, etc) conducted?
v.	 Do you think your company's tolerance of mistaic es or failures is
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417. SYSTEMS
A. PLANNING
i.• Which of the following best describes the t ype of Planning
undertaken?
	
(1 = not at all; 5 = exactly
1 -) 3 4 5
Formal long-term plans.(e.g. 5 year plans) 1
Formal medium to short-term plans 1-, 3 i 5i
1 2 3
Explicit but informal statements of goals I
No formal plans 1i_
2
1 2 3 4 5Other L 1 ;
ii.	 In terms of "planning" and "action" how would you describe your
company?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5Planning is the	 1 J Action is the
most important	 most .1=Ortcui
3.	 CONTROL
i.	 Do you employ control procedures?
What control procedures do you employ to ensure that marketing
plans/objectives are being acheived? (Rate im portance 1 = very
unimportant; 5 very important)
a.	 Periodical (monthly, quaterl y , etc.)
Formal assessment of profitability of
products, markets, terriories and
channels of distribution
b.	 Provisions made to examine and validate
periodically various marketing costs
Specifying many rules and variables
1 4
which have to be measured and filed,
the measurements providing a guide to
action.
d.	 Informal, regular communications in the
1firm ensures nothing gets far out of
line
e.	 Other formal procedures
COMMENTS:
C.
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1 3
C. INFORMATION
i. What marketing intelligence systems do you employ?
Marketing information is moved round the company primarily
through
Formal, proceduralised
reports (i.e. written
reports, ink on paper
formats, computer print
outs)
4	 5
	  Informal routinized
formats (i.e. verbally
meetings)
D. NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT (NPD)
i. How would you describe the system for NPD in your company?
i	 ,	 3	 (..	 ...-....
a.	 New product ideas are ,	 1	 1 New product ideas can
gathered or generated	 emerge from any source
and screened by a formal 	 within the company
NPD department
b. Concept research and
business analysis seldom
takes place prior to
investing in new idea
C.	 There is little Product 3
and/or market testing
before launching a new
product
3	 4-
, A lot of concept researci
and business analysis
takes place before
investing in the new ide,
3
, Product and/or market
testing are always done
before launching a new
product
18. SUPER-ORDINATE GOALS/SHARED VALUES 
A.	 Besidesgoals like profits, achieving sales, growth, market share,
etc., what other values or goals are considered very im portant to
you and your company?
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Very
 low Very high
3. How important are the above goals/values.	 (Rank if there are more
than one goal/value states above: 1 = most im portant; 5 = least importan
Value/Goal	 Rankina
Would you describe personnel's understanding of, and commitment to,
the business objectives/strategies and values of the company as:
APPENDIX SIX
THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE OVERSEAS RESEARCH
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COMPANY:
INTERVIEWEE AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
1. COUNTRY IMPORTANCE 
A. How important is the UK market to your corporate success?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
unimportant 	  crucial
B. Which countries are considered more important than the UK as potential
markets for your products?
Please comment:
C. Do you see the UK as a country for significent investment or
disinvestment in the short to medium-term period?
Please comment:
D. Has rationalisation and redundancies been carried out in the UK
operation over the last five years by the Japanese parent company?
Please comment:
E. Are you satisfied with management - workers relations in the UK?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Dissatisfied 	
 Very satisfied
F. How important is the contact between the Japanese and the UK
Management in stimulating the interchange of ideas on:
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
a) Marketing	 Unimportant 	  Very important
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
b) Product Innovation	
	  Very important
Unimportant
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2. CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
How does the UK subsidiary fit into the overall coporate organisation
of the USA company and its worldwide operations?
Chart/Diagram:
Comments:
3. MARKRTING OBJECTIVES 
What are your marketing objectives for your United Kingdom subsidiary?
Please comment: 	
4. EIBED2/11da
A. How successful has the UK operation been over the last five years.
(Please rate:	 1 = poor performance; 5 = very successful)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
A. Sales growth
1 2 3 4	 5
B. Profitability
1 2 3 4	 5
C. Market Share Gains
B. In the short to medium term future, do you expect to see:
MARKET SHARE
Much Smaller
PROFITABILITY
Much Weaker
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
	
 Much Greater
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
	  Much stronger
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(Please state country of origin)
6. COMPETITORS' TARGETS 
A. Who are your major competitors?
In the UK: 	
In Japan:
B. Would you say that your major competitors in the UK are:
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Mostly weak/unaggressive 
	
Comments:
Highly aggressive?
C. Please rank in order of importance the strategies that your major
competitor in the UK is concerned with. (1 = most important, 6 =
least important).
Low prices
Product quality
Product innovation 
	
	
7. TECHNOLOGY/MARKPT STRATEGIES
	
Advertising/Promotion
Good distribution
Powerful salesforce
Which best describes your company overall?
(Please rate: 1 = Not at all, 5 = Describes it best)
A. When do you enter markets
1 2 3 4 5
First to market (initiatives market)
Early to market (early in the PLC) 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Established markets (during the growth
stage)
1 2 3 4 5
Late to market (late growth or early
majority)
B. R & D Capability 
1 2 3 4 5
Strong on advanced research capability
1 2 3 4 5
Flexible and responsive R & D
capability
1 2 3 4 5
Strong product design capability
1 2 3 4 5
Strong process development and cost
reduction capability
316
C.	 Marketing	 trengths 
1 2 3 4 5
Good at stimulating primary demand
1 2 3 4 5
Good at product differentiations
1 2 3 4 5
Good at segmentation and positioning
8. ElaKIE=BEMIAlfr,E_ECE=
Which budget and performance criteria are most scrutinized by your Head
Office in your UK subsidiary?
Not at all Very much so
Profitability 1 2 3 4 5
Costs 1 2 3 4 5
Market share 1 2 3 4 5
Cash flow 1 2 3 4 5
9. FINANCIAL BACKING 
Does the Japanese parent give financial backing/investment to its UK
subsidiary when needed?
Little financial backing 1 	 2	 3	 4	 5 Much financial backing
(Expects subsidiary to be self-sufficient)
10. CONTACT BETWEEN JAPANESE AND UK COMPANIES 
A. Who is the UK Managing Director directly responsible to, in the
Japanese company?
Please comment.
B. Who else in the Japanese company is responsible for receiving and
monitoring feedback from the UK subsidiary?
Please comment: 	
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C. How would you describe the reporting functions between Japan and
the UK?
Informal 1	 2	 3	 4	 5 Very Formal
Multi-level 1	 2	 3	 4	 5 At a very senior level
only
D. What is the usual method of contact?
Please Comment: 	
E. How frequently?
Please comment: 	
11. ORIENTATIONS 
A. How much do the following describe the parent company's philosophy
on overseas markets?
a. It is primarily hone
country oriented -
strategies are
developed primarily
for the hone market; Not at
	 Exactly
overseas business is all
regarded as a	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
useful bonus
b. Overseas markets have
become crucial because
of their sales and/or
growth potential
relative to the hone
country - strategies
are developed along
lines similar to those
for the hone market with
slight modifications to
meet overseas
	 Not 'at
opportunities	 all 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
c. Overseas markets have
become crucial because
of their sales and/or
growth potential
relative to the hone
country - the company
will significantly	 Not at
modify strategies to
	 all
better meet overseas
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
opportunities
Exactly
Exactly
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1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
d. It is globally oriented
- strategies are
developed specifically
for world narketing
opportunities; the
home country does not
have special priority
B. The product sold in the U.K./overseas market is:
a. subject to no naJor	 Not at
modifications from that
	 all
marketed in the hone narket. 1
b. nodified to a great extent
to meet specific U.K./host
	 1
country needs.
Exactly
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
c. a standardised product for
the regional or world wide 1
	 2	 3	 4	 5
market.
C. Pronctional (advertising and sales promotion) policies pursued in
the U.K./overseas narket are:
a. similar to those	 Not at
employed in the hone	 all 1	 2 3	 4	 5
market.
b. established independently
by the company/overseas
subsidiary to suit
specific U.K./host country 1	 2 3	 4	 5
market conditions.
Exactly
c. developed by headquarters
and standarised for the
region or world market.
d. Overseas markets have
becone crucial because
of their sales and/or
growth potential
relative to the hone
country - the company
will significantly 	 Hot at
modify strategies 	 all
to better meet oversaes 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
opportunities
e. It is globally oriented
- strategies are developed
specifically for world
marketing opportunities;
the hone country does
not have special priority
	 1 2	 3	 4	 5
Exactly
319
D. Distribution approaches employed in the U.K./overseas market are:
a. based on those	 Jot at
traditionally	 all
used in the hone narket. 	 1 2	 3	 4	 5
b. specifically adapted to
U.K./host country market
	 1 2	 3	 4	 5
conditions.
c. standardised for the region 1 	 2 3	 4	 5
or world market.
E. Product prices in the U.K./overseas market are:
Exactly
a. similar, to those charged
in the hone market
(i.e. calculated
on the sane basis as that
charged in the hone market
with the addition of overseas
distribution costs and so	 Not at
forth)	 all
1 2
	
3
b. much higher than those
charged in the hone market. 1 2	 3
c. much lower than those charged
in the hone market.	 1 2	 3
Exactly
4 5
4 5
4 5
d. What are the reasons for charging higher or lower prices in the
overseas markets?
F. How well do the following statements describe your
company's/overseas subsidiary's position?
a. Strategically and financially it is treated as an
independent company.
Not at all 1 2	 3	 4	 5 Very much so
b. It is not treated as an independent company, and its
strategy and financial performance are set and evaluated in
terns of the following company's total global objectives.
Not at all	 1 2	 3	 4	 5 Very much so
G. Vhen an aggressive competitor (particularly foreign competitor)
launches an attack in the U.I./overseas narket, to what extent
is Headquarters involved in launching a retaliatory attack on the
'aggressor' in terns of:
a. establishing retaliatory strategy and tactics to be deployed?
Not at all 1 2	 3	 4	 5 To a Great
	  extent.
b. committing cash to finance the retaliatory action?
Not at all 1 2
	 3	 4	 5 To a Great
	  extent
H. Are retaliatory attacks on an aggressive foreign competitor in
the U.K./overseas narket:
a. always launched in the U.K./overseas nnrket itself?
Not at all 1 2
	 3	 4	 5 Very much so
b. launched in the aggressive foreign competitor's own hone
market or other national market where the aggressor is
particularly vulnerable?
Not at all 1 2	 3	 4	 5 Very Mich so
I. How much do the following describe the composition of the top
management of your company/the overseas subsidiary? Rate along
the scales given.
a. Hone country nationals
Not at all 1 2	 3	 4 5 Very much
b. Local or host country nationals
Not at all 1 2	 3	 4	 5 Very much
c. People from the region or any country in the world
Not at all 1	 2	 3	 4	 5 Very Mich
THANK MU.
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